SPECIAL SUMMER BOOKS ISSUE

THE NEW REPUBLIC

TWO CHEERS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
Cass R. Sunstein

THREE CHEERS FOR ALLY McBEAL
Sarah Blustain



THE BETRAYAL

WHAT THE PEDOPHILIA SCANDAL MEANS FOR CATHOLICS
Michael Sean Winters

WHAT IT MEANS FOR NON-CATHOLICS
Peter Beinart

#BXBKDML ********5-DIGIT 94301
#TNR000006817l/5#78 05JAN04 3241
RON K UNZ 548
555 BRYANT ST # 371 P4
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

18

MAY 6, 2002

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is America's very best health care nonprofit?

Check the evidence:



1. *U.S. News & World Report*, "America's Best Hospitals," 23 July, 2001.
2. *Modern Healthcare*, "Improving Care Through Integration," January 7, 2002.
3. *Health Affairs*, "Health Plan Characteristics and Consumers' Assessments of Quality," March/April 2001. (See www.NonProfitHealthCare.org for abstract)

Look at U.S. News & World Report's list of America's Best Hospitals.[1] All are nonprofit. 100%. See the leading consumer magazine's list of the highest ranked HMOs. 19 out of the top 20 are nonprofit. And 96 out of the top 100 integrated health networks.[2]

Then, a major study found that nonprofit health care plans are much better at customer service and access to care.[3]

Unfortunately, investment bankers seem to want health care to be investor-owned. Would that improve health care in America … or just bring millions in fees to those investment bankers?

Hear the other side: visit www.NonProfitHealthCare.org

ALLIANCE FOR
ADVANCING
NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE℠

Alliance of Catholic Health Care · International Union, UAW · The Cambridge Alliance · Univera Healthcare
COPIC Companies of Colorado · Michigan Health & Hospital Association · Loretto · Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama* · Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Nebraska* · Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan*
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas* · Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts* · Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois*
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota* · Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma* · Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utica–Watertown*
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana* · Blue Cross Blue Shield of the Rochester Area* · Blue Cross Blue Shield of Central New York*
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Mexico*

*Independent Licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association.
Join the Alliance. See website for details: www.NonProfitHealthCare.org.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts

WASHINGTON, D.C.
MAY 6, 2002
ISSUE 4,555

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
MARTIN PERETZ

EDITOR
PETER BEINART
Literary Editor
LEON WIESELTIER
Executive Editor
CHRISTOPHER ORR
Senior Editors
JONATHAN CHAIT, JONATHAN COHN, MICHELLE COTTLE, GREGG EASTERBROOK, JOHN B. JUDIS, LAWRENCE F. KAPLAN, ANDREW SULLIVAN, JAMES WOOD
Legal Affairs JEFFREY ROSEN
Managing Editor SARAH BLUSTAIN
Assistant Managing Editor AMANDA FAZZONE
Films: STANLEY KAUFFMANN
Theater: ROBERT BRUSTEIN
Poetry: GLYN MAXWELL
Art: JED PERL
Architecture: MARTIN FILLER
Dance: JENNIFER HOMANS
The New Republic Online
Assistant Editor CHRISTIANE CULHANE
Director of Business Operations ARI GERSEN
New Republic Books (BASIC BOOKS)
VANESSA MOBLEY
Contributing Editors
FOUAD AJAMI, AKHIL REED AMAR, PETER BERKOWITZ, PAUL BERMAN, JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, NATHAN GLAZER, ANTHONY GRAFTON, DAVID GRANN, YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI, ANN HULBERT, TONY JUDT, ROBERT KAGAN, MICHAEL KINSLEY, CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, JEREMY MCCARTER, JOHN MCWHORTER, SHERWIN B. NULAND, DAVID RIEFF, MAGGIE SCARF, LEE SIEGEL, RONALD STEEL, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARGARET TALBOT, E.V. THAW, HELEN VENDLER, MICHAEL WALZER, SEAN WILENTZ, ALAN WOLFE, ROBERT WRIGHT
Contributing Artists
JACK COUGHLIN, VINT LAWRENCE, DAVID SCHORR, TOM TOLES
Associate Editors
MICHAEL CROWLEY, FRANKLIN FOER, RYAN LIZZA, JASON ZENGERLE
Associate Literary Editor RUTH FRANKLIN
Art Direction JOE HEROUN, CHRISTINE CAR/H2C
Editorial-Corporate Coordinator
LAURA E. OBOLENSKY
Production and Information-Technology Director
BRUCE STEINKE
Production Manager HENRY RIGGS
Assistant Editors
NOAM SCHEIBER, SARAH WILDMAN, SACHA ZIMMERMAN
Assistant to the Editor ASHER PRICE
Assistant Literary Editor ERIN LEIB
Assistant Poetry Editor MELANIE REHAK
Reporter-Researchers
JULIE BOSMAN, REIHAN SALAM

PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER
STEPHANIE SANDBERG
General Manager
ANNETTE POCICA
ADVERTISING SALES AND MARKETING
Associate Publisher
ELISE ADDE
Director of Advertising, West
JOAN STAPLETON TOOLEY
Director of Advertising, New York
TIM WHITING
Publishing Consultant DAVID NUDO
Marketing Director SARA ZYSKOWSKI
Associate Advertising Manager MEREDITH COSSA
Marketing Assistant ETHAN FISCHER
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
Acting Controller MICHAEL SOUTHALL
Accounting Assistant VANESSA WILSON
Business Assistant SARA DEGRAEVE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Chairman ROGER HERTOG
MARTIN PERETZ
MICHAEL STEINHARDT

4 **CORRESPONDENCE** Does the United States still care about democracy in China? &c.

6 **PETER BEINART** TRB: LIMITS What not to say about the pedophilia scandal.

9 **THE EDITORS** GREEN BLUES Democrats, the environment, and the truth.

10 **NOTEBOOK** Why Karen left, &c.

12 **MICHAEL CROWLEY** ON THE HILL: DEATH AND TAXES The problem that won't go away.

14 **FRANKLIN FOER** WELFARE STATE Alaska, America's experiment in socialism.

16 **PHIL GUNSON** CARACAS DISPATCH: RECOUP One coup didn't topple Chávez. Two did.

19 **JOHN B. JUDIS** OPTION PLAY Bush unlearns the lessons of Enron.

21 **NOAM SCHEIBER** NUMBERS GAME For decades the Council of Economic Advisers commanded respect for its independent economic analysis. Then George W. came along.

24 **MICHAEL SEAN WINTERS** THE BETRAYAL Behind the Catholic Church's pedophilia scandal lies an intellectual and moral abdication that cannot be set right by mere resignations or changes in policy. The leaders of the American Catholic Church will have to rediscover something they lost long ago: the courage to speak the truth.

28 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ON FILMS: MATTERS OF CERTAINTY *Frailty* puts a genial face on evil; *Changing Lanes* is a little underdone.

SUMMER BOOKS

32 **CASS R. SUNSTEIN** KEEPING UP WITH THE CLONESES *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* by Francis Fukuyama

42 **ELISABETH LASCH-QUINN** LOVING AND LEAVING Our culture has come to regard divorce as a temporary nuisance, not a seismic shock. A consideration of the history of marriage in the United States suggests a different approach.

54 **PATRICK J. GEARY** THE WEREWOLF AND US *Metamorphosis and Identity* by Caroline Walker Bynum

56 **APRIL BERNARD** POEM *Fort-Da*

58 **SARAH BLUSTAIN** WASHINGTON DIARIST: SPLIT END

On the Cover: Illustration by MICHAEL WOLOSCHINOW
On the Web: www.thenewrepublic.com

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Vol. 226, Number 17, Issue 4,555, May 6, 2002. (Printed in the United States on April 24, 2002.) Published weekly (except for combined issues dated March 4 & 11, April 1 & 8, July 8 & 15, August 5 & 12, August 19 & 26, September 9 & 16, December 2 & 9, and December 30, 2002 & January 6, 2003) at 1331 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005. Telephone (202) 508-4444. For advertising inquiries, please contact Meredith Cossa at (202) 508-4485 or our NY sales office at (212) 465-8447. Yearly subscriptions, $59.94; foreign, $99.94 (U.S. funds); Canada, $79.94 (U.S. funds). Back issues, $4.00 (includes postage & handling). **© 2002 by The New Republic, LLC.** **(ISSN 0028-6583). Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Rights and permissions: fax (202) 628-9383. Indexed in Readers' Guide, Media Review Digest. Microform, Canadian Periodical Index, CD-ROM, issue, and article copies are available through University Microfilms Intnl., 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Telephone 1-800-521-0600. Postmaster: Send changes of address to The New Republic, P.O. Box 37298, Boone, IA 50037-0298. Member, Audit Bureau of Circulations. Unsolicited manuscripts can be returned only if accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope (e-mail address: tnr@aol.com). For subscription inquiries or problems call 1-800-827-1289 or visit our website at www.thenewrepublic.com.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Great wall

TO THE EDITORS:

John Berlau's attack on the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a disgraceful melange of inaccuracy, bias, and distortion ("Asia Minor," March 25). His thesis is that NED denied funding to projects by Chinese dissidents to maintain support for its budget by the Clinton administration, which favored a policy of engagement with the Chinese government. Because the thesis is utterly false, Berlau must omit or distort anything that contradicts it. Thus, he makes no mention of the labor program of the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center, NED's second-largest China program, because the AFL-CIO is part of the anti-engagement coalition. He also omits any mention of the many grants NED makes to Tibetan groups allied with the Dalai Lama, who is hardly a regime favorite. He fails to note that NED's funding of dissident and human rights programs—far from being cut back as he implies—has been sharply increased during the last year, with further significant increases planned for the period immediately ahead.

His distortions are no less significant and are far too numerous to fully explain here. He writes that NED's support of Human Rights in China (HRIC) doesn't contradict his thesis because it's not a "threat" to the Chinese regime and doesn't advocate democracy. Why, then, did the Chinese government describe HRIC as "an organization that plans to overthrow the Chinese government," when it blocked the group's bid for consultative status on the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)? Berlau writes that we refused to help the Chinese Democratic Party (CDP) because we didn't give a grant to a particular exile group, ignoring the fact that NED has provided humanitarian aid to CDP members and to the families of imprisoned CDP members. When our program officer Louisa Coan Greve noted the reluctance of foundations with offices in China to help dissidents for fear of being expelled, her point was not to rationalize a retreat from cutting-edge programs, as Berlau implies, but rather to explain that we don't have an office there precisely so that we can remain cutting-edge.

Berlau's account of the discontinuation of the grant to the China Strategic Institute (CSI) fails to note that the reason the group received no grant in 1998 was that it had broken up over an internal dispute. It then received a small grant the following year, after it was reconstituted, to help a group in China pushing for competitive



elections at the township—not just the village—level.

The group in China continued to receive NED support through the International Republican Institute (IRI), which ironically is a part of the "reform" program to which Berlau most strongly objects. The idea that the Internet news service VIP Reference failed to complete the necessary paperwork to receive a grant approved by NED's board because the NED program officer "created bureaucratic hurdles" is laughable. Hundreds of grantees yearly do what is necessary to conform with federal grant guidelines. Are we to be blamed for this particular failure, presumably because of our kowtow to the Clinton administration's China policy? Be serious.

NED is obligated to ensure accountability in the use of public funds. Its standard in judging the worthiness of a proposal is not the degree of anti-Beijing vehemence of a group or individual but the prospect that the activity proposed will have an impact in fostering democracy. In that regard, NED has adopted a two-pronged strategy toward China, supporting exile-based human rights and free media programs as well as in-country programs promoting reform. All the specialists we have consulted endorse this strategy, and to my knowledge NED is the only democracy-promotion institution that takes such an integrated approach. It is the reason NED's China program enjoys such broad support, not simply from the past and present administrations, but also from Congress, which is the body responsible for appropriating NED's budget. Berlau objects to the second prong of our approach, which he has every right to do. But he has no right to say that we are abandoning the first or to distort the integrity and character of our whole program.

CARL GERSHMAN
President
National Endowment for Democracy
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITORS:

As a proud occasional contributor to TNR's Books & the Arts section (I recently reviewed Ian Buruma's study of Chinese dissidents), I am sorry to see TNR's politics section practicing the kind of "If there's smoke, there's fire" journalism previously associated with David Brock and *The American Spectator*. Berlau's article does nothing to advance American assistance to Chinese democracy by using circumstantial evidence and reaching speculative conclusions about the China programs of NED. People turned down for grants are generally poor sources of information on the goals and procedures of foundations, and NED's respect for the privacy of its applicants must restrain it from responding to their denunciations in kind. From my own contacts with NED's China program since its inception, I can testify that the Endowment works hard to nurture and finance programs that are responsibly managed and effective in promoting Chinese democratization.

ANDREW J. NATHAN
Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science
Columbia University
New York, New York

TO THE EDITORS:

No one from TNR ever contacted us to inquire about the nature of our democracy work before it was described in "Asia Minor." Fortunately for Berlau, the essence of democracy is free speech and freedom of the press, even when it is inaccurate. HRIC has actively promoted democratic change in China as part of our core mission for over 13 years. As a result, myself and Executive Director Xiao Qiang are in involuntary exile, unable to return to China. The Beijing government has consistently attempted to block HRIC participation at the United Nations and other international venues.

The editors welcome correspondence from readers. Please address letters to Correspondence, TNR, 1331 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20005 (letters may also be sent electronically to tnr@aol.com). All letters should include the writer's full name, address, and telephone number; be typed double-spaced; and be fewer than 200 words. Letters may be edited for space and clarity. Please do not send letters via fax.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To us, this does not indicate that China is somehow less disturbed by our work than that of others, as Berlau's piece implies.

As for our position on the Olympics, we do not believe that China's hosting of the Games is the key issue. Rather we view the Olympics as an opportunity to raise awareness of serious human rights abuses in a climate of greater international scrutiny and, therefore, as an opportunity for significant improvement.

LIU QING
President
Human Rights in China
New York, New York

JOHN BERLAU REPLIES:
Carl Gershman attributes to me an argument that I never made. I never maintained that NED stopped supporting aggressive pro-democracy groups simply to keep the Clinton administration from cutting the Endowment's funding. I don't claim to know all the reasons why the shift occurred at NED. What is clear is that after former President Bill Clinton spoke of a "strategic partnership" with China in late 1997, NED moved away from funding democratic opposition to Beijing and toward cooperative engagement projects with the regime. And nothing in any of the letters refutes this point.

Indeed, Gershman's main complaint seems to be that I didn't give NED a pat on the back because it has not yet *totally* abandoned the funding of China's democratic opponents. Gershman calls the projects of the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center NED's second-largest China program. But according to its most recent annual report, NED still gave almost three times as much—more than $1 million in 2000—to its first-largest program, which is to aid, through the IRI, the Beijing dictatorship in implementing its dubious "village committee elections" in the countryside.

Gershman also claims NED has provided humanitarian aid to members of the underground CDP. These specific grants are not listed in any of NED's three most recent annual reports. When I contacted the Endowment, its spokeswoman, told me that it had given a total of $10,000 to $20,000 in support since 1998, but that it could not identify the recipients for fear of reprisal by the Chinese government. This explanation sounds plausible, but Free China Movement leader Shengde Lian, who says he maintains extensive contact with CDP leaders in China, has never heard of any members or their families getting this money. "We don't know the people, if they ever existed," he says.

That NED may be planning further cuts is not my speculation, but the advice of NED's China consultant, Anne Thurston, who urged the Endowment in an internal memorandum to "begin planning a phaseout of some exile-based programs" and shift the money to cooperative projects with China like the village elections. While Gershman promises "significant increases" in funding for dissidents next year, he tellingly never repudiates Thurston's long-term recommendations.

Andrew Nathan writes that my sources aren't credible simply because they've had their funding requests rejected by NED. But many of my sources are heroes of the Chinese democracy movement and have even been honored by the Endowment in the past. That Wei Jingsheng could not get any grants after NED bestowed on him its annual Democracy Award is very significant.

On the issue of NED's dispute with VIP Reference, I presented both sides and gave NED a fair say. NED may have been justified in not awarding a grant to VIP founder Richard Long; but it was certainly not justified in its misleading fiscal maneuvers that made many in Congress and the human rights community believe that it had. NED should never have listed VIP as a grant recipient in its annual report and congressional testimony until the grant was awarded. And after the Endowment did that, NED officials ignored their responsibility to correct the record once they decided, for whatever reason, not to give VIP any money.

On its website, HRIC describes its mission as "advocating effective implementation of China's domestic laws and practices in compliance with international human rights obligations." This is a laudable goal, as I stated in my article, but it is not the same as pushing for democracy. HRIC should not be the only type of exile group NED substantially funds. The Endowment needs to put pressure on the Chinese government by supporting dissident groups that can circumvent the dictatorship's tight grip on information and help organize factions, such as laborers, to demand democratic reforms.

When I was writing my story, NED never communicated to me that CSI had "broken up" before the Endowment could award the group a grant in 1998, as Gershman now claims. If this claim had been made then, I would have reported it. Wu Xuecan still maintains that the group did not close its doors until late 2000, after it was shut off from any funding from NED. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB

FROM WASHINGTON

Limits

EVER SINCE IT broke four months ago, commentators have called the pedophilia scandal a cultural challenge for the American Catholic Church. But it is also a cultural challenge for the American opinion industry—for the network of columnists, TV pundits, and editorial writers who frame the scandal in the public mind. It is a cultural challenge because they have so little to say.

At first glance, the dynamics of the Church pedophilia cover-up feel familiar: Mid-level officials abused their authority; their superiors, fearing embarrassment, protected them, immeasurably compounding the offense; those superiors responded to initial press reports by stonewalling and denigrating the accusers; but then, when the revelations grew overwhelming, they belatedly opted for full disclosure and public apologies. Presented with this apparently familiar script, the commentariat has settled into its familiar role. As with Enron, Gary Condit, and Monica Lewinsky, it has focused on two main questions: "Who should take the blame?" and "What lesson is to be drawn?"

The problem in the Church pedophilia scandal is that the opinion industry can't answer either of those questions because, in a deep sense, they are none of its business. *The Boston Globe* and *The Boston Herald* have called on Bernard Cardinal Law to resign. But you can't declare someone unfit for their post without having an opinion about the requirements of the post. And you can't have an opinion about the requirements of the post without having an opinion about the mission of the institution as a whole. Newspapers can call on a politician to resign because they have legitimate opinions about the purpose of the government in which he or she serves. They can demand that a cardinal who shields pedophile priests go to jail because they have legitimate opinions about criminal justice. But they can't legitimately call on a cardinal to resign because they can't have a legitimate opinion about the purpose of the Catholic Church. You can't weigh Law's cover-up of pedophilia against his work serving the poor, or opposing abortion, or bestowing the sacraments, or espousing the gospel, without making a judgment about the relative value of those endeavors, and that judgment is inescapably theological. It is a judgment about the best way to incarnate the revelation of Jesus Christ—and that's not a judgment for *The Boston Globe*.

The *Globe* has tried to evade this authority problem by citing polls showing that a majority of Boston Catholics want Law to resign. But that just compounds the confusion by imposing a democratic methodology onto a nondemocratic institution. If a majority of Representative Jim Traficant's constituents want him to resign, their opinion might legitimately guide the *Globe*—because Traficant serves at the pleasure of his constituents. But cardinals are not elected by their parishioners; they serve at the pleasure of the pope. Implying that a cardinal should resign because a majority of his parishioners want him to does not let the *Globe* avoid a judgment on the mission of the Catholic Church; it is a profound—and radical—judgment in and of itself.

The second question—"What lesson is to be drawn?"—is only slightly more conducive to public debate. The genuine public policy issues at play in the Church pedophilia crisis are fairly uncontroversial. Newspapers have rightly demanded that pedophile priests be prosecuted to the full extent of the law—but there's no real disagreement about that. There is a narrower debate about exempting clergy from laws that require people who work with children to report accusations of child abuse. But even here, there is a wide consensus that such laws must be repealed—as Massachusetts and New York are in the process of doing.

The real "What lesson is to be drawn?" question concerns the nature of the priesthood. The right has used the scandal to make familiar arguments about the depravity of gay sexuality and the permissive culture of the 1960s. The left has used the scandal to make familiar arguments about the need for sexual openness and female equality.

But treating the pedophilia scandal as another battle in the culture war doesn't make sense—because the culture war is about competing visions of American society. The "What lesson is to be drawn?" question in the pedophilia scandal is about competing visions of the Catholic Church. Combatants in the culture war can base their arguments on the Constitution, the American political tradition, or universal morality. But a position on the celibacy of priests must be based on the traditions of the Church. In arguing one point or another, commentators on the pedophilia scandal frequently make sociological arguments—for instance, that if you defrocked all gay priests, you would face a grave manpower problem. But in this debate, you can't divorce sociology from theology—there's no point in having enough priests if you think they're violating the religious tradition they're ordained to uphold.

This is not to say that the media shouldn't report on the pedophilia scandal. Only secular newspapers have the resources to uncover what pedophile priests and their superiors did. And although the Church may want that information kept private, newspapers rightly operate on the assumption that the more information the public has, the better. Moreover, given the enormous role that newspapers and television play in our society, it's perfectly appropriate for them to serve as vehicles for a discussion among American Catholics about how to respond to the scandal. (To allow Catholics a space to respond to the scandal is not to imply—as the *Globe*'s editorial did—that the Church's response to it should be determined by a vote of the faithful.)

There's nothing wrong with Catholic thinkers writing or talking—as Catholics—about their vision of the Church. (Michael Sean Winters does exactly that on page 24.) But the media should be clear about what it's doing: It's facilitating an essentially private debate within one religious community. In debates over government policy—say affirmative action or abortion—it's dangerous to imply that some people's opinions are more valid by virtue of their identity. But in this case, it's dangerous not to—because non-Catholics don't have a legitimate role in determining the character of the Catholic Church.

And that's why the pedophilia scandal represents a cultural challenge to the opinion industry. The punditocracy's premise is that everybody is entitled to an opinion about everything; we take polls seriously even when most of the respondents know virtually nothing about the topic. Overall, that's probably a good thing: Better an uninformed but open debate than an educated but closed one. But there are some topics on which everyone's opinion isn't equally valid because, if they were, communities would lose their autonomy—and, ultimately, some part of their freedom. What is my opinion about how the American Catholic Church should respond to the pedophilia scandal that engulfs it today? My opinion is that my opinion really doesn't matter at all.

PETER BEINART

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

©2002, Fannie Mae. All rights reserved. The house logo is a registered mark of Fannie Mae.

At Fannie Mae, our job is to lower costs to save home buyers money.

At Fannie Mae, our main purpose is to lower the cost of homeownership so that more families can experience the joy and pride of having homes of their own.

That's been our goal for over 30 years. And our work is paying off. We help lenders offer mortgages to home buyers that save them as much as $30,000 over the life of a 30-year, fixed-rate conventional loan.

You see, at Fannie Mae, everything we do is in the pursuit of one *goal — making the American Dream an affordable dream.*

FannieMae
www.fanniemae.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHAT ISRAEL MEANS TO ME

"America and Israel share a special bond. Our relationship is unique among all nations. Like America, Israel is a strong democracy, a symbol of freedom, and an oasis of liberty, a home to the oppressed and persecuted."
BILL CLINTON

"In Israel, free men and women are every day demonstrating the power of courage and faith. Back in 1948 when Israel was founded, pundits claimed the new country could never survive. Today, no one questions that Israel is a land of stability and democracy in a region of tyranny and unrest."
RONALD REAGAN



"My commitment to the security and future of Israel is based upon basic morality as well as enlightened self-interest. Our role in supporting Israel honors our own heritage."
GERALD R. FORD

"Israel was not created in order to disappear —Israel will endure and flourish. It is the child of hope and home of the brave. It can neither be broken by adversity nor demoralized by success. It carries the shield of democracy and it honors the sword of freedom."
JOHN F. KENNEDY

"I had faith in Israel before it was established, I have faith in it now. I believe it has a glorious future before it— not just another sovereign nation, but as an embodiment of the great ideals of our civilization."
HARRY S. TRUMAN



"We will stand up for our friends in the world. And one of the most important friends is the State of Israel. My administration will be steadfast in supporting Israel against terrorism and violence, and in seeking the peace for which all Israelis pray."
GEORGE W. BUSH

"For more than 40 years, the United States and Israel have enjoyed a friendship built on mutual respect and commitment to democratic principles. Our continuing search for peace in the Middle East begins with a recognition that the ties uniting our two countries can never be broken."
GEORGE BUSH



"The survival of Israel is not just a political issue, it is a moral imperative. That is my deeply held belief and it is the belief that is shared by the vast majority of the American people. . . . A strong secure Israel is not just in Israel's interest. It's in the interest of the United States and in the interest of the entire free world."
JIMMY CARTER



"Americans admire a people who can scratch a desert and produce a garden. The Israelis have shown qualities that Americans identify with: guts, patriotism, idealism, a passion for freedom. I have seen it. I know. I believe that."
RICHARD M. NIXON

"Our society is illuminated by the spiritual insights of the Hebrew prophets. America and Israel have a common love of human freedom, and they have a common faith in a democratic way of life."
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

"Our forces saved the remnant of the Jewish people of Europe for a new life and a new hope in the reborn land of Israel. Along with all men of good will, I salute the young state and wish it well."
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

As Israel marks its 54th birthday, we celebrate the country's special place in the hearts of Americans and in the hearts of America's Presidents. In every Administration, the President has spoken eloquently of the importance of a secure Israel to America's vital national interests.

The American Jewish Committee

Harold Tanner
President

David A. Harris
Executive Director

Gershon Kekst
Chair, Ad Campaign

165 East 56 Street, New York, NY 10022-2746 **www.ajc.org**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Green Blues

IN AN APRIL 19 *New York Times* photo, John Kerry and Paul Wellstone high-five as if they've just won the Super Bowl; various staffers and environmental lobbyists look on, clapping. The victory party was to celebrate last week's defeat of the Bush administration's plan for exploratory oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). The defeat was happy news for Kerry's presidential prospects, for green fund-raising, and for Democratic political positioning in the 2002 congressional campaign. But it was bad news for the nation.

On Earth Day this year, it's worth reflecting on the symbiotic, and increasingly pernicious, interaction between the environmental movement and the Democratic Party. The former has grown so adept at raising money by warning of imminent environmental catastrophe that it is losing all sense of proportion; and the latter, eager for environmentalist votes and financial support, has been all too happy to go along.

To listen to the Democrats—particularly those running for president—is to learn that the environment is in bad shape today and, with the smallest push, could be in disastrous shape tomorrow. In his much-noted Earth Day speech, for example, Al Gore warned, "There's a movement afoot by polluters ... to dismantle America's capacity to limit the releases of dangerous waste products and poisonous emissions, threatening to take us back to the days when America's rivers and lakes were dying, when skylines were some days not visible because of the smog, and when toxic waste threatened so many communities." Fortunately, this alarm is a false one. All forms of pollution in the United States—air, water, and toxic materials—have been declining for decades. Boston Harbor and the Hudson River, along with many other long-polluted bodies of water, show steadily improved quality. Los Angeles has set so many consecutive annual records for air cleanliness that smog has nearly vanished as a pressing political issue in California; toxic and "dangerous" emissions are down by almost half in the last decade alone. Nor is there any serious proposal before Congress or the White House that would substantially undermine the laws responsible for this decline in pollution. Even if industry gets its way on laxer standards for old Midwest power plants (the most important current controversy), the effect would only be a slower *reduction* of pollution, not an increase. This doesn't mean there's no cause for environmental vigilance; but it does mean there's no cause for hysteria.

And it means that the popular notion that the Bush administration has launched a wide-ranging assault on environmental regulation is simply wrong. Sure, there is plenty to dislike in George W. Bush's environmental record, in particular his spineless refusal to advocate an increase in gas-mileage standards for SUVs (a spinelessness shared by many Democrats and their allies in the labor movement) and his lack of a global-warming plan. But in no major area have the Bushies relaxed environmental safeguards; in fact, they have imposed strict, new regulations on diesel pollution and arsenic in drinking water. The action on diesel emissions has gotten the president no credit whatsoever, and the stricter arsenic standard caused him a world of grief when he postponed its implementation for several months. Though Bush has been pummeled for more than one year for trying to "increase the arsenic" in drinking water, the existing safeguards remained in effect while the new regulation was considered: Arsenic did *not* increase anywhere. And the stricter standard became law with Bush's blessing months ago.

Perhaps most importantly, reflexive bashing of Bush's environmental policies is not only dishonest; it may actually hamper further environmental progress. Consider the Democratic "victory" on ANWR. The nation needs to reduce its dependence on Persian Gulf oil. And while drilling in ANWR is no panacea, it could help, and it would almost certainly cause little environmental damage. Does this mean the Democrats should have supported ANWR drilling? Not necessarily. Rather it means they shouldn't have let the environmental lobby bully them into making it non-negotiable. Last August this magazine recommended an energy-independence compromise in which the Democrats permit exploratory drilling in ANWR in exchange for a Republican concession on increasing fuel-efficiency standards—a measure that would have a vastly greater environmental impact ("Over a Barrel," August 20, 2001). And as *The New York Times* reported last week, at least one Northeastern Democrat contemplated just such a compromise—until he was shut down by the environmental lobby. "If you told the environmentalists we would end global warming once and for all in return for ANWR," he told the *Times*, "they'd still say no." In other words, the green lobby and their Democratic allies put environmental demagoguery before environmental progress. Excuse us if we don't consider that a reason to celebrate. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LONG GOODBYE: This week's unanticipated departure from the White House of Karen Hughes, President Bush's most trusted confidante for the last eight years, has triggered an orgy of speculation among the Washington press corps. Much of it, however, is probably wrong. It is universally accepted that Hughes left strictly because she, her husband, and their 15-year-old son were homesick for Texas. And that's true enough, as far as it goes. But while there's little doubt that Hughes left on her own, there were good reasons for her to leave now. For one, her influence and usefulness waned inside the White House after 9/11 (See "Spin Off," by Ryan Lizza, October 15, 2001). Through no fault of her own, the former TV reporter was simply not as instrumental to George W. Bush once his presidency was redefined as a campaign against global terrorism. As advisers like Condi Rice, Colin Powell, George Tenet, John Ashcroft, and even Pentagon spinner Torie Clarke became more important, Hughes struggled to find her niche. Her most important post-9/11 assignment, the Coalition Information Center (CIC), which was billed as the heart of America's propaganda war against Islamic fascism, withered on the vine after only a few months. Some staffers assigned to the CIC even complained about having nothing to do while Hughes made a futile attempt to revive the project. "People there wanted to move on. She was the one most resistant to letting it break up," says a Republican source. In fact, given Hughes's diminished influence post-9/11, her move back to Austin may actually make her *more* important to the White House. "This is one of the first moves of the '04 election," says one Bush source. The White House is always sensitive to preserving Bush's outsider credentials, and Hughes's move to Texas hints that the '04 campaign will be largely run from Austin—just as Al Gore ran his 2000 campaign from Nashville. Another widespread assumption is that Hughes's departure will create a substantial void in the White House communications apparatus. But in reality, what Hughes will do from Texas—concentrate on major speeches and big-picture message strategy—is not that different from what she does now. She had already delegated many of her day-to-day duties to fairly competent aides. The speechwriting shop is run by the widely admired Michael Gerson, the press office by the widely loathed but effective Ari Fleischer, and Communications Director Dan Bartlett long ago took on many of Hughes's other responsibilities. Bartlett's presence will likely mean that another expectation of the press corps—that the White House will be less controlling of information—is misplaced as well. Bartlett, like Hughes, is a longtime Bush loyalist, having worked for W. since 1993. As a friend who worked with Bartlett on the campaign puts it: "Dan doesn't stray. He's the ultimate soldier. He will do what he is asked and will do what he is told." In other words, Karen Hughes may be gone, but her spirit will linger.

SENATORS OF THE CORN: With so many Senate Democrats eager to run for president, it's become all too easy for Republicans to dismiss every Democratic initiative as jockeying for 2004. But sometimes the shoe fits. Take, for instance, the energy bill the Senate was wrapping up this week. Although we are aware of no recent popular groundswell for expanding the federal government's ethanol-subsidy program, a provision added to the bill, without a hearing, by Senate leader (and potential White House candidate) Tom Daschle will require gasoline refiners to *triple* their use of the corn-based fuel by the year 2012. Ethanol proponents say it's less polluting than gasoline but have never made a convincing case that their product is worth the expense, which will rise under Daschle's plan from an estimated $1 billion per year in public subsidies to $2.5 billion. Their stronger argument is made directly to politicians, especially those seeking the


AMERICA, I AM READY TO FIGHT!
MOUSSAOUI
AMERICA MUST BE DESTROYED! AND ISRAEL!
AND AMERICANS MUST BE KILLED AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE TOO!
TRIERS ©2002 THE NEW REPUBLIC
I'LL ENTER THAT AS A PLEA OF "EVIL."
AND YOUR REQUEST FOR A LARGE PLANE IS DENIED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goodwill of primary voters in Iowa corn country. So it was little surprise that when New York's Charles Schumer bravely took on Daschle with an (unsuccessful) amendment to strip the ethanol provision, he won over not one of his colleagues known to be contemplating a run for president—not Joe Biden, John Edwards, John Kerry, Joe Lieberman, Chris Dodd, or, of course, Daschle himself. Of these, only Daschle, a South Dakotan, can marginally save face by arguing that he was acting in the parochial interest of corn farmers at home. And Lieberman and Kerry share the added embarrassment of having voted in the past against expanding the ethanol program (Lieberman as recently as March 1998). At least one possible '04 candidate had the principle to vote no: Republican John McCain. If only there were more Democrats like him.

EVIDENTLY KURT WALDHEIM WASN'T AVAILABLE: "Secretary General Kofi Annan today brushed aside Israeli objections to the make-up of a three-member fact-finding team" convened to investigate Israel's actions in Jenin. So wrote *The New York Times*' John Kifner this week. Israel, he went on, "was known to particularly object to [Cornelio] Sommaruga," the former head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Why? You'd never know from Kifner's report, which was content to let readers imagine that the objection is another of Ariel Sharon's irrational grudges. In fact, this grudge is extremely well founded. From 1987 to 1999 Sommaruga was president of the ICRC—a body composed of 176 national member societies but not, you guessed it, Israel. When, in March 2000, then-President of the American Red Cross Dr. Bernadine Healy moved to have Israel's national society, Magen David Adom, admitted to the world body, Sommaruga fought her tooth and nail. "If we're going to have the Shield of David," Healy insists Sommaruga declared, "why would we not have to accept the swastika?" Considering Sommaruga's record, it's not Israel's opposition that raises questions; it's why Annan appointed him in the first place.

MAYBE THEY SHOULD PUT HIM ON THE U.N. COMMISSION?: "By my own standard, what happened there was a massacre. But if you are asking, 'Did I see tens of people killed?' Frankly, no."—Taabat Mardawi, a senior Islamic Jihad fighter from Jenin, interviewed by CNN on April 23

THE INVISIBLE PRIMARY: In a bid to reintroduce herself to voters in her native North Carolina, Elizabeth Dole—fresh from 35 years in Washington—is visiting all of the state's 100 counties as part of her Senate campaign. "It is a wonderful experience," Dole said at one recent stop, "because you meet people everywhere you go." Well, only certain kinds of people: If you happen to be a fellow candidate in the GOP Senate primary, for example, or worse yet a journalist, Dole doesn't want anything to do with you. Of the four other Republicans running to succeed Jesse Helms, only two have ever actually *met* Dole. That's because Dole has not only dodged debates so far, she's even steered clear of speeches where she would have to share the stage with other candidates. Members of the Fourth Estate don't get treated much better. As veteran North Carolina political reporter Paul O'Connor lamented in *The Chapel Hill News* this week, "In 23 years of covering state politics, I've never seen a candidate tell editorial boards that if they want to talk to her they can have 20 minutes—if they drive to Salisbury and undergo a 90-minute credentials exam first." Seems like a 90-minute credentials exam is exactly what Dole needs herself. ■


I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE SOME OF MY THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS ON THE DEPARTURE OF MY CLOSE FRIEND AND ADVISER KAREN HUGHES.
BUT SHE'S GONE NOW AND CAN'T TELL ME WHAT THEY ARE.
THEY WILL — BE MISSED.
TOLES
©2002 THE NEW REPUBLIC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the Hill

Death and Taxes

By Michael Crowley

Call it springtime for Daschle. Lately the Democratic Party's fortunes have been looking up. The Dems are gaining traction on George W. Bush over his handling of the Middle East, and last week they successfully shot down his plan to drill for oil in Alaska. White House hopefuls like Al Gore have been getting great press for their increasingly tart Bush-bashing. And the president's poll numbers are finally cooling off: For the first time since September 11, voters say they prefer Democrats to Republicans in Congress.

After enduring weeks of ridicule for their lack of a cogent political message, Democrats have even rolled out a new platform for the 2002 elections. Following consultations between Tom Daschle, Dick Gephardt, and strategists at the Democratic National Committee, last week Democrats arrived at a list of five key issues—printed on laminated cards and distributed to House and Senate members—that contrast "Democratic Values" with "Misplaced Republican Priorities." Its pillars are Social Security and "pension" security (not-so-implicitly tied to the Enron meltdown), the environment, a prescription-drug benefit, and new spending on schools. Former Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta, who has become a top strategy guru for Hill Democrats, was enlisted this week to brief the party's rank-and-file on the new platform.

So have those madcap Democrats finally gotten their act together? Not necessarily. Because all the laminated talking points in the world can't conceal the huge elephant in the Democratic living room: the Bush tax cut. Nearly one year after Bush's signature domestic achievement, Democrats are still confused and divided about how to handle it. The Dems' new talking points allude to the tax cut with a warning that "Republicans are spending your Social Security money on tax breaks for special interests." But that's hardly a clear position on taxes and the federal budget. Which is not that surprising considering that Democrats don't have one.

Over the past several months party leaders Tom Daschle and Dick Gephardt have basically decided to attack the tax cut as reckless and irresponsible while refusing to call for its repeal. They argue that, given Republican control of the House and Bush's veto power, there's no chance of altering the tax cut until Democrats win the House, or the White House, or both. And politically, Democrats fear that any vote against the tax cut could send them in the opposite direction. That's because control of the House will likely be decided in a handful of Southern and rural swing districts, which tend to be anti-tax—and because several vulnerable Senate Democrats are up for reelection in pro-Bush "red" states like South Dakota, Louisiana, and Montana. Daschle and Gephardt's muddy message helps those Democrats from having to make hard decisions on taxes. And they're also part of the reason House Democrats didn't offer an alternative budget last month for the first time since Republicans took over the House in 1995. And Daschle says he's not sure he'll have the votes to offer one in the Senate; many a Democrat is wary of endorsing a resolution that will put them on record as supporting a dip into the sacrosanct Social Security trust fund. Yet few if any are willing to support language calling for the spending cuts or the tax cut rollback (or even freeze) needed to avoid such a plunder. This conundrum has kept Democrats bickering amongst themselves well past the traditional mid-April deadline for a budget resolution, providing Republicans with an opportunity for some gleeful taunting. Trent Lott notes that the Senate hasn't failed to pass a budget resolution since the mid-1970s; and he says that Daschle is headed for an "abdication" that will lead to a "Wild, Wild West" appropriations process with no spending limits; at a Tuesday meeting with reporters, Senate GOP leaders sported large green buttons that read, "WHERE'S THE BUDGET?"

The latest—laminated—message offensive is supposed to circumvent these problems, particularly on the tax front. "We recognize that Democrats are going to be running differently on the tax issue in different states and districts," says one party operative. "These issues bridge those folks who voted for tax cuts and those who voted against them." The trouble is, Republicans are proving highly effective at driving a wedge between those people. Last week House Republicans passed a permanent extension of the Bush tax cut, which, thanks to an arcane budget rule under which it was passed, is due to expire after ten years. After last week's vote, Daschle vowed that a permanent extension—which might cost $4 trillion from 2012 to 2022—would never make it to the Senate floor. But after GOP senators threatened to stall an energy bill Daschle had hoped to finish weeks ago, the South Dakotan compromised, agreeing to allow a vote on permanently extending the repeal of the estate tax—a major part of Bush's overall package.

Why did Daschle give in? Just consider the way GOP Senate candidates reacted to the House extension of the tax cut. Jim Talent of Missouri and John Thune of South Dakota immediately issued challenges to their incumbent opponents—Democratic Senators Jean Carnahan and Tim Johnson, respectively—to join them in supporting a gloriously low-tax future. Thune warned in a press release that without action by Johnson and his fellow Democrats the Bush tax cut would expire, "creating the largest tax increase in American history." That sort of talk is sure to alarm Johnson, who has already run ads conspicuously touting his support of the original Bush tax cut.

The GOP charges are bogus, of course. But that doesn't mean they won't work. Tax attacks have undoubtedly helped to keep Carnahan below 50 percent in recent state polls and, as of February, have left Johnson actually trailing Thune. And by forcing the estate tax repeal vote, Republicans have chosen an especially torturous issue for Democrats. For although estate tax repeal is the element of the Bush tax cut that most shamelessly pays off the ultrarich—nearly half of its benefits would go to estates worth more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The International Criminal Court—the United States Sends Regrets

David Davenport is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

They threw a party at the United Nations recently, but the United States did not attend. The hoopla, celebrated by sixty-six nations and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, marked the birth of the new International Criminal Court (ICC), but the United States, by refusing to ratify the treaty creating the court, sent its regrets. **The establishment of a major world court without U.S. participation opens a new and troublesome chapter in international law and diplomacy.**

Only a few years ago, the United States would have been expected to support the new court. Most of America's traditional allies, including Great Britain, Canada, and its European friends, are key participants. The United States has been a major supporter of the temporary international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (precursors of the permanent ICC) and was one of the nations helping to shape the new court.

But a funny thing happened on the way to the International Criminal Court. A group of "like-minded nations" became highly committed to a court with far more sweeping powers than ever before seen or envisioned, and, in the end, they hijacked the process, rushing past U.S. concerns. The Clinton administration was ambivalent, but the Bush administration has been steadfastly opposed, and rightly so.

There is plenty not to like about the ICC. Although the court's primary agenda is war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, it also has jurisdiction over a new, undefined crime of "aggression." With troops stationed around the world, the U.S. military has reason to be concerned. Instead of cases being referred to the court by the U.N. Security Council, an independent prosecutor will make those highly political decisions. Amazingly, the ICC purports to have jurisdiction over citizens of countries that do not participate in the court, an unprecedented expansion of international law.

Why should Americans care? For one thing, it is highly likely that Americans will be investigated or charged as criminal defendants. Government officials, military officers, and soldiers—even corporate executives—are all possible targets. Another concern is that defendants cannot rely on the right to a jury trial, protection against unreasonable searches, and many other protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution. With considerable anti-American sentiment attending the creation of the court, the ICC could easily become a forum for trying U.S. military and national policy as criminal matters.

In a larger sense, Americans should also be concerned that sixty-six nations, out of the nearly two hundred in the world, have railroaded the formation of this court. Although its humanitarian purposes may be noble, a criminal court of universal **jurisdiction created by one-third of the nations of the world, representing one-sixth of its population, constitutes a major power play.** The party at the United Nations was not just about a court; it was also a celebration of small and medium-sized nations and hundreds of nonprofit organizations attempting to level the playing field with the United States and other world powers.

— David Davenport

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.



Interested in more commentary on public policy?

Visit us on-line at **www.hoover.org** *or contact us to receive a complimentary copy of the 200-page, award-winning* **Hoover Digest.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than $5 million—the GOP has outspun Democrats on the issue. In Republican parlance, it is a creepy "death tax" that allows the Internal Revenue Service to haunt your afterlife. Perhaps most crucially, says the GOP, the tax would have a disproportionate effect on family-owned businesses, particularly America's heroic family farms. Little of this may be honest or true. But for all the talk of ANWR and Al Qaeda, farm issues will be critical to this year's Senate races (which is one reason why a farm bill has been stalled for weeks by political jockeying between the parties).

Daschle might take solace from the idea that an estate tax debate, though presumably an affront to his core principles, would allow senators like Johnson and Carnahan—as well as Montana's Max Baucus, Louisiana's Mary Landrieu, and Max Cleland of Georgia—to cast votes that will shore up their fiscal-conservative credentials. The risk is that although Daschle said this week he was confident Republicans lack the 60 votes they'll need to permanently engrave the repeal, that's no sure thing. When Republicans forced a vote on a nonbinding resolution on the topic earlier this year, 56 senators, including a remarkable eleven Democrats, supported permanent repeal of the estate tax. And since two solid Republican votes—Pete Domenici and Robert Bennett—were absent, Lott plausibly counts 58 firm votes in favor. Finding two more won't be easy, but it's hardly impossible. Carnahan was not among those senators who supported permanent repeal, and she'll endure furious abuse from Talent if she votes no again. Other question marks, as usual, are Bob Torricelli of New Jersey and John Breaux of Louisiana, whom Daschle can rarely count on for anything. Republicans also think they can woo Democrat Tom Carper of Delaware, who did not support the resolution earlier this year but did briefly support the estate tax repeal last year.

Daschle is a canny legislator, and he'll probably devise an alternative to the permanent repeal effort (most likely raising the limit for estate tax exemptions) that gives his candidates cover without giving away the store. But it will still be another victory for Republican policy—and another defeat for Democratic principles. Bet you don't find that on a laminated card. ■

The myth of Alaskan self-reliance.

Welfare State

By FRANKLIN FOER

THE FIGHT OVER drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) may be over, but it revealed a curious truth: The most zealous proponents of dotting the Alaskan tundra with oil derricks are ... the Alaskans themselves. A poll last year showed that 75 percent of state residents support ANWR drilling. The *Anchorage Times* and *Anchorage Daily News* both came out in favor of it. And the state's small but noisy congressional delegation—Senators Ted Stevens and Frank Murkowski and Representative Don Young—led the charge on Capitol Hill. "Anyone that comes to this floor and says this is drilling in wilderness is a liar, a liar," barked Stevens last week, demonstrating a fervor rarely found in debates over the technical definition of "wilderness." (Stevens maintains that ANWR is instead a "coastal plain.") "[I]f it was back in the days, I would challenge them to a duel."

Stevens and his fellow Alaskans like to think of themselves as embodying a kind of rugged, frontier libertarianism. Alaska's senior senator damns his opponents as "radicals." And its lone congressman calls the federal government an "absentee landlord" and decries its regulations as "federal shackles." On the fringe, such sentiment is voiced by the Alaskan Independence Party (AIP), which pushes for secession and successfully ran Nixon Interior Secretary Walter Hickel for governor in 1990, winning 39 percent of the vote. "Alaska is a non-self-governing land," argues AIP Chair Mark Chyrson, comparing the state's plight to that of Latvia and Lithuania under Soviet occupation. But the image of Alaska as a land of self-reliant individualism extends across the state's (admittedly narrow) political spectrum, from its Republican congressional delegation to Democratic Governor Tony Knowles, who argues that Alaskans should be permitted to hunt on federal lands and chop down federal forests as they please. "Most Alaskans make a living from the land, and have a special bond with it," he explains. "Throughout the vast remoteness of much of the state, Alaskans depend on subsistence hunting and fishing to put food on their tables."

IF ONLY IT were all true. In fact, Alaska is arguably the least self-reliant state in the union, dependent on federal largesse to an unmatched degree. Take ANWR. At first blush, Alaskans seem like a rare and admirable exception to the NIMBY rule, offering up their treasured lands for the national good. (Drilling in ANWR "can help offset the need for oil from nations hostile to the United States," the *Anchorage Daily News* selflessly offered.) But Alaska's unique *imby*ism is a touch more self-interested. Thanks to the federal government's generous 1959 grant of statehood, Alaska has received a fortune in royalties from oil drilled on its North Slope. Since the late 1970s this money has accumulated in an account called the Permanent Fund. It has accumulated so much, in fact, that Alaska not only has no need for income or sales tax, but the state actually pays residents an annual stipend—last year $1,850.28 a head—just for living there. So with every drop of oil pumped, wealth is transferred from Americans generally—the oil is all coming out of federally owned land—to Alaskans almost exclusively. And the more oil is pumped, the larger that transfer. No wonder the state spent $7 million lobbying for ANWR—it's a fraction of what it would get if the legislation went through.

Nor is the state's oil subsidy an isolated case. Indeed, Alaska edges out Virginia and Maryland as the leading recipient of federal spending per capita. According to Citizens Against Government Waste, last year Alaska received

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lean air is
1st Century.

Our generation is demanding lots of electricity ... and clean air.

That's why nuclear energy is so important to America's energy future. Nuclear energy already generates more than 20 percent of America's electricity, and nuclear power plants don't pollute the air. That's important, because we need a reliable source of electricity to meet our needs in the 21st Century – but we also need clean air. With nuclear energy, we can have both.

Nuclear.
The Clean Air Energy.

NEI

Nuclear Energy Institute
1776 I Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006-3708
202-739-8000

For more information, visit www.nei.org
or www.switchonamerica.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$710.88 worth of pork per capita—more than *20 times* the national average. A few recent examples of your tax dollars at work: $176,000 to the Alaska Reindeer Herders' Association; $150,000 to the Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission; and $3 million for new dorms at the Challenger Learning Center in Kenai. And all this is in addition to the billions of dollars of military spending the state receives as a strategic outpost—one that, needless to say, is not particularly strategic in the post-cold-war era.

As for the myth of Alaska's rugged individualism, it's largely just that. Historian Stephen Haycox has shown that most pioneers arrived in Alaska for the Klondike Gold Rush on organized junkets. They came by trams, not treacherous hikes; and they lived off canned meat, not hunted moose. And if the state's Davy Crockett streak was exaggerated then, it's completely overblown now. Three-quarters of Alaskans reside in urban areas. More than half live in metropolitan Anchorage—an emerging latte town with the requisite array of Borders and Starbucks. According to the census, the largest segments of the labor force toil in white-collar jobs. Governor Knowles's romantic vision notwithstanding, fewer than 4 percent of Alaskans work in fishing, forestry, or farming.

One might expect Alaska's representatives in Washington to show a modicum of gratitude for the federal government's beneficence to their state. Instead, they are avatars of the state's swaggering self-image. Stevens boasts that he's "one mean, miserable SOB." Don Young likewise flatters himself that he's "not one of those smooth namby-pamby politicians." Young, in particular, has an ugly tendency to vilify political opponents. "I'm proud to say that they are my enemy," he said of environmentalists in 1996. "They are not Americans, never have been Americans, never will be Americans." When Texas Representative Lloyd Doggett politely raised some objections to the post-September 11 airline bailout, Young responded, "May you walk and may you die in the desert." In 1995 at a Fairbanks high school, he told students that he hated federally funded art. "Butt fucking. You think that's art?" he announced ever so appropriately. But his pièce de résistance came in a 1994 hearing at which he banged an 18-inch-long walrus penis bone into his palm while dressing down the director of the Fish and Wildlife Service.

During the decades of debate that preceded Bill Clinton's 1996 signing of the welfare reform bill, Republicans argued that cash subsidies created a culture of dependence and entitlement that ultimately led to anti-social behavior. Stevens himself contended that the system "breeds discontent and idleness." It's a lesson, however, that has yet to be applied by Alaska's congressional delegation, who posture angrily as leaders of the GOP's Leave us Alone Coalition even as they represent the nation's largest remaining welfare state. Young, for one, likes to recommend that his opponents "Go to Russia." But he should consider his own advice. If Seward's Folly were returned to its previous owners, he might learn a thing or two about life in a postsocialist economy. ■

Caracas Dispatch

Recoup

By Phil Gunson

The nineteenth-century, cream-colored Miraflores Palace stands on a rise toward the western end of the high, narrow valley in which the Venezuelan capital is located. Across the street is the Palacio Blanco, which enjoyed brief fame in 1992 when Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez's rebel troops tried to burst open its main doors using a light tank as a battering ram. The Caracas slums flank this bastion of presidential power on two sides, like jaws. On Saturday, April 13, the jaws closed. Thousands of mostly poor *Caraqueños* poured from the ranchos (as the shanties are known here) to demand the reinstatement of their hero, the onetime coup leader turned elected president, whose term of office had been abruptly interrupted the day before.

Interim President Pedro Carmona Estanga—dubbed "Pedro the Brief" by local wags—fled in panic, along with aides, ministers, power brokers, and hangers-on. The palace guard—which had remained loyal to Chávez—took back Miraflores without firing a shot, and within hours the former president was back in power. When his ministers and office staff returned to their desks, they found much of their equipment and computer files missing.

But there was something else missing as well. To the astonishment of the palace guards and protocol staff, a large portrait of Simón Bolívar, the Caracas-born liberator of much of South America, had been pulled from the walls and stuffed in a storeroom. Bolívar is to Venezuela what George Washington is to the United States, and Chávez, like many politicians before him, had sought to appropriate the Liberator's legacy for himself. He even renamed the country the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. And while Chávez and his political project had aroused growing ire in the months preceding the coup, no one—not even the vocal opposition—had ever proposed taking it out on the Liberator himself.

So who were these Bolívar-haters who took power for two days while Chávez was under arrest? They clearly had little in common with the hundreds of thousands of anti-Chávez demonstrators who had marched on the palace on Thursday, April 11, or with key opposition and labor leader Carlos Ortega, whose goal in stirring up the protest had been to replace Chávez with a transitional government that respected Venezuela's existing constitution and institutions. While hostile to Chávez, this first group would likely have included moderate members of his coalition in a new government. The anti-Bolivarists, by contrast, were part of a second group, right-wing and eager to purge Venezuela of both its Chávez connections and its Bolivarian roots. When Ortega's crowd marched on the palace on April 11, and the

Phil Gunson is a freelance journalist based in Caracas.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contexts

understanding people in their social worlds

Accessible Articles
Stimulating ideas and research, designed to engage and challenge

Diverse Perspectives
Fresh viewpoints, clear concise thinking and jargon-free reporting

Current Discoveries
A vital and thought-provoking companion to modern society

Introducing contexts

A groundbreaking new quarterly of the American Sociological Association dedicated to understanding people in contemporary society. **Contexts** presents the best sociological inquiry – from timely research and in-depth features, to striking photo essays and personal histories – in a real world perspective. Confronting the controversial issues affecting society today, **Contexts** opens up newsworthy findings and current affairs to relevant debate.

A preview of contexts

English-only triumphs, but the costs are high
by alejandro portes

After the sexual revolution: Gender politics in teen dating
by barbara risman and pepper schwartz

Crime decline in context
by richard rosenfeld

Life without father: What happens to the children?
by sara mcLanahan

Did welfare reform work? Implications for 2002 and beyond
by sandra hofferth

Executive Editor: Claude Fischer, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley
Published by the University of California Press

contexts subscriptions

Special Offer!
Subscribe today to become a charter subscriber to Contexts
Individual $40
www.contextsmagazine.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shooting—which killed 17 and injured 140—began, blame fell on Chávez, prompting the military to abandon the president. And in those frantic and shadowy hours, Group Two took over. In other words, the debate in Washington over whether the Bush administration defended or subverted democracy in Venezuela overlooks the fact that there was not one coup but two. One broad, one narrow; one democratic, one authoritarian. And to this day almost no one knows why or how one gave way to the other.

HUGO CHÁVEZ HAD taken power in the first place in large part because of popular frustration with Venezuela's corrupt political parties. And in his time in office, he successfully marginalized them even further. As a result, opposition to his increasingly authoritarian rule fell to Venezuela's civil society: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, business leaders, the Catholic laity, and the media. The NGOs were outraged by Chávez's increasing concentration of power into his own hands, his disregard for the constitution, and his failure to address corruption and poverty. Labor—led by Ortega—was angry at his efforts to install his loyalists atop the union leadership and at a decree forbidding public employees from striking. Oil interests were fuming at presidential meddling with their autonomy. And the media was engaged in a fierce, long-running battle with the president, who would later accuse them of running "laboratories of lies" and had sent mobs to attack their buildings and journalists.

This was Group One, and it was they who spearheaded April 11's mass protests. It's not clear who exactly in this broad coalition saw the protests as part of a plan to trigger a military coup; but at least some of its leaders clearly hoped, as one of them put it later, "to heat up the street" on the understanding that a big enough protest movement would, by itself, trigger the military's withdrawal of support from Chávez's government—opening the way for an interim government and new elections. In fact, as early as February an organization called the "Moral Reserve Front of the National Guard," which claimed to represent liberal elements in the military, had drafted a document entitled "Keys to the Peaceful Overthrow of Chávez." And some believe that the "first" coup—the one spearheaded by Venezuelan civil society—followed almost exactly the script that it laid out.

The street heated up alright—in fact, more than a dozen protesters were shot, allegedly by Chávez supporters. As news of the killings spread, key members of the military began to defect. A Group One leader told me that when he heard ten senior officers had broken with the government, he remarked jubilantly, "Those are our guys." As military defections mounted, Group One prepared to replace Chávez with a nine-man junta—composed of five civilians and four members of the military—that would prepare the country for new elections. Pedro Carmona, head of the Venezuelan business federation Fedecámaras, was not one of them.

Yet on the morning of the coup, Carmona suddenly appeared as president, backed by senior officers who had broken with Chávez. What transpired is still a matter of controversy and confusion, but it appears Group One had been double-crossed. In addition to taking down Bolívar's image, within 13 hours the hard-liners of Group Two had disbanded parliament, fired the country's judges, and changed its name from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela back to the Republic of Venezuela. As the Group One leader put it to me, "They rode on our backs."

SO WHO MADE up Group Two? In part, it was Opus Dei—several of Carmona's Cabinet members had ties to the very conservative, very secretive Catholic group. As early as 1998 General Ruben Rojas Perez, commanding general of the army and son-in-law to former President Rafael Caldera—a man with extremely close ties to Opus Dei (his son is one of its foremost leaders)—had tried to prevent Chávez from taking power. And from his first months in office, Chávez had battled the Church hierarchy—whose leadership he once called "devils in vestments." He had withdrawn government funding for the Church's educational and social projects, and he tried to undermine its special legal status. For many in the Church—especially the right-wing of the Church—Chávez seemed to be following the model of his close friend and ally Fidel Castro.

What's more, Opus Dei was one of the few groups in Venezuelan society with reason to hate Simón Bolívar. Orthodox Catholics regard the Liberator's freemasonry—with its roots in pre-Christian occult traditions—as heresy. And historically, the Church sided with Spain against the South American independence movement Bolívar led. "Almost all the independence heroes were freemasons," explains political analyst Alberto Garrido. "The Church was on the side of [colonial power] Spain, and took a long time to reconcile itself to their status as heroes."

Joining this coalition was the most conservative, anti-communist wing of the military, centered around the navy. These Group Two co-conspirators were even more alarmed by Chávez's ties to Castro than was Opus Dei; and in particular, they feared his ties to the leftist FARC guerrillas in neighboring Colombia. Conservatives in the military saw Chávez as ushering in social revolution at home and surrendering Venezuela's sovereignty by turning a blind eye to Colombian and other guerrilla groups crossing into their country. (Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Peter Romero has lent credence to these claims, accusing Chávez of financing rebels throughout the Andean region, including in Ecuador.) Chávez himself had repeatedly called for regional integration between Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. And hard-liners in the navy saw this as a means to the Bolivarian goal of uniting the three countries into the macrostate of *Gran Colombia*.

Finally, Group Two seems to have contained elements of the oil industry, the dominant sector in the Venezuelan economy. Upon taking power, Carmona and his cronies quickly repealed 49 decree-laws issued by Chávez last November, including the highly controversial *Ley de Hidrocarburos*, or oil law—which had infuriated the president of the state oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA), General Guaicaipuro Lameda. The oil law had required oil companies to vastly increase their royalties to the state. It also man-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dated that the government control 51 percent of every joint venture with the private oil industry—the same model long used by Castro. What's more, Chávez had tried to determine the makeup of PDVSA's board. After the coup, Lameda appeared in a prominent role in the Carmona government and was slated to regain his position as head of PDVSA. And Carmona himself was, until recently, president of Venoco, a petrochemicals company engaged in a joint venture with Pequiven (a division of PDVSA) and Shell Petroquimicos de Venezuela—precisely the sort of venture the new oil law threatens.

It was Group Two's ideological and social narrowness—and its authoritarian tendencies—that helped ensure its downfall and Chávez's return. The unions and other key elements of Group One, finding themselves locked out of Carmona's government, quickly withdrew their support from the new regime. Within the military, a similar process occurred because, while Group Two was backed by some conservative senior officers, it lacked the support of the mid-level officers who directly command troops. In fact, Chávez was restored to power not by his loyalists alone, but by soldiers and civilians who preferred him to the new hard-line government that within two days had disbanded parliament and fired the judiciary.

So Chávez is back in power. But the intrigue that produced the two coups and one countercoup is far from over. Some give Chávez a week, others months, but few think he will survive to the end of his term in 2007. Last Friday I took a call on my cell phone. "This is your friend's friend," a male voice said. I was talking to the head of the Moral Reserve Front. He told me the group was working on a "new strategic concept." "When will we be hearing from you again?" I asked him. "In eight days," the voice said. He rang off before I could ask him what he meant. ■

What W. didn't learn from Enron.

Option Play

By JOHN B. JUDIS

NOT LONG AGO, the Enron scandal seemed destined to become the Bush administration's Whitewater. One reason it hasn't is that the Democrats and the media haven't turned up a smoking gun showing that the Bushies tried to bail out Enron. Another is that the Bush Justice Department has come down on Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen, like a ton of bricks. But third, and perhaps most important, the administration quickly endorsed reforms aimed at discouraging the practices that allowed Enron—and many other companies fueling the late 1990s bubble—to deceive investors about their financial health. "This much is clear," the president declared soon after the scandal broke, "To properly inform shareholders and the investing public, we must adopt better standards of disclosure and accounting practices for all of corporate America."

If only he'd meant it. Several months later, with Enron off the front page, the Bush administration has not only neglected the accounting reforms needed to prevent Enron from happening again, but it is actively working with the business lobbies trying to block them. A perfect example is the debate over stock options and how companies list them on their financial statements and tax returns.

During the '90s companies increasingly resorted to stock options to pay their top executives and managers. The practice spread from tiny start-ups to the Fortune 500, where stock options today account for almost 60 percent of executive pay. Now, there's nothing intrinsically wrong with stock options; they can motivate employees by granting them a stake in their company's success. What *is* problematic is the way companies count them on their financial records and tax returns. As the law now stands, companies don't have to deduct stock options from the profit totals on their financial statements even though, like wages, the options are a form of compensation. This omission played a key role in creating the wildly inflated profits and consequent euphoria that fueled the '90s stock market bubble. According to the Federal Reserve, if stock options had been counted from 1995 to 2000, Fortune 500 companies would have seen their annual profit margins drop from 12 percent to 9.4 percent. Among some high flyers the deflation would have been larger still: Counting stock options, Cisco Systems' profits in 2000 would have been 40 percent lower and Lucent Technologies' 32 percent lower.

But it gets worse. The same firms that have not deducted the cost of options from their profit statements *have* deducted the cost on their tax returns. And as a result, many of America's most prosperous firms enjoyed a lucrative tax loophole. In 2000, for instance, Microsoft saved $2.06 billion in taxes and Cisco $1.4 billion by deducting stock-option costs. According to Citizens for Tax Justice, Enron turned what would have been a $112 million tax bill into a $278 million *refund*. This cycle of inflated profits and deflated tax payments helped push America's high-tech sector in the late '90s from fast, sustained growth into manic overdrive and then—when reality finally intruded—into the slump and disillusionment from which it has still not fully recovered.

Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, superinvestor Warren Buffett, and former Securities and Exchange Commission head Arthur Levitt—the cream of America's financial establishment—all want to require companies to deduct the costs of stock options on their financial balance sheets. So do the Council of Institutional Investors (the country's main shareholding organization) and Standard & Poor's (the main credit-rating agency). Senators Carl Levin and John McCain have introduced legislation that would go part of the way toward doing this: The Levin-McCain bill says that if companies want a tax deduction on their stock options, they have to make the same deduction on their financial statement. If they decide not to deduct options on their financial statement, they can't deduct them from their taxes. (California Representative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pete Stark has introduced parallel legislation in the House.)

But the business lobbies that pack K Street are determined to block any change in accounting and tax rules, as they did in 1994 and again in 1997 when Levin and McCain introduced similar legislation. The Business Roundtable, the American Electronics Associations, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers—acting through the newly formed Coalition to Preserve and Protect Stock Options—have lined up squarely against Levin-McCain. And in spite of George W. Bush's avowed commitment to reform, they've found an ally in the president. On April 8 Bush told *The Wall Street Journal*, "Alan Greenspan is very smart. I'd hate to get into a debate with him." He then proceeded to do exactly that, explaining that he opposed any change in the way businesses counted stock options.

HERE, IN BRIEF, is how stock options work. Employees who get stock options from their employer as payment acquire the right to buy the company's stock after a fixed period at the price at which it was initially selling. If the stock's price has risen in the meantime, the employee can make money by buying the stock from the company at its original price and then reselling it on the market at its current price.

Companies claim stock options should not count as costs because they are not cash payments from the firm to the employee. But Greenspan and Buffett call them noncash costs, like depreciation, which ultimately come out of a company's earnings. After all, when employees exercise their stock options, the company has to forego selling its stock at the higher market price in order to sell it at the original price to the employee. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also considers stock options a cost, which is why it allows companies to deduct the difference in what they could have received from selling their stock on the open market from their earnings for tax purposes.

Companies that provide stock options also pay a cost in what is called the "dilution" of their stock values. When employees exercise their stock options, companies have to put new stock on the market, thus diluting the earnings per share of the old stock. To avoid this, companies frequently buy back and retire their own stock, so there is no net increase in the number of shares on the market. These repurchases, which became extremely common in the late '90s, are another cost on the firms' earnings from issuing stock options.

The Coalition to Preserve and Protect Stock Options has marshaled three basic arguments in favor of retaining the status quo. First, as it argued in one press release, reforms like Levin-McCain would "discourage broad-based, rank-and-file access to stock options." But it's hard to see how. Perhaps if the *only* benefit companies received from issuing stock options was inflating their profit margins, then Levin-McCain would persuade them it wasn't worth it. But companies have long claimed that they benefit in many ways from issuing stock options, including by fostering employee identification with the company and deferring compensation costs.

Second, the Coalition claims the reform will "lead to investor confusion and less accurate financial statements." But it's hard to imagine that any new disclosure requirements would be more confusing than the current system, which dates back to 1994, when business successfully beat back an effort by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)—the private, independent body that sets accounting policy—to require companies to deduct stock-option costs from their profits. The FASB ultimately settled for merely requiring companies to include a footnote about stock options in their financial reports—a footnote it often takes a trained stock analyst to find and interpret. In Cisco Systems' annual report for 1997, for instance, it took me a half-hour to locate the relevant footnote: It was the second item of the ninth heading of the seventh section of the report's seventh (and last) chapter.

Finally, the Coalition argues that the legislation will "raise taxes on companies issuing employee stock options." And to be sure, some liberal critics of stock options, like Randall Dodd of the Derivatives Study Center, want to do exactly that—by simply ending the tax deduction for stock options. But the Levin-McCain bill would do nothing of the sort. It would end the deduction on stock options *only* for companies that excluded stock options from their profit-and-loss statements. The business groups worry that the FASB's formulas for calculating the cost of stock options could produce a number less than the IRS's formula for calculating a tax deduction, thus limiting the deductions and, in effect, raising taxes on companies. But that could be easily solved by adjusting the formula for determining stock options' impact on profits so that it equaled the calculated tax deduction, as FASB contemplated doing in 1993. (At the time companies weren't interested because they feared equalizing the two numbers would take too big a bite out of their published profit figures.)

But the really depressing thing about the stock-options battle isn't that the administration—and most Republicans—are backing the K Street lobbies. It's that key Democrats are too. Senator Joe Lieberman, who helped block reform in 1994, sent a letter to Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans and Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill last month charging that the Levin-McCain bill would "deprive investors of information about stock options and reduce the availability of broad based stock option plans." According to Michael Siegel, spokesman for the Senate Finance Committee, Chair Max Baucus "is inclined not to support the legislation, but he does believe the issue should be addressed in a thoughtful way." Thanks a lot. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle backed an earlier Levin bill on the topic but has now turned publicly noncommittal; Lieberman's staff say Daschle is against it. And if he and Baucus are opposed, Levin-McCain might not even make it to a Senate vote.

That's not just stupid policy; it's stupid politics. After all, Enron drove a truck through the stock-options loophole. From 1996 to 2000 the company failed to figure $600 million in stock-option deductions into the $1.8 billion in earnings it claimed on its financial statements. And thanks to stock options, it didn't pay taxes for four out of these five years. The real Enron scandal, as this magazine has said

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the beginning, is the policies that allowed the company to perpetrate its fraud. And on stock options at least, the Democrats aren't merely neglecting to hold the Bush administration accountable for that scandal; they've become part of it themselves. ■

Bush's war on honest economics.

Numbers Game

By Noam Scheiber

In mid-February the White House Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) put out one of the several documents it generates each year. Under the headline "President Bush's 2001 tax relief softens the recession," the two-page report argued that without last year's tax cut, the economy would have shrunk much faster than it actually did. The study went on to make a few pro forma comments about "[increasing] the incentives for saving," and "reducing an important impediment to ... the overall accumulation of wealth," before noting that the tax cut would continue to work its magic in the coming months. "[B]y the end of 2002," the report concluded, "the President's tax relief will have helped the private sector to create 800,000 more jobs."

On its face, this was nothing out of the ordinary. Economists—particularly those employed in Washington—run these estimates as a matter of routine. But there was something curious about the CEA report: Nowhere did it contain so much as a hint as to the study's methodology—no statistical appendix, no footnotes about assumptions, not even a phone number you might call to request that information. In fact, the closer you looked, the less "economic" the report appeared. Logical contradictions stuck out like a sixth finger, among them the suggestion that the tax cut, which by definition dramatically decreased national saving (i.e., the surplus), was at the same time *increasing* saving. And some of the language sounded oddly political, like the suggestion, right out of a George W. Bush stump speech, that the tax cut had "strengthened families." As William Gale, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who served on CEA in the first Bush administration, recalls, "[T]he report ... was basically an assertion, not an analysis. If there was an analysis, it was nowhere to be seen."

A cynic might ask why anyone should be surprised. After all, CEA serves the president and as such its priorities and research agenda are set by the White House. "Life in the political world is different from academia," concedes Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel, who was a member of the Clinton CEA and worked on the staff of the Reagan CEA. And yet, for most of its 56-year history, CEA has been notable for the *lack* of politics in its work. The Council is composed almost entirely of academic economists, on one- or two-year leave from universities, whose sole mission is to provide the president with objective economic advice. While bureaucracies like the Treasury, Commerce, and Labor Departments employ highly competent economists of their own, CEA is "the only group of economists in the government that doesn't have some agency ax to grind," as Nixon CEA Chairman Herb Stein famously quipped.

As a result, CEA economists are widely viewed in economic policy circles as scrupulously nonpartisan. In a 1992 article excerpted on the CEA website, former Reagan CEA Chairman Martin Feldstein wrote that "[t]he tradition of professionalis[m] is so strong that even in a presidential election year the CEA chairman appoints members of the staff for the coming academic year with the clear understanding that they will continue to serve even if the party in power loses the presidential election." And over the years CEA officials have been fiercely protective of their independence. Though a pro-business conservative himself, Feldstein quickly found himself out of favor with the Reagan White House for advocating deficit reduction and publicly supporting the Fed's tight monetary policy. Feldstein reportedly so infuriated Reagan Treasury Secretary Don Regan that Regan instructed members of Congress to "throw away" CEA's annual economic report.

All of which is to say that if the Bush administration were using its CEA to put an academic imprimatur on political decisions of questionable economic merit, it would be very big news indeed. Former Jimmy Carter CEA Chairman Charles Schultze once succinctly described CEA's mission as pushing decisions "as far as possible in the direction of sanity." If CEA is no longer pushing, there may be few limits on how far in the direction of insanity this administration will go.

For years CEA was pretty much the only game in town for serious economic analysis. But starting in the 1970s economists began cropping up in all corners of government. In response, recent presidents have tended to rely on a single entity to collect all the economic advice being offered. In the first Bush administration, this entity was called the Economic Policy Council (EPC), and was essentially managed from the Treasury Department. But having run on campaign themes like, "It's the economy, stupid," Bill Clinton needed a higher-profile body, and so he moved the EPC into the White House and renamed it the National Economic Council (NEC). All of a sudden CEA had a rival—and an intensely political one—in its own backyard.

For much of the Clinton administration that rivalry never materialized. According to White House lore, Clinton CEA Chair Laura Tyson recognized the potential for conflict early on and worked out an informal arrangement with Robert Rubin, the first NEC head, to defuse it. "There was agreement about the relative size and relative makeup, and the difference in mission," Tyson says. As former Eisenhower aide Bradley Patterson explained it in his book *The White House Staff*, Tyson sought "to maintain CEA's long-standing reputation as the purveyor of hard, factual economic data—gathered, analyzed, and distributed without any bending to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political considerations or the need for 'spin.'"

Remarkably, that arrangement more or less held up even after Tyson and Rubin left their respective positions. And because it did, CEA remained largely apolitical. That's not to say its arguments always held sway. Janet Yellen, Clinton's third CEA chair, recounts a discussion with NEC over a graph in the president's 1998 annual economic report that noted an alarming number of personal bankruptcies despite otherwise solid economic news. Yellen ultimately removed it after asking herself, "Is this really important? Does it really matter? ... We're not adding something untrue, but removing something marginal." But more often CEA stood its ground. For example, the Council convinced the Clintonites to adopt a market-based approach to key elements of the Kyoto Protocol. And it helped limit the president's protectionism on steel. Yellen recalls, "I told President Clinton protecting steel would cost about eight hundred thousand dollars per year per job ... [and] he's probably thinking, 'Give me a break; I've got unions and senators and congressman from steel states breathing down my neck.'" In the end, though, the economists largely prevailed. "He didn't do nothing, but not nearly as much as Bush," says Yellen.



It wasn't long after the inauguration of George W., however, that the divide between the politicos at NEC and the economists at CEA broke down altogether. While the campaign's top economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, was quickly installed as NEC director and assistant to the president for economic policy, CEA lacked a chairman for more than a month. So Lindsey began filling the void. "Lindsey came and started to tell us he'd like to work with CEA really closely, that he would like us to start a weekly memo to him," says one former staff member. This posed a big problem. After all, not only was Lindsey in a political job, but he was the primary author of Bush's tax cut and had earned a reputation as something of an ideologue. "We started to feel like, 'Hey, he's acting like he's our boss. Gee, this doesn't feel right.' No one knew what to do about that," adds the staffer.

In the meantime, rumors swirled. Some feared the White House was planning to consolidate NEC and CEA. "After [Lindsey] became head of NEC, we were concerned about him having joint custody. Justifiably," recalls another economist. Others heard—and the press reported—that the administration was having difficulty finding a CEA chair because Lindsey's prominence within the administration would inevitably mean taking a back seat. And Lindsey did little to deflect these suspicions. At an early meeting with the CEA staff, for example, he allegedly referred to himself as the "de facto CEA chair." (Lindsey confirms through a spokesman that he convened the meeting but doesn't remember using the phrase.) One former CEA economist was so concerned she "got in touch with John Taylor [rumored to be a candidate for the CEA chairmanship] and he gave me a little pep talk.... He said, 'Yes, it's right for you to worry about working with [Lindsey].'"

In many ways Lindsey was more a symptom of the problem than its underlying cause. From the beginning of his presidency, Clinton essentially cast his lot with Wall Street, betting that if he reined in the deficit, bond traders would reward him with lower long-term interest rates. In other words, Clinton's entire economic strategy hinged on winning credibility in the financial world, which made it vital that respected, mainstream economists play a prominent role in his administration. Bush, on the other hand, came into office having hitched his fortunes to a massive supply-side tax cut. But because supply-siders take it on faith that lowering marginal tax rates will trigger economic growth, establishing credibility among economists was much less of a concern.

All of which explains why the CEA staff was relieved when Columbia economist Glenn Hubbard was finally appointed to be the Council's chair. Though a committed supply-sider like Lindsey—and a devout proponent of the tax cut—Hubbard was at least highly regarded as an academic. As one CEA economist puts it, "At least he was talking the same language as the senior staff."

But Lindsey continued to exercise considerable influence even after Hubbard's arrival, parceling out and supervising many of the Council's projects. As another CEA economist describes it, "In the current environment NEC functions as workload manager—distributing projects and watching projects.... NEC is more integrated in the work." And Lindsey's primary method for distributing and watching projects was the CEA chief of staff, Diana Furchtgott-Roth, a former colleague of his from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), who had spent her career advocating for conservative economic causes and who once served as an economist at the American Petroleum Institute, the lobbying arm of the oil

CHRISTIAN ROUX

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industry. Former CEA economists say Furchtgott-Roth exercises enormous authority over substantive issues. "Diana's job is very much taking what she hears in her meeting with Larry Lindsey each morning and turning it into CEA analysis," explains one former colleague. (According to Hubbard, Furchtgott-Roth attends the daily NEC staff meeting.) Another complains, "She [has] a blatantly political agenda," and recalls that Furchtgott-Roth once directed him to poke holes in work another agency had already done because "Larry Lindsey said ... they did this analysis incorrectly." (Furchtgott-Roth says through a spokesman that she has no recollection of the exchange.) "If you're looking for a villain, she's it," says the economist.

By most accounts, the power Furchtgott-Roth wields is unprecedented. The CEA chief of staff under Clinton was little more than an administrative position and almost never exercised authority over analytical questions. Many CEA chiefs of staff don't even have backgrounds in economics. According to Tyson, "The chief of staff when I was there was not involved in the substantive agenda.... It was representing institutional issues." "In the past, I remember getting direction from members," reflects another former CEA staffer. "In this case, we also got direction from the chief of staff. That was new." But even more troubling is Furchtgott-Roth's role in representing a political adviser like Lindsey rather than Hubbard, her ostensible boss. Peter Orszag, who worked in Clinton's CEA, says flatly: "In my experience at CEA, it would have been highly unusual for the chief of staff to represent the interests of anyone other than CEA. That was what the chief of staff did."

HUBBARD SEEMS TO have responded to Lindsey's influence not by digging in his heels, like many of his predecessors, but by making CEA more political itself. One of his early acts as CEA chairman, say former employees, was to ask senior staff to identify the economic literature that showed a strong correlation between economic growth and tax cuts. "He had me talk with macro modelers like [well-known conservative] Allen Sinai to try to get more concrete empirical analysis that supported it," says a former CEA economist in charge of tax policy. On one occasion, Hubbard came across a report by the conservative Heritage Foundation that he found promising, and he asked for a more credible source that made a similar argument. "Hubbard was interested in it," the economist recalls. "But he said, 'No one's going to believe this.' So he sent me off looking for other sources of information." (Hubbard has no recollection of the episode.)

Another CEA staff economist recounts a similar experience while working on Social Security. Hubbard had become interested in a short article by AEI Fellow Kevin Hassett comparing the returns under a hypothetical private pension system to actual returns under Social Security. Eager to make use of the analysis, Hubbard asked the staffer to reexamine Hassett's work to see if it checked out. When he did, the numbers proved misleading—the economist notes that Hassett's argument broke down "quickly once you worked past its carefully constructed example"—and Hubbard declined to recommend them for use elsewhere in the administration. But neither did he call attention to the shortcomings in the privatization argument. Instead, Hubbard simply tried a different approach: He dispatched another CEA economist, Jeffrey Brown, to help author the Bush administration's Social Security report, which made the case for privatization not on the basis of financial returns but on overtly political grounds like the value of individual choice. (Hubbard recalls a short, nontechnical piece he co-authored with Hassett for AEI, but not the incident in question; he confirms having assigned Brown to the Social Security task force.) In principle, one could defend the value of having an economist like Brown work on the report. Yet once CEA had discredited the economic rationale, it's not clear how much a CEA economist could contribute to a commission set up to propose privatization.

Of course, as Orszag points out, working at CEA means "there's always a tension between being relevant and being academically pristine." But usually this results in CEA economists and members agonizing over whether they're comfortable with an argument the administration favors—and respectfully disagreeing when they're not. Orszag, for example, recalls the Clinton administration's efforts to link free trade with job growth, whereas the real benefit lay not in adding jobs but in replacing them with better ones. "CEA was always very reluctant to say trade is good because it creates jobs, even though it was the rhetoric of other agencies and the president," he says. At the current CEA, however, these distinctions are almost never made. Instead, the basic operating assumption is that CEA's position is the administration's position—regardless of the underlying economics.

Perhaps the most glaring instance of this, former CEA officials say, was Hubbard's performance during last fall's stimulus debate. The original House bill, which the president supported, was by all accounts laughable. Even the president's own Treasury secretary, Paul O'Neill, referred to it derisively as "show business." Academic economists tended to see its numerous longer-term measures—a repeal of the corporate alternative minimum tax, a three-year-long tax break for investment—as exactly wrong for the short-term economic problems facing the country. Hubbard had even endorsed that logic himself in a 1996 academic paper. Nonetheless, he spent the fall defending a similar proposal and criticizing rival ones, often suspending the laws of economics to do so. In December CEA released the intellectual forebear to the February study—a two-page report asserting that the stimulus bill's business tax provisions "address[ed] the fundamental source of economic weakness over the past year." One month earlier Hubbard had dubbed it "a major fallacy to praise new [Democratic] spending plans as 'stimulus' " in a *Washington Post* op-ed, which one former CEA member says "was just a joke." "This is no one's economics," the former member says. "It's not even right-wing economics.... If an undergrad wrote that, you'd give the statement and the logic behind it a D."

Would any one economic decision have come out differently had the Bush CEA been more independent? It's impossible to say. An assertive CEA might have objected to the Bush energy plan's near-exclusive emphasis on supply—citing the potentially larger gains from reducing demand—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or to the stimulus plan's long-term giveaways. But even if it had, an administration bent on rewarding the business interests that helped elect it probably wouldn't have backed down. Even former Clinton CEA officials concede they spent a lot of time being ignored.

On the other hand, there has been at least one instance where the White House was genuinely torn between economics and politics: the internal debate over steel tariffs, which, by all accounts, was agonizingly close. To his credit, Hubbard—like his predecessors in other administrations—opposed steel tariffs as economically counterproductive. But the reason some of those predecessors succeeded in blunting the political urge toward protectionism was their prestige as independent economists. By the time this spring's steel decision came along, Hubbard had already undermined that independence. And once you've lost your independence as an economist, you're just another political adviser—which means you might as well not be there at all. ■

How to save the Church.

The Betrayal

By MICHAEL SEAN WINTERS

THE CRISIS IN the Catholic Church started as a sex scandal the way Watergate started as a burglary: What followed has become the real scandal. We all know that the sexual abuse of minors is horrific; but somehow the bishops did not react with horror. That is what truly shocks.

Many bishops still do not understand that it is less the actions of pedophile priests than their inaction in the face of them that is now the issue. During Good Friday and Easter services, the bishops repeatedly begged forgiveness for the pedophiles' bad deeds. But none of the three cardinals at the heart of this scandal—Bernard Law in Boston, Edward Egan in New York, and Roger Mahony in Los Angeles—begged forgiveness for their own sins of negligence. To this day, their statements are filled with prevarications. Cardinal Egan wrote in a letter read at Masses last weekend: "If in hindsight we also discover that mistakes may have been made as regards prompt removal of priests and assistance to victims, I am deeply sorry." Note the distance between the word "mistakes" and the pronoun "I."

This is not the voice of moral clarity. The average Catholic churchgoer understands that no amount of psychological screening can guarantee that a pedophile won't sneak through and become a priest. What the churchgoer cannot fathom is this: Why, when confronted with such perversion, did the bishops not react with appropriate—that is to say, human—empathy? Page after page of depositions demonstrate that these men of the cloth saw the victims of sexual abuse not as children of God, but as potential liabilities. And why, to this day, do the bishops seem incapable of speaking candidly? Why do they still sound like spinmeisters rather than spiritual guides? The answers are not comforting.

The first reason is perhaps the easiest to understand. If the bishops have responded like attorneys trying to protect the assets of a corporation, that is because lawyers and insurance companies are telling the bishops how to respond. Like many people, the bishops have forgotten that the lawyers work for them, and not the other way around. The Church's potential financial liability is enormous and, now that insurance companies are no longer shouldering part of the burden, that liability is growing. "The bishops look like tobacco executives fifteen years ago, still denying that tobacco is addictive. But in the long run, all that denial does

MICHAEL SEAN WINTERS has written on Catholicism for THE NEW REPUBLIC, *The New York Times Magazine*, *America*, and other publications.

MICHAEL WOLOSCHINOW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not save a penny. Whatever you have already done, you will pay for," says Loyola Marymount University Professor of Finance Paul Schulte. He's right. In the long run, denial will not help the bishops financially, but it is costing them what little moral capital they have left. And that is a price the Church cannot afford, because the Church is not a corporation. A Catholic does not bring his three-day-old child to IBM to be welcomed into the world, nor does he call his attorney "Father." Multimillion-dollar payouts to victims don't threaten the Church nearly as much as does the further loss of confidence in the moral compass of its bishops.

THE SECOND REASON for the bishops' inaction is clericalism. In *The Irish Times*, Father Thomas Doyle, O.P., wrote: "There is a solid principle in political science that says the governing elite of an organisation will eventually think that it is the organisation. That's a mistake that the Catholic bishops have made: thinking that they alone are the church." The U.S. bishops and clergy inherited an awesome role from the immigrant Catholic ghetto. Often the only educated member of the subculture, the priest was also the doctor, the teacher, the lawyer. His advice was often sought and almost always taken. Having Father over for dinner was the social highlight of the year. Bishops were accountable to those above them: the pope and God—and no one else. The role of the people was "to pray, pay, and obey."

In addition to this lack of accountability, the careerist ambitions of some bishops inclined them to sweep scandals under the rug. In normal times, one advances through a complex hierarchy by avoiding controversy, not addressing it. In 1985, for example, while serving at the Vatican Embassy in Washington, Father Doyle drafted a report on the potential for pedophilia cases to bankrupt the Church; for his effort, he was exiled to a chaplaincy in the military. Moreover, the "old boy" network clearly clouded the judgment of those in authority. If Father Paul Shanley and Bishop John McCormack had not been seminary classmates, it is doubtful Shanley would have been kept on board after he gave a speech endorsing "man-boy" love. The normally humane desire to protect one's friends and colleagues, mixed with a desire to avoid controversy, encouraged bishops to ignore the moral enormity in their midst.

In Catholic theology, the bishops are the successors of the apostles. On Good Friday, reading the account of Jesus' trial and death, we Catholics were reminded that on the night before Jesus' death, his apostles all fled from him. If the bishops had utilized those passages to begin their own contrition—indeed, if they had acted with even a semblance of humility over the years—they could today seek cover behind the surely truthful observation "We are all sinners." But they did not, and they cannot.

The third cause of the bishops' inaction—both the most complicated and the most important—is the culture of silence and denial about human sexuality within the Catholic Church. Two years ago a well-known priest and seminary rector in Cleveland, Father Donald Cozzens, wrote a book about the priesthood in which he dealt candidly with sexual issues, discussing "taboo" subjects like the ratio of heterosexual and homosexual clergy. Cozzens did not question the Church's teachings on sexual ethics, but he did say that the Church must begin to talk about the sexual inclinations and behaviors of the clergy. The word went out that his career was over. Cleveland has been a "bishop factory" throughout the twentieth century; and under John Paul II, seminary rectors often have been tapped as new bishops. But Cozzens was not made a bishop, nor was he even given a second term as rector of the seminary. Similarly, in 1987 Father Charles Curran was stripped of his tenured professorship at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., for his liberal views on divorce, masturbation, and other questions of sexual ethics. It is one of the ironies of John Paul II's pontificate that while the Church has opened dialogues with Protestants, Jews, and Muslims to a degree unthinkable 50 years ago, discussion within the Church has been quashed. This elimination of discussion, in the name of stifling dissent, is an affront to a cornerstone of the Church: veracity. "In the beginning was the Word," opens the Gospel of John—not the half-truth, nor the evasion, nor the knowing wink. Watching the bishops squirm in front of the cameras over the past few months, we are reminded that sexuality is best discussed in more intimate and personal settings than a press conference. But if sexuality is not discussed at all, the things that eventually emerge from the dark are exactly those that land one in front of cameras or on the witness stand. An aversion to discussion inevitably leads to a fetish for secrecy that is spiritually and morally corrupting.

THERE IS A reason the Church hierarchy fears honest discussion: It fears it will expose a crisis of belief. There is a pervasive sense within the Church that no one really believes its teachings on sexuality anymore—not the laity, not even the clergy. In a strict hierarchy, no one wants to say the emperor has no clothes. When discussion is not permitted, and honest questions avoided, the Church must assert its teachings on the basis of "authority" alone; and if those teachings do not cohere with the people's lived experience, a regime of hypocrisy and indifference arises that does more to undermine "authority" than any honest discussion possibly could.

The Church's lack of credibility on questions of sexual ethics is especially disheartening because the Church has a lot to say to a culture in which sexuality is dehumanized, commodified, and generally seen as less than the beautiful thing the Catholic Church's best theology insists it is. It is more than a little ironic that a culture awash in images of underage sexuality—the same culture that gave Oscars to *American Beauty* and where Britney Spears albums go multi-platinum—is now struck with horror at the revelation of priestly molestation. The irony, however, is grim. When the Church is most needed to remind our culture that sexuality can and should be humanizing, a giving of self in freedom and love, a participation in God's ongoing creative work, the Church instead finds itself in court.

But the church cannot preach sexual ethics in a vacuum; one reason its message has failed so utterly is because American Catholicism has reduced religion to morality and specif-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ically to sexual morality. Unfortunately, because the liberalism of the public sphere requires that we set our dogmatic claims aside, the Church's cultural position invites just such a reduction. In an article in the Catholic quarterly *Communio,* theologian Monsignor Lorenzo Albacete commented: "It is a great temptation for the Church to reduce its mission to that of an ethical authority in order to gain access to the public forum."

Few would argue that the Church's moral teachings, standing on their own, are persuasive in today's culture. But they were never meant to stand on their own. What is distinctive about Catholicism is not the manner in which its members copulate, but how we pray and to whom. This core sense of wonder at the admittedly large claims of the Catholic faith—that God himself came down from Heaven, was born of a virgin, walked upon the Earth, died, and rose from the dead—and the wonder they must necessarily inspire to those who hold them, are what the Church must reclaim if its credibility is to be restored. Unless a bishop or theologian can trace his views on moral issues to the empty tomb of Easter morning, there is nothing distinctively Christian or Catholic about them.

Most American bishops are not first-rate theologians, and they do not perceive the limits imposed by the "natural law" theory to which the Church has wedded its moral teachings. Natural law has produced a very act-centered morality, a kind of Catholic utilitarianism, when the historical role of Catholicism has always been to insist on the transcendence of the human person, on the belief that utility is not the ultimate criteria for human choices. Yet natural law's anthropology is so hyperteleological that the wonder before creation, and before one's fellow creatures, that is proper to the soul is lost, and the relationships that follow are diminished in their richness, their humaneness. Surely the most important thing to know about the human person from the story of Genesis is that we are created in the image and likeness of God, and it is that belief which, through the centuries, has been the surest bulwark against dehumanization. Until the radicalism of Catholicism's claims about the creation of mankind and the mercy of God are better preached and understood, the bishops should be more reticent about what the natural law does and does not permit. To cite one horrific example, through a quirk in current Church law, you can murder your spouse, go to confession, remarry, and continue as a communicant; but you cannot divorce your spouse, go to confession, remarry, and continue as a communicant. I am no moral theologian, but that strikes me as messed up.

How can the Church climb out of this mess? First, by not blaming scapegoats. The left has blamed celibacy, and the right has blamed gay priests. But these are attempts to hitch prior ideological wagons to the pedophilia scandal's horse—akin to Karl Rove suggesting on September 13 that the best response to terrorism would have been, say, a cut in the capital gains tax. Making clerical celibacy optional would not eliminate the opportunities for moral compromise; it would simply create different ones: With the first abandoned wife, everyone would be clamoring for the good old days. As for attacking gay priests, the last thing the Church needs now is a witch-hunt of any sort. It is never a good day for an auto-da-fé.

Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon, who serves on two Vatican commissions, recently told *The New York Times* that the blame lies with the 1960s—as if pedophilia were unknown in earlier times. Glendon and other right-of-center social critics identify a 2,000-year-old faith with the Church of their grandparents, and they worry over the slightest alteration, as if the Church has not survived in large part because of its ability to adapt. As John Henry Cardinal Newman wrote in discussing human psychology and the development of Christian doctrine: "[T]o live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often." Glendon is right that the '60s changed much in our society and culture when it comes to sexuality—just not in the way she darkly imagines. For instance, before 1960 it is doubtful that Glendon would have sat on a Vatican commission or, for that matter, on the faculty of Harvard Law. The struggle for women's equality that characterized the '60s also insisted that sexuality be viewed from nonmale points of view. It turns out that a male boss squeezing his female secretary's tush was never much fun for her; as a result of listening to women's thoughts about sexuality, such behavior is now called harassment and it is against the law. That represents a moral achievement. Similarly, it turns out that little Johnny never much liked it when Father groped him either. The sophisticated Europeans who mock American Puritanism need only wait until little Giovanni and little Jean-Marie have had enough as well: The pedophilia crisis has already hit Ireland, but it will find its way to the rest of Europe. It is America's sexual revolution itself—the sexual revolution Glendon so despises—that has helped create the universal revulsion to the current pedophilia scandal.

In fact, it was the bishops' refusal to see pedophilia from the child's point of view—their tendency to see it as merely a sin of the flesh rather than a radical betrayal of trust—that lies at the heart of the current scandal. And that refusal has deep roots. The relevant canons (Church laws) lump pedophilia together with other sexual acts and make no consideration of the victim at all. Most people are, rightly, forgiving of sins of the flesh. But when one uses a position of authority to coerce sexual relations from a minor, or even from a young person of majority age who is nonetheless a parishioner or an underling, this is a sin of the spirit, a betrayal of all that the Church says sexual love should express—the free gift of self in equality and freedom.

The most obvious scapegoat is, of course, Cardinal Law. The *Los Angeles Times* has reported that several bishops want him to resign. But most of them want him to resign for the wrong reason. They may correctly believe Law mishandled the situation, but mostly they just want the scandal to go away and think that once the press has had its pound of hierarchic flesh the Church can return to normal. If they are right, then I hope Law stays.

If, on the other hand, Law were removed because he was not accountable to his flock, then his resignation would be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the first of many. After all, the situation in New York appears to be even worse than in Boston. In March *The Hartford Courant* reported that while he was bishop of Bridgeport, Cardinal Egan had also shuffled child molesters from parish to parish. After a week of silence, Egan claimed to have operated only under the advice of "prominent psychological institutions." Unfortunately, the next day the *Courant* published another damning story in which the director of the psychological institute that Egan consulted directly contradicted the cardinal's claims. "In some cases, necessary and pertinent information related to prior sexual misconduct has been withheld from us," Dr. Harold I. Schwartz of the Institute of Living told the newspaper. "In some cases, it would appear that our evaluations have been misconstrued in order to return priests to ministry."

In Los Angeles the publication of memos between Cardinal Mahony and his staff show him to be an ecclesiastical apparatchik of the first order, worried only about the public image of the Church. As Steve Lopez editorialized in the *Los Angeles Times*: "If the [Los Angeles] archdiocese had been half as aggressive in making sure sex offenders were removed from the ministry as they were in rushing attorneys into court to hide unflattering secrets, it might not be in the middle of this mess." If the pope were not so ill, perhaps he would demand the resignation of all three cardinals. Only something unprecedented like that would acknowledge the scale of the horror.

BUT THE POPE is ill, and so it is likely that the only organization that can deal with the controversy is the U.S. Conference of Bishops. When the nearly 200 American bishops hold their annual June meeting, they must adopt a national policy on sex abuse; they must fess up that their negligence and inaction were immoral; and they must beg the forgiveness of their clergy and their people. The national policy must enshrine a level of openness to which ecclesiastical procedures are unfamiliar. Lay people must be included on the boards that review allegations of sexual abuse. Court records must be unsealed if the victims desire it, and all future settlements—including the sums expended—must be part of the public record.

The problem is that the Bishops' Conference can only make legally binding decisions by unanimous consent, and some conservative bishops have made a career of obstructing such unanimity on principle. Especially under John Paul II, conservatives have preferred to have the Vatican make the decisions by fiat, rather than have the bishops debate and vote on policies stateside. The main objective of this week's meeting in Rome between all the U.S. cardinals and the pope appears to be precisely this: to make clear that should any bishop obstruct the formulation of a national policy, Rome will not support him. Different bishops have differing views about the role of a bishops' conference in the life of the Church, but today it is all there is. However ill the pope may be, the cardinals in the Vatican are not prepared to let this crisis go on forever.

But resignations and a new policy are not enough. Most importantly, in future appointments, bishops must be selected not for their ability to parrot the Vatican line, but for their ability to lead the local church and their willingness to see the hierarchic structure of the Church as a hierarchy of service—not power—in which they are accountable to the clergy and the laity below as well as to the pope above. Perhaps in the future priests should exercise greater influence in the selection of bishops—as they once did. Lest we forget, the most prominent bishop in the world, the bishop of Rome, is still elected to office by the clergy.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN the Church in the United States and the Vatican must also be restored to balance. Rome has become increasingly powerful within the Church over the past two centuries. Before the nineteenth century, local governments played key roles in the selection of bishops and even in the appointment of parish priests. Only with the separation of church and state, which the Catholic Church fought on principle, has Rome gained complete control over the personnel of the Church. Without government as a local counterweight, the local clergy and laity must now exert whatever pressure is needed to make sure their bishops are leaders, not martinets. Indeed, it may be time to return to the ancient Catholic tradition of not permitting bishops to move from one bishopric to another, more prominent one. If a man knew he was to be the bishop of Bridgeport for the rest of his life, he might be more inclined to face the realities of the local church head-on rather than worrying about becoming an archbishop somewhere else.

Still, no amount of procedural tinkering will help the Church if the men who lead it refuse to be candid. Put differently, bishops must be chosen for their humility and honesty. As in every case of sin, what is ultimately called for is less a change of policy than a change of heart. In the late 1790s the first Catholic bishop in the United States, John Carroll, welcomed a group of nuns from France by making them a gift of a slave woman and her daughter. We read this and recoil in horror—how did he not understand that trafficking in human beings was a moral enormity? We do not know that any more than we know what men and women 200 years hence will see with a similar sense of puzzlement and disgust when they look back upon our age. The Catholic bishops should remember this when they feel themselves inclined to stridency in all but their charity.

In studying the long history of Catholicism, one realizes that as bad as things are, they have been worse before. And yet the Church survives because the life of faith, in a man or in a people, is an unpredictable thing. As Monsignor Albacete recently told me, "If, in addition to all the terrible things we have learned, if tomorrow it was revealed that the pope had a harem, that all the cardinals had made money on Enron stock and were involved in Internet porno, then the situation of the Church today would be similar to the situation of the Church in the late twelfth century ... when Francis of Assisi first kissed a leper." Saints, not bishops, will remake the face of the Church, and the making of saints is God's work. It would be wonderful indeed if every bishop were a saint. But the current crisis could have been avoided if the bishops had merely remembered they were human beings. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Matters of Certainty

BILL PAXTON IS a genial actor. In such films as *Traveller* and *Twister*, he provided a dollop of amiable reliability when things around him were whirling. Now, for the first time, he has directed—**Frailty** (Lions Gate), in which he also stars; and this quiet, friendly man has chosen the story and the role of a serial killer who commits his murders with a double-bladed ax.

The reason for Paxton's choice soon becomes clear. It's not for gross contrast, the mere fact that such a role is the last thing that we would expect from his familiar image. Such a contrast can be upsetting. One of the most shocking film shocks that I remember was not in a scare flick but in an Italian western called *Once Upon a Time in the West*, in which Henry Fonda, our hometown Henry Fonda, played a cold-blooded gunman. That was a clever professional jolting of an icon. In *Frailty*, Paxton is out for something bigger. He wants to explore the dangers of belief, the perils of conviction in a person who himself happens to be appealing.

The screenplay by Brett Hanley begins in the present after some ghastly killings, then flashes back to put before us exactly the Paxton whom we have known. He is an auto mechanic in a Texas town, a widower raising two boys of about nine and twelve whom he dearly loves. Their lives proceed with just enough minor bumps to confirm the smoothness. Then Dad, who is a conventional churchgoer, has a dream in which, as he tells his boys, God has commanded him to destroy demons. A list of names has been provided, and Dad will set to work in his spare time to obey. He will not be killing people (whom he does not even know); he will be destroying demons hiding in ordinary beings. Other revelations confirm these divine instructions.

He needs his sons' confidence and help, so, gentle and loving as he is, he tells them that he knows his mission is strange but that it is God's will—in fact, he is to be called God's Hand. The boys, frightened and confused, help their father commit the first murder because to some extent they believe him and to a great extent they love him. Dad's proof that the apparently ordinary first victim is really a secret demon comes when Dad puts his hand on the bound and gagged victim and convulsions occur—Dad's own, really, but they seem a heaven-sent proof.

The story enlarges, but we need mention only that Hanley strains a bit to supply twists—presumably so that we will not foresee the ending after the grisly machine begins to roll. The plot does not matter: Paxton does. His gentleness, his meek acceptance of the heavy burden laid on him, his love of his boys, his certainty—these are the true scares.

What Paxton is laying on us, through Hanley's script, is that he knows we like him and that he is relying on our affectionate response to him to convey something more than horror. He is asking us to consider the risks of persuasion—dynamic persuasion in a person who, by any standard outside his demented belief, is socially decent. I thought of the woman who in recent years drowned her children because she thought she was possessed by Satan and wanted to save their souls from her influence. I thought of a newsreel I once saw of a fervent Nazi concentration-camp commander playing with his children, who obviously adored him. And then I thought, after much more thinking, about possibly moving to another planet where belief is not in itself a value.

Paxton's directing is perfectly serviceable, but it is worth noting that his cinematographer was the experienced Bill Butler (*One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, among others), and his editor was Arnold Glassman, who has done many television documentaries. In a directorial debut, a good cinematographer and editor quite naturally support the newcomer, sometimes by giving him what he wants in better shape than he expected. But it must have been Paxton himself who helped the two boys in the story, Matthew O'Leary and Jeremy Sumpter, through all the difficulties of their roles. And Paxton's own performance, his very persona, seals the fright.

Frailty makes us remember the familiar Yeats lines: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity." But Yeats forgot to tell us how, faced with the pallor of the first and the heat of the second, we can tell one from the other before the damage is done. Or are we to assume that intensity is always suspect?

The menu in any good restaurant lists the name of a dish—rack of lamb or Chilean sea bass or whatever—and right underneath includes the vegetables and sauce that accompany the main item. Many a screenplay reminds me of this procedure. Someone gets a central idea for a picture, then has to cook up the rest of the story to accompany and dress it.

Changing Lanes (Paramount), written by Chap Taylor and Michael Tolkin, is a prime example of the process. The main item, the "rack of lamb," is a minor auto accident and the effects it has on the lives of the two people concerned. Then, after they had the center of the dish, Taylor and Tolkin had to cook up the dressing. What *are* the effects of the accident on the lives of the two drivers concerned? Who are the two men? We can almost hear the writers puzzling: "Now that we have the idea, what in hell do we do with it?"

They still don't know. All through the picture they struggle—uncertainly—to fulfill their premise. They just keep concocting away. The place is New York. Ben Affleck, one of the two drivers, is a lawyer who is late for a court appearance, loses an important file in the fuss about the accident, and, through that loss, discovers things about his law firm and the law itself. Samuel L. Jackson, an insurance broker who belongs to Alcoholics Anonymous, has a court date, too, to keep his wife from moving to Oregon with their children. Both stories reveal a lot of heavy-breathing carpentry as they grab for coincidences. None of the action in either story or in their intertwining seems organic. The whole picture is a set of contrivances that could have been a different set of contrivances.

The director, Roger Michell, an Englishman, did brightly enough with *Notting Hill*, but here he seems continually hustling to get a grip on things. Affleck gives his usual smooth performance—a good-looking young man who has interrupted his private life long enough to visit a film studio and do what is asked of him by a director before he goes on about his private life. Samuel L. Jackson, a talented actor, gives his character all the weight that its construction will bear.

The most interesting aspect of the film is not the novelty for which it yearns but something that is by now happily familiar. Jackson is black, and this fact is irrelevant. We are now getting used to films in which a black actor's race is never mentioned. In a world full of less pleasant acceptances, we can be grateful for one advance. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Imaginative Journeys*

Negotiating with the Dead

A Writer on Writing

Margaret Atwood

"Atwood's riffs on writing not only will delight readers who are fans of her fiction but also may serve to cheer fledgling writers as they set out on their imaginative journeys."

*—*Los Angeles Times*

"This interesting and compelling book is as wise as it is charming, and it is very charming indeed...."

—*Washington Post Book World*

"Atwood allows her wit to shine on almost every page..."

—*Library Journal*



"In Atwood's book, I found hours of delight, of genial excitement — experienced with the certainty that I shall go back to it again and again for moments of joy. And — but — the greatest beneficence is that I now have a book to prescribe to any and all prospective writers. Read this carefully, I shall say. Think about it till you believe you understand what Margaret Atwood is saying, and then come back, if you like, and we can talk."

—*Michael Pakenham, Baltimore Sun*

0-521-66260-5, Hardback, $18.00









Trimalchio

An Early Version of *The Great Gatsby*

Now in paperback

F. Scott Fitzgerald

James L.W. West, III, Editor

"Trimalchio has shown me a new way to love *Gatsby.* I'm compelled into a vast aesthetic contemplation: I dream of *The Great Gatsby* as it might have been, greater still."

—*Adam Begley, New York Observer*

0-521-89047-0, Paperback, $19.00

Molière

A Theatrical Life

Now in paperback

Virginia Scott

"As the first substantive English-language biography of Molière since 1930, this is a happy arrival for students of the theater and of French literature and culture."

—*Publishers Weekly*

0-521-01238-4, Paperback, $23.00

The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language

Rodney Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum

"...manages to be at once authoritative, sensible and readable."

—*Terry Langendoen, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Arizona, past President of the Linguistic Society of America, and former Chair of the Linguistics and Language Sciences section of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*

0-521-43146-8, Hardback, $150.00

Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders

George W. Breslauer

"...is the most insightful analysis of recent Russian statecraft yet to appear."

—*Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Visiting Professor, Princeton University, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union*

0-521-89244-9, Paperback, $23.00

At better bookstores

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

www.cambridge.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To Our Feli

We affirm our love for the State of Israel, the hope of the Jewish people. Our gratitude goes out to the citizen-soldiers of Israel who protect one another from their would-be destroyers. We embrace the resolve of Israeli citizens who suffer ongoing merciless terror in their streets, buses, restaurants, and synagogues.

We declare that it is past time for the governments and leaders of all Arab and Muslim nations to recognize—unconditionally and unequivocally—the State of Israel, a democracy that has flourished honorably for 54 years despite repeated Arab attempts to annihilate it. We justly expect Arab and Muslim countries, as members of the family of nations and claimants of numerous lands and extensive territories, to respect the sovereign right of the Jewish people to its one historic homeland.

Sylvia F. Abrams, Siegal College of Judaic Studies
Rina Alcalay, University of California, Davis
Edward Alexander, University of Washington
Robert Alter, University of California, Berkeley
Michaela Amato, Penn State University
Joyce Antler, Brandeis University
Max Apple, University of Pennsylvania
Abraham Ascher, The Graduate Center of CUNY
Hava Avraham, Harvard Medical School
Shalom Avraham, Harvard Medical School
Ivet Bahar, University of Pittsburgh
Neta Bahcall, Princeton University
Egon Balas, Carnegie Mellon University
Eugene Bardach, University of California, Berkeley
Fred Baumann, Kenyon College
Murray Baumgarten, University of California, Santa Cruz
Dan Ben-Amos, University of Pennsylvania
Stephen D. Benin, University of Memphis
Sheldon Benjamin, University of Massachusetts Medical School
Alan Benjamin, Penn State University
Stanley A. Berger, University of California, Berkeley
David Berger, Brooklyn College and The Graduate Center, CUNY
Alan L. Berger, Florida Atlantic University
Norman Berkowitz, Boston College
Peter Berkowitz, George Mason University
Adele Berlin, University of Maryland
Hannah Berliner-Fischthal, St. John's University
Lawrence Bernstein, University of Pennsylvania
Richard Bersohn, Columbia University
Mark Blitz, Claremont McKenna College
Ronald A. Brauner, Siegal College of Judaic Studies
Christopher Bruell, Boston College
Stephan F. Brumberg, Brooklyn College and The Graduate Center, CUNY
Janet Burstein, Drew University
Dwayne E. Carpenter, Boston College
James W. Ceaser, University of Virginia
Norman Chigier, Carnegie Mellon University
Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley
Mortimer M. Civan, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine
Bernard L. Cohen, University of Pittsburgh
Zafrira L. Cohen, Stern College, Yeshiva University
Morris A. Cohen, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Sarah Blacher Cohen, University of Albany, SUNY
Jacob Cohen, Brandeis University
Jay N. Cohn, University of Minnesota Medical School
Michael J. Cowen, SUNY Buffalo
Morton M. Denn, City College of New York
Alan Dershowitz, Harvard University
Bruce Dezube, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
David Dobkin, Princeton University
Seymour Drescher, University of Pittsburgh
Martin Dworkin, University of Minnesota
Barry L. Eichler, University of Pennsylvania
Lawrence Eisenberg, University of Pennsylvania
Mickey Eisenberg, University of Washington
Jehoshua Eliashberg, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Todd Endelman, University of Michigan
Arnold Engler, Carnegie Mellon University
Rodney Falk, Boston University School of Medicine
Arthur Feldman, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
Yael S. Feldman, New York University
Stephen Fienberg, Carnegie Mellon University
James S. Fine, University of Washington
Norman Finkelstein, Xavier University
William Firshein, Wesleyan University
Michael Fishbane, University of Chicago
David E. Fisher, Dana Farber Cancer Institute
Hans Fisher, Rutgers University
Sylvia Barack Fishman, Brandeis University
George P. Fletcher, Columbia University School of Law
Michael V. Fox, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Daniel Frank, The Ohio State University
Mayer G. Freed, Northwestern University
Solomon Friedberg, Boston College
Milton Friedman, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Rivka Friedman, Hunter College of CUNY
S. Marvin Friedman, Hunter College of CUNY
Michelle Friedman, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
Norman Fruman, University of Minnesota
Ester Fuchs, Columbia University
Jeffrey R. Garber, Harvard Medical School
Yair Gazitt, University of Texas Health Science Center
David Gelernter, Yale University
Jane S. Gerber, The Graduate Center of CUNY
Murray Gerstenhaber, University of Pennsylvania
George Gidal, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Pinchas Giller, University of Judaism, Los Angeles
Fred Gilman, Carnegie Mellon University
Zvi Gitelman, University of Michigan
Lewis Glinert, Dartmouth College
Amy Golahny, Lycoming College
Walter Goldburg, University of Pittsburgh
Bruce L. Golden, University of Maryland
Robert Goldenberg, SUNY Stony Brook
Gerson Goldhaber, University of California, Berkeley
Matt Goldish, The Ohio State University
Steven L. Goldman, Lehigh University
Ari L. Goldman, Columbia University
Yadin Goldschmidt, University of Pittsburgh
Solomon Goldstein, The Graduate Center of CUNY
Elliot Gootman, The University of Georgia
Robert J. Gordon, University of Illinois at Chicago
Gershon Greenberg, American University
Jerome Groopman, Harvard Medical School
Leonard Groopman, Weill Cornell Medical College
Benedict Gross, Harvard University
Jonathan L. Gross, Columbia University
Gary D. Grossman, Warnell School of Forest Resources
Barbara J. Grosz, Harvard University
Juan Grunwald, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine
Janet Hadda, University of California, Los Angeles
Ruth Halaban, Yale University School of Medicine
David Weiss Halivni, Columbia University
Peter L. Hammer, Rutgers University
Paul Hans, Harvard University
Robert A. Harris, Jewish Theological Seminary
Jay M. Harris, Harvard University
Pamela Hartzband, Harvard Medical School
Kathryn Hellerstein, University of Pennsylvania
Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Graduate Center of CUNY
Dorit Hochbaum, University of California, Berkeley
Irving L. Horowitz, Rutgers University
Philip M. Hosay, New York University
Mark Huberman, Harvard Medical School
Allen Hyman, Columbia University
Kurt J. Isselbacher, Harvard Medical School
Arthur J. Jacobson, Cardozo School of Law
Martin S. Jaffe, University of Washington
Katarzyna Jerzak, The University of Georgia
Michael Johnstone, Harvard Medical School
Sergei Kan, Dartmouth College
Stephen Katz, Indiana University
Steven Katz, Boston University
Elaine Kauvar, Baruch College

P.O. Box 380895, Cambridge, M

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

w Americans

We invite all people of conscience to join us in condemning the murderous suicide attacks on our fellow Jews in Israel, and in asserting the incontrovertible necessity of self-defense in a war that Israel neither sought nor initiated—a war begun eighteen months ago by the Palestinian leadership as an attack upon constructive diplomacy. Civilization chooses the credo of life, not the worship of death.

We confirm our confidence in the President's adherence to principle, and our gratitude to our fellow Americans for their recognition of Israel's bravery and resiliency. Confronting the storm of Islamist terrorism that assaulted these shores on September 11, 2001, we are reminded that the State of Israel has been the fighting front line of democracy since its founding in 1948. In this hour of peril and anguish, we call upon the continuing support of America for our Israeli allies.

Morton Keller, Brandeis University
Dov-Ber Kerler, Indiana University
Carole S. Kessner, SUNY Stony Brook
Anatoly M. Khazanov, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Dan Kirschner, Boston College
Samuel Z. Klausner, University of Pennsylvania
Dennis B. Klein, Kean University
Alexander Kogan, Rutgers University
David Kohn, Drew University
Meir Kohn, Dartmouth College
Joseph Korn, Boston University School of Medicine
Gregory Korshin, University of Washington
Bertram Kostant, Mass. Institute of Technology
Abba M. Krieger, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Jack Kugelmass, Arizona State University
Marc Lange, University of Washington
Ruth Langer, Boston College
David Leeman, Harvard Medical School
Michael Levine, Carnegie Mellon University
Baruch A. Levine, New York University
Daniel Levinthal, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Frank Levy, Mass. Institute of Technology
Herbert S. Lewis, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Deborah E. Lipstadt, Emory University
Leonard M. Lodish, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Alan Marcus, Boston College
R. Shep Melnick, Boston College
Arnold J. Meltsner, University of California, Berkeley
Robert Mezey, Pomona College
Asher Z. Milbauer, Florida International University
Mark Jay Mirsky, City College of New York
Gary Saul Morson, Northwestern University
Allan Nadler, Drew University
Alan J. Nathanson, Wesleyan University
Howard Needler, Wesleyan University
Jacob Neusner, Bard College
Susan Nieditch, Amherst College
Maximillian E. Novak, University California, Los Angeles
Stewart E. Novick, Wesleyan University
Alan J. Nussbaum, Cornell University
Elliot Oring, California State University, Los Angeles
Zsuzsanna Ozsvath, University of Texas, Dallas
Bruce R. Parker, Baylor College of Medicine
Andrew Pessin, Kenyon College
Douglas Pleskow, Harvard Medical School
Nehemia Polen, Hebrew College
Robert E. Pollack, Columbia University
Karen Prager, University of Texas at Dallas
Morris Pripstein, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Rachel Pruchno, Boston College
Noah S. Prywes, University of Pennsylvania
Shalom Rackovsky, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
Ruth Raphaeli, Columbia University
Robert Rethy, Xavier University
Paul Lawrence Rose, Penn State University
Jerome Rosenberg, University of Pittsburgh
John Rosenberg, University of Pittsburgh
Myron Rosenblum, Brandeis University
Alvin H. Rosenfeld, Indiana University
Carl Rosenzweig, Syracuse University
Ralph Roskies, University of Pittsburgh
David G. Roskies, Jewish Theological Seminary
James Roszenweig, Harvard Medical School
Jeffrey Rubenstein, New York University
Michael J. Ruckenstein, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania
Benjamin P. Sachs, Harvard Medical School
Joshua D. Safer, Boston University School of Medicine
Oren Sagher, University of Michigan
Yoram Sagher, University of Illinois
Jerry Samet, Brandeis University
Roberta Sands, University of Pennsylvania
Marc Saperstein, The George Washington University
Jonathan Sarna, Brandeis University
Lifsa Schachter, Siegal College of Judaic Studies
Jacob J. Schacter, The Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik Institute
Lawrence H. Schiffman, New York University
Ronald Schneeweiss, University of Washington
Ismar Schorsch, The Jewish Theological Seminary
Evelyne Albrecht Schwaber, Boston Psychoanalytic Institute
Jules Schwaber, Harvard Medical School
Paul Schwaber, Wesleyan University
Drew Schwartz, Indiana University
Michael M. Segal, Harvard Medical School
Robert Seltzer, Hunter College of CUNY
Julius L. Shaneson, University of Pennsylvania
Stewart Shapiro, The Ohio State University
Benjamin Sheldon, University of Massachusetts Medical School
Susan Shell, Boston College
Oded Shenkar, The Ohio State University
Maxim D. Shrayer, Boston College
Bernard Shull, Hunter College of CUNY
Philip Siegelman, San Francisco State University
Steve Siporin, Utah State University
Elaine Sisman, Columbia University
Eugene Smolensky, University of California, Berkeley
David Solomon, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine
Dina Spechler, Indiana University
Mark A. Sperling, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine
Seymour Spilerman, Columbia University
Bernard D. Steinberg, University of Pennsylvania
Abe Steinberger, Mount Sinai Medical Center
Richard C. Steiner, Yeshiva University
Theodore I. Steinman, Harvard Medical School
Edward A. Stern, University of Washington
Shlomo Sternberg, Harvard University
Lawrence Sternberg, Brandeis University
Suzanne Last Stone, Cardozo Law School
Barry S. Strauss, Cornell University
Daniel Tarsy, Harvard Medical School
Milton Taylor, Indiana University
Edward Teller, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Jeffrey H. Tigay, University of Pennsylvania
Lionel Tiger, Rutgers University
Allan J. Tobin, University of California, Los Angeles
Martin Trow, University of California, Berkeley
George L. Turin, University of California, Berkeley
Mervin F. Verbit, Brooklyn College of CUNY
Daniel Walden, Penn State University
Daniel Weinstock, Penn State University
Ronald Weintraub, Harvard Medical School
Beno Weiss, Penn State University
Jack Wertheimer, The Jewish Theological Seminary
Steve Whitfield, Brandeis University
Ruth R. Wisse, Harvard University
Harvey Wolfe, University of Pittsburgh
M. Michael Wolfe, Boston University School of Medicine
Seth Wolitz, University of Texas, Austin
Paul R. Wolpe, University of Pennsylvania
Gazitt Yair, University of Texas Health Science Center
Mark Zeidel, University of Pittsburgh
Annette Zelversmit, Long Island University
Douglas P. Zipes, Indiana University School of Medicine
Gerald Zuriff, Wheaton College

Affiliation solely for purpose of identification. Our apologies to those whose names did not arrive in time for inclusion.

38-0895 • www.peace4israel.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BIG BOOKS
by
BIG AUTHORS

LIBERATION BY OPPRESSION
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SLAVERY AND PSYCHIATRY
Thomas Szasz
0-7658-0145-0 (cloth) 370 pp. $39.95/£33.50

The Age of Happy Problems
Herbert Gold
With a new introduction by the author
0-7658-0917-6 (paper) 2002 250 pp. $24.95/£20.95

Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millenium
A SOCIOLOGICAL PROFILE
Andrew M. Greeley
0-7658-0131-0 (cloth) 2002 192 pp. $29.95/£29.50

"Boss" Tweed
THE STORY OF A GRIM GENERATION
Denis Tilden Lynch
New extended introduction by Dennis Hale
0-7658-0934-6 (paper) 2002 433 pp. 29.95/£24.95

YOU DON'T SAY
MODERN AMERICAN INHIBITIONS
Benjamin DeMott
With a new introduction by the author
0-7658-0851-X (paper) 250 pp. $24.95/£20.95

transaction
Visit us on the web at
www.transactionpub.com

Order from your bookstore or direct from the publisher.
Toll free (US only) 1-888-999-6778
or Fax 732-748-9801
Transaction Publishers
Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey
Department AD2001 PE01
35 Berrue Circle
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8042

Keeping Up With the Cloneses

By CASS R. SUNSTEIN

Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

(Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 272 pp., $25)

THE WORD "UNNATURAL" is never a compliment. You would not describe your best friend as having "a lovely, unnatural smile." No company would advertise its product as being "one hundred percent unnatural." But John Stuart Mill, writing in 1874, urged that it is a big mistake to think that things are better if they are natural. "If the artificial is not better than the natural," Mill asked, "to what end are all the arts of life? To dig, to plough, to build, to wear clothes, are direct infringements on the injunction to follow nature." According to Mill, "Nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day performances." And Mill went further. He urged that "the duty of man is the same in respect to his own nature as in respect to the nature of all other things, namely not to follow but to amend it." For Mill, "conformity to nature has no connection whatever with right and wrong."

Mill was not writing about modern science, which is the major domain in which people are now arguing about efforts to "amend" nature. Mood-altering drugs are prescribed to tens of millions of Americans to combat depression and anxiety—both of which are thought to have, in many cases, a genetic origin. As a result of in vitro fertilization, babies can be made not the natural way, but by placing sperm and egg in a plastic dish. Louise Brown, the first human being conceived outside the womb, was born twenty-three years ago; and more than two hundred thousand people have now been conceived in this way. Before very long, some scientists say, human beings will be able to create "designer babies," with physical and psychological characteristics meeting the specifications of parents.

Does this seem like science fiction? Recently a Chicago woman gave birth to a child who had been "pre-screened" for early-onset Alzheimer's disease, which ran in the family. Doctors examined a number of embryos before finding that one of them—the eventual child—was free of the early-onset Alzheimer's gene. The child is now doing well. If genetic screening already allows people to choose among embryos, might cloning be feasible, too? Consider the birth of little CC, the recently cloned cat from Texas, a genetically identical copy of Rainbow, a two-year-old female. (CC does not look much like Rainbow, because the womb environment led to different markings on her coat.) Some people think that it is morally monstrous to clone pets, in part because doing so is "unnatural." The overwhelming majority of Americans think that it is morally monstrous to clone people, in part for the same reason. Maybe Mill overstated his argument.

Francis Fukuyama is best known for an essay that he wrote in 1989, to mark the fall of communism, called "The End of History." He argued that liberal democracy had forever triumphed over its adversaries, which, in his view, had exhausted themselves. There were many problems with his argument, and in the aftermath of September 11 Fukuyama's claim seems less than plausible; but at least it was a bold essay with a striking thesis. Fukuyama's new book is not bold and it lacks a striking thesis. Fortunately, though, it has a rich and important subject.

One of Fukuyama's goals is to steer a middle position between those who are phobic about biotechnologies and those who think that regulation is both impossible and unwise. In Fukuyama's view, regulation is both possible and wise, above all so that we hold on to "human nature." But Fukuyama offers inadequate guidance to those who are uncertain about what exactly should concern us. His book is earnest, worried, informative, and responsible, but in key spots it is platitudinous and frustratingly vague. It is also, I think, fundamentally misdirected: Fukuyama goes wrong by relying on abstract

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

claims about human nature, instead of exploring in concrete detail the likely consequences of new technologies for actual human lives. But I am getting ahead of the story.

FUKUYAMA BEGINS WITH a competent, wide-ranging, but scattered survey of scientific developments. Even without modifying genes, doctors are now able to influence behavior through neuropharmacology, which is used to control various psychological ailments. Fukuyama emphasizes the "vast increase in scientific knowledge about the biochemical nature of the brain and its mental processes," a development that in his view has left Freud in the dust. "Freudianism might be compared to the theory developed by a group of primitive tribesmen who found a working automobile and tried to explain its internal functioning without being able to open the hood." Owing to modern neuroscience, we are now able "to peer, however tentatively, at the engine." Fukuyama focuses in particular on selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), such as Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft, which appear to constitute what he calls a "happiness pill." Low levels of serotonin in the brain are associated with depression and aggression, and by increasing serotonin levels, SSRIs seem to deliver huge benefits, even miracles. Twenty-eight million Americans—ten percent of the population!—are now using SSRIs.

Fukuyama is especially interested in the apparent fact that SSRIs increase self-esteem. This, he remarks, "refers to a critical fact of human psychology, the desire all people have for recognition." He thinks that this desire "has a biological base ... related to levels of serotonin in the brain." It is at this point that Fukuyama gets nervous. "Virtually all human progress has been the by-product of the fact that people were never satisfied with the recognition they received; it was through struggle and work alone that people could achieve it." For people who do not have a clear psychological illness, SSRIs start to mark a path that looks "uncomfortably like the soma of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*."

Fukuyama is similarly uncomfortable with Ritalin, which in his view "has come to play the role of an overt instrument of social control." Ritalin is prescribed for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), a "disease" (the quotation marks are Fukuyama's) associated with, though not limited to, young boys who have a hard time sitting still and paying attention. According to one account, as many as fifteen million Americans may be suffering from one or another form of ADHD. Fukuyama is skeptical. He thinks that the simpler explanation is that ADHD is really "just the tail of the bell curve describing the distribution of perfectly normal behavior." He fears that people with certain problems "would like to absolve themselves of personal responsibility for their actions." In his account, both parents and teachers are avoiding old-fashioned discipline and training, and resorting far too often to the view that even mildly wayward children suffer from a pathology.

Fukuyama goes further. Prozac is heavily prescribed "for depressed women lacking in self-esteem," giving them "more of the alpha-male feeling that comes with high serotonin levels." Ritalin, by contrast, is prescribed "largely for young boys who do not want to sit still in class because nature never designed them to behave that way." The result of the two drugs is to move boys and girls "toward that androgenous median personality, self-satisfied and socially compliant, that is the current politically correct outcome in American society."

Yet Fukuyama is far more concerned with what is to come. He thinks that more sophisticated, powerful, and targeted efforts will emerge before long, operating as techniques of social control, marketed by pharmaceutical companies, and exercised



To order call **800-405-1619.** Prices subject to change without notice.

A Ghost's Memoir

The Making of Alfred P. Sloan's *My Years with General Motors*
John McDonald
foreword by Dan Seligman
"McDonald's manuscript is written with a rare combination of verve and strong documentation. The story it tells is an important one—of a collaboration that produced what Bill Gates called 'probably the best book to read if you want to read only one book about business.'"
— Steven J. Brams, New York University
172 pp. $24.95

now in paperback
The Wind of the Hundred Days

How Washington Mismanaged Globalization
Jagdish Bhagwati
"Beware anti-globalizers! Your most formidable opponent speaks out with his customary eloquence, wit, and incisive reasoning."
— Sylvia Ostry, University of Toronto, Canadian Ambassador for Uruguay Round
408 pp., 13 illus. $21.95 paper

now in paperback
The Invisible Heart

An Economic Romance
Russell Roberts
"This snappy, well-written novel casts economic polemic in fictional form. . . . Engaging and informative." — *Publishers Weekly*
288 pp. $14.95 paper

Master Passions

Emotion, Narrative, and the Development of Culture
Mihnea Moldoveanu and Nitin Nohria
"All of us, especially managers, must learn how our ambitions and actions contribute to our personal and organizational conditions. *Master Passions* provides a remarkable roadmap to help us be introspective in useful ways."
— James Champy, Chairman of Consulting, Perot Systems Corporation
272 pp. $29.95

now in paperback
Keys to Prosperity

Free Markets, Sound Money, and a Bit of Luck
Rudi Dornbusch
"Highly stimulating commentary on contemporary issues of enduring interest." — *Foreign Affairs*
369 pp., 34 illus. $17.95 paper

now in paperback
Creative Destruction

Business Survival Strategies in the Global Internet Economy
edited by Lee W. McKnight, Paul M. Vaaler, and Raul L. Katz
"For those who need to learn how to navigate through the world-shaking storms of innovation that characterize the Information Age, this lucid and insightful volume is required reading."
— Reed Hundt, former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission
250 pp. $15.95 paper

new from the mit press



http://mitpress.mit.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not by the state but "by parents, teachers, school systems, and others with vested interests in how people behave." Medicines that modify behavior are one route by which we might become "post-human." Another route, Fukuyama contends, involves longevity, which has grown dramatically in the last century. In 1900, the average life expectancy in the United States was in the late forties; it is now in the mid-seventies. Significant further increases may be possible—and if "a genetic shortcut to immortality exists, the race is already on within the biotech industry to find it."

What are the social and political consequences? One result is that "voting age populations in the developed world will be more heavily feminized, in part because more women in the growing elderly cohort will live to advanced ages than men, and in part because of a long-term sociological shift toward greater female political participation." Fukuyama also thinks that "biotechnology is likely to offer us bargains that trade off length of life span for quality of life." Eventually our relationship "to death will change," and "accepting death will appear to be a foolish choice, not something to be faced with dignity or nobility."

However dramatic this seems, Fukuyama insists that genetic engineering is "the most revolutionary technology of all." This technology is already being used in agriculture, producing insect-resistant corn and herbicide-resistant soybeans. "The next line of advance is obviously to apply this technology to human beings." Armed with an understanding of the functions of genes, researchers might well be able to affect intelligence, crime, even sexual orientation, for all of these have genetic components. Fukuyama predicts that the initial steps in this general direction will consist of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and screening (as in the case of pre-screening for early-onset Alzheimer's). In his view, parents will routinely be able to screen embryos for a wide variety of disorders—and to implant in the mother's womb those with the preferred set of genes. He also thinks that human cloning will precede genetic engineering. The ultimate prize will be the "designer baby," meaning a baby with preselected characteristics such as "intelligence, height, hair color, aggression, or self-esteem." Fukuyama believes that genetic engineering "puts eugenics squarely back on the table."

What is wrong with all this? Fukuyama's answer is based on the idea of human nature, which he defines as "the sum of the behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental factors." This definition raises many questions. What does "typical" mean, and how can we figure out a "sum" of genetically determined behavior and characteristics? Fukuyama recognizes that human characteristics, such as height, are variable within the species and over time, but he stresses that nature determines "the overall degree of possible variance." Environmental factors "can change median heights," but they "cannot push human heights above or below certain limits." And what is true for height is true for intelligence as well. Fukuyama adds that there are "species-typical ways in which we perceive, learn, and develop intellectually." Language is central, as are certain values of parental love and reciprocity.

IN HIS DISCUSSION of these matters, Fukuyama explores a number of philosophical issues, particularly the "naturalistic fallacy," that is, the idea that empirically based claims about human nature cannot furnish any guidance on what we should be doing. Hume, for example, is widely thought to have shown that one cannot get an "ought" from an "is." But Fukuyama thinks that the naturalistic fallacy is itself fallacious. In his opinion, you can get an ought from an is. To establish this point, he offers nothing less than a brief tour of the "Western tradition," beginning with Socrates and moving briskly through Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. Fukuyama urges that "virtually all


the Art and Politics of
Arthur Szyk
SPECIAL EXHIBITION
April 10–October 14, 2002
IRVIN UNGAR THROUGH THE ARTHUR SZYK SOCIETY
Arthur Szyk (1894–1951) began his career as a gifted book illustrator and ultimately became one of the most influential World War II artists in America. He used his artistry to support the Jewish people, awaken the world to Nazi tyranny, mobilize the international community to end the Holocaust, and herald the Allied cause. His powerful, intricate work appeared in *Time, Esquire,* the *New York Post, Collier's,* the *Chicago Sun, Look,* and other leading publications. More than 140 original works of art by Szyk, many not exhibited in more than 50 years, and a large number of his images from prints, newspapers, magazines, and posters are being displayed during the exhibition.
In the Museum's Sidney Kimmel and Rena Rowan Exhibition Gallery
Admission is free. No passes are necessary for entering the Museum or special exhibitions. Passes are needed only for the Permanent Exhibition and may be obtained at the Museum, at www.tickets.com, or by calling (800) 400-9373.
Open 7 days a week 10 a.m.–5:30 p.m.
Special Extended Hours
April 11–June 13: Tuesdays and Thursdays open until 8 p.m.
Extended hours are made possible in part through the support of Lorraine and Jack N. Friedman.
100 Raoul Wallenberg Place, SW • Washington, DC 20024-2126 • (202) 488-0400 • www.ushmm.org • Metro: Smithsonian
UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KEEPING CURRENT



After the World Trade Center

Rethinking New York City

Michael Sorkin and Sharon Zukin, Editors

September 11th transformed all of New York City, not just the historic financial district of Lower Manhattan. This **timely collection** calls on New York's best urbanists to consider the attack and its aftermath in the broadest context.

Contributors include: Moustafa Bayoumi, Marshall Berman, M. Christine Boyer, Edwin G. Burrows, Eric Darton, Keller Easterling, Beverly Gage, David Harvey, Setha M. Low, Peter Kwong, Peter Marcuse, Robert Paaswell, Andrew Ross, Arturo Ignacio Sánchez, Neil Smith, Michael Sorkin, John Kuo Wei Tchen, Mike Wallace, Mark Wigley and Sharon Zukin.

Now in Paperback

One of The Economist's *Best Books of 2000*

A Common Humanity

Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice

Raimond Gaita

"...a work of both the writer and philosopher. It is a **rare and distinguished contribution** to our public life."

— Martin Krygier



Discovering Islam

Making Sense of Muslim History and Society, Revised Edition

Akbar Ahmed ♦ Foreword by Lawrence Rosen

"...**vivid and absorbing**...offers a stimulating introduction to a religion of 800 million people and a quarter of the world's countries: a religion which is also an extraordinary political force."

— *The Economist*



Silent Theft

The Private Plunder of Our Common Wealth

David Bollier

"This **beautifully written, carefully argued** book shows how little we learned from the past. Bollier shows how in a range of important contexts, free and open resources are being enclosed, to the benefit of the corporate class, and burden of Americans generally."

— Lawrence Lessig



Neon Metropolis

How Las Vegas Started the Twenty-First Century

Hal Rothman

"Hal Rothman's **wonderful book** forcefully revises virtually every standard-issue urbanist cliché about Vegas. Within the city of sin and simulation, he finds one of striving, decency, and possibility, a post-millennial American dream."

— Michael Sorkin

Routledge ♦ www.routledge-ny.com ♦ 800-634-7064

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

philosophers" who offer theories of rights "end up reasserting various assumptions about human nature into their theories." Thus those who contend that reproductive choices should be treated as special rights must think that such choices are "somehow more important than other kinds of rights, based on their importance for a median or average human individual."

To support the claim that human nature exists, and that it matters for purposes of policy, Fukuyama also offers some remarks about the idea of animal rights. He suggests that some such rights should indeed be recognized, simply because nonhuman animals "can feel pain and suffer." But the idea of animal rights grows out of "an empirical observation of what is typical for their species" and hence a "substantive judgment about their natures," which, for an opponent of the naturalistic fallacy such as Fukuyama, is an appropriate basis for establishing rights.

Fukuyama moves rapidly from human nature to human dignity, which derives from "some essential human quality underneath that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect." He sees this idea as deeply egalitarian, because it "entitles every member of the species to a higher moral status than the rest of the natural world." With respect to biotechnology, he is concerned that social elites will be able to bypass the genetic lottery and ensure preferred characteristics for their children. Notwithstanding its random quality, or indeed because of its random quality, such a lottery has a kind of egalitarianism, "since everyone, regardless of social class, race, or ethnicity, has to play in it." But "when the lottery is replaced by choice, we open up a new avenue along which human beings can compete, one that threatens to increase the disparity between the top and bottom of the social hierarchy." Fukuyama fears that the belief in human dignity might be at risk if we are no longer bound to our (or his) notion of human nature.

WHAT DOES FUKUYAMA propose to do? His argument is not for any particular law, but for institutions that will ensure a democratic check on biotechnology. "In the face of the challenge from a technology like this, where good and bad are intimately connected, it seems to me that there can be only one possible response: countries must regulate the development and use of technology politically, setting up institutions that will discriminate between those technological advances that promote human flourishing, and those that pose a threat to human dignity and well-being." Fukuyama hopes for both domestic regulation and international regulation. He wants to rely not on existing agencies, but on "a new agency to oversee the approval of new medicines, procedures, and technologies for human health." This agency should have authority "over all research and development, and not just research that is federally funded." In arguing for such regulation, he spends much of his time urging that we move beyond the polarized debate between libertarians who oppose any regulation at all and morally motivated critics of biotechnology as such.

Fukuyama is alert to an obvious question: who will oversee any new regulatory institutions? He responds that institutions should be controlled by "the democratically constituted political community," bringing its own judgments to bear on the key questions. Fukuyama also believes that "it is simply not the case that the speed and scope of technological development cannot be controlled." In many morally vexing matters, such as those involving human body parts and nuclear weapons, domestic and international regulation has been quite effective. While no regulatory system is entirely successful, controls are possible if enough people are committed to them.

Indeed, existing controls, mostly covering agricultural biotechnology, do a great deal. The problem is that in light of recent scientific innovations there are "gaping holes in the existing regime." But Fukuyama is unclear on the substantive content of any regulation, devoting only a few pages to the details. With respect



INDICTMENT AT THE HAGUE
The Milošević Regime and Crimes of the Balkan Wars
Norman Cigar and Paul Williams,
Introduction by Ivo Banac

"Cigar and Williams were the first to set out in meticulous detail Milosevic's legal responsibility for genocide and other crimes of war."
—Noel Malcolm, author of *Bosnia: A Short History*

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS OF THE DAMNED
The War Inside Kosovo
Matthew McAllester

"McAllester takes the reader not only along the streets where atrocities have been committed but inside homes while they are happening."
—*Washington Post*





SERBIA
The History of an Idea
Stevan K. Pavlowitch

Serbias have come and gone, and they have moved from place to place. This book looks at the historical forces, actors, ideas, and period which have molded the entities that go by the name "Serbia."

NYU PRESS www.nyupress.nyu.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thinking Allowed

Dostoevsky

The Mantle of the Prophet, 1871–1881

Joseph Frank

This fifth and final volume of Joseph Frank's celebrated biography of Dostoevsky renders with a rare intelligence the last decade of the writer's life, the years in which he wrote *A Raw Youth*, *Diary of a Writer*, and his crowning triumph: *The Brothers Karamazov*.

Cloth $35.00 0-691-08665-6 Due May



Racism

A Short History

George M. Fredrickson

With a rare blend of learning, economy, and insight, George Fredrickson surveys the history of Western racism from the late Middle Ages to the present. This illuminating work is the first to treat racism across such a sweep of history and geography.

Cloth $22.95 ISBN 0-691-00899-X





Free Trade under Fire

Douglas A. Irwin

Here Douglas Irwin sweeps aside the misconceptions that litter the debate over trade and gives readers a clear understanding of the issues involved. This is an essential primer for anyone who wants to understand one of the most heated controversies of our time.

Cloth $27.95 ISBN 0-691-08843-8

A Carnival of Revolution

Central Europe 1989

Padraic Kenney

This is the first history of the revolutions that toppled communism in Europe to look at the grassroots movements behind those revolutions.

Cloth $29.95 ISBN 0-691-05028-7

Imperfect Garden

The Legacy of Humanism

Tzvetan Todorov

"*Imperfect Garden* is a moving defense of humanism, an eloquent articulation of its central values of freedom, responsibility, and decency."
—Stephen Greenblatt

Cloth $29.95 ISBN 0-691-01047-1
Due May

New in paperback

With a new afterword by the author

Republic.com

Cass Sunstein

"*Republic.com* raises important and troubling questions about the effects of the Internet on a democratic society. Sunstein's assessment is persuasive."
—Stephen Labaton, *New York Times Book Review*

Paper $12.95 ISBN 0-691-09589-2
Due May
An ebook edition is available from major on-line retailers for $9.95.



Princeton University Press 800-777-4726 • WWW.PUP.PRINCETON.EDU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to reproductive cloning, he takes a firm stand, arguing for a ban on both practical and moral grounds. The practical problem, he writes, "is that cloning is the opening wedge for a series of new technologies that will ultimately lead to designer babies." The moral problem is that "cloning is a highly unnatural form of reproduction that will establish equally unnatural relationships between parents and children," with a parent having to "nurture a younger version of his or her spouse."

Fukuyama is more ambivalent about the appropriate treatment of early embryos, which are the source of the ongoing controversy over stem-cell research. Early embryos—less than a few days old, just tiny clumps of cells—might be created and used to produce stem cells, which are highly adaptable, and which might be used for therapeutic and research purposes. Very recently, for example, stem cells were used to cure a mouse whose blood and immune system had been destroyed. Congress is now debating whether to ban cloning of human embryos for therapeutic and research purposes; and some people would like to ban stem-cell research altogether.

But in this matter Fukuyama does not offer a final judgment. In his view, it is morally relevant that an embryo "has the potential to become a full human being." It is entitled to less protection than an infant, but still "it has a higher moral status than other kinds of cells or tissue that scientists work with." For this reason, Fukuyama doubts whether scientists "should be free to create, clone, and destroy human embryos at will." He urges that "if we are to do things like harvest stem cells from embryos, we should put a lot of limits and constraints around this activity to ensure that it does not become a precedent for other uses of the unborn that would push the envelope further."

More generally, Fukuyama, with his emphasis on human nature, contends that it is important "to distinguish between therapy and enhancement," authorizing the former while restricting the latter. "The original purpose of medicine is, after all, to heal the sick, not to turn healthy people into gods." He knows that the distinction between therapy and enhancement is unclear and deeply contested, but he thinks that this is the sort of distinction that regulatory agencies can administer. His closing plea is not for any particular set of controls but for a new set of institutions, representing a higher form of freedom than the freedom recommended by those who argue for unfettered freedom of choice. "True freedom means the freedom of political communities to protect the values they hold most dear, and it is that freedom that we need to exercise with regard to the biotechnology revolution today."

MANY OF FUKUYAMA'S positions are reasonable. He is right to insist that these scientific advances raise serious ethical issues. Prozac and Ritalin certainly do seem to be overused. It is sensible to restrict scientific experimentation with fetuses; even those who support the right to choose abortion should want to regulate the research uses of unborn children who have reached a certain stage of development. Fukuyama is also correct to criticize those who think that legal restrictions cannot possibly work. At the very least, such restrictions will reduce the level and the likelihood of the prohibited conduct. It is certainly reasonable for Fukuyama to want some democratic control of the emerging situation; no sensible person is opposed to that. But on the hard questions—those on which people are now disagreeing—Fukuyama says much too little, and what he says offers too little help. More important, his emphasis on the idea of "human nature" seems to me confusing and wrongheaded. This is not because human nature does not exist, or because it is irrelevant to politics, but because it offers us too little guidance for thinking about biotechnology, and because it does not support the distinction, crucial to Fukuyama, between "therapy" and "enhancement."

Let us turn to specific issues. Begin with stem-cell research. As I have said, Fukuyama concludes that the potential of a human embryo entitles it to a lower moral status than that of a human child, but a higher moral status than that of other cells. There is nothing wrong with middle positions, but what exactly is his argument here? Some people insist that embryos, even at a very early stage, have the same moral status as children. Other people believe that an early human embryo—smaller than the period at the end of this sentence—is entitled to no greater moral status than any other group of cells. Fukuyama offers his plausible centrist view, but he provides no argument against the views that he rejects.

Consider the following position. Stem-cell research promises to produce significant social benefits, including better treatment of many medical conditions, such as diabetes, Parkinson's disease, heart disease, paralysis, cancer, burns, and other conditions related to specific cell abnormalities. If scientists will be using and cloning embryos only at a very early stage when they are just a handful of cells (say, before they are four days old), there is no good reason for a ban. It is silly to think that "potential" is enough for moral concern. Sperm cells have "potential," and (not

"Informed, lively, and challenging...



Cloth • 0-471-44277-1 • $29.95 US/$46.50 CAN

CATO INSTITUTE

...Brink Lindsey's book illuminates the tough road ahead in the fight for free markets and against the dead hand of the past. I have benefited greatly from reading this book and so can everyone who cares about freedom."

–George P. Shultz
former U.S. Secretary of State

Provocative and contrarian, *Against the Dead Hand* offers a portrait of the current struggle for global capitalism in the face of outdated twentieth-century political and social concepts. From Soviet Communism to European democratic socialism, to modern protectionism, Brink Lindsey reveals the extent to which the "dead hand" of the old collectivist dream still challenges a free market world economy.

At bookstores, or call 1-800-767-1241 or visit www.cato.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDERSTANDING OUR WORLD



THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE
Small Wars and the Rise of American Power
Max Boot

"Anyone who wants to understand why America has permanently entered a new era in international relations must read *The Savage Wars of Peace*." *–Los Angeles Times Book Review*

"Fascinating reading . . . *The Savage Wars of Peace* will seem to a few unapologetically imperialistic, but far more readers will rightly see that its message is instead a moral one–and never more timely than now." *–The Weekly Standard*

YELLOW
Race in America Beyond Black and White
Frank H. Wu

"An excellent overview of the official and unofficial policies that have shaped Asian-American history and identity in the U.S., and of the thinking that has laid the foundation for them." *–Chicago Tribune*

"[Wu] gets beyond the black-white debate that we're used to and takes us into the 21st century on the race question." *–BusinessWeek*





THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS
And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life
Richard Florida

"A powerful, insightful book... Never before have I seen anyone capture so succinctly the values and desires of the new 'creative class' and the essence of human capital and the creative ethos." –John Seely Brown, Former Director, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)

"An insightful portrait of the values and lifestyles that will drive the 21st century economy." –Lewis M. Branscomb, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University



THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL
Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa
Bill Berkeley

A NEW REPUBLIC BOOK

"First-rate reporting." *–Foreign Affairs*

"A smart and broad introduction to the political crisis in Africa." *–New York Times Book Review*

A BOOK SENSE 76 SELECTION
A *LOS ANGELES TIMES* BEST BOOK OF 2001
NOW IN PAPERBACK



THE CASH NEXUS
Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000
Niall Ferguson

"Stimulating and provocative. Not only original and creative but deeply researched." *–The Wall Street Journal*

"With practiced eye, he takes aim at the claim that economics decides the course of history; that democracy brings wealth and peace; that Britain and America were undone by imperial overstretch; and that today's world is governed by financial markets." *–The Economist*

NOW IN PAPERBACK

WHEREVER BOOKS ARE SOLD **BASIC BOOKS** **A Member of the Perseus Books Group** **www.basicbooks.com**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to put too fine a point on it) most people are not especially solicitous about them.

In any case, scientists are now permitted to experiment on grown animals; and if we want to prevent unjustified suffering, surely we should be more concerned about experiments on monkeys, pigs, and dogs than about research involving very early human embryos. Some people respond that if we allow such research, then we will encounter some hard line-drawing problems. They maintain that if we are to keep our moral convictions intact, then we must draw the line here and now. But if significant medical advances are likely, why not draw the line there and then? Fukuyama does not argue for a ban on stem-cell research; the problem is that his discussion provides no response to the opponents or the supporters of such research.

With respect to human cloning, Fukuyama's arguments are embarrassingly thin. In his view, cloning is an "unnatural form" of reproduction that might lead to "unnatural" relationships between parents and children. But artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization are unnatural, too; and I doubt that Fukuyama would want to ban them. Does Fukuyama object also to cesarean section? To anesthetizing women during childbirth? Believe it or not, Fukuyama seems worried that parents might develop inappropriate feelings toward their spouses' clones. (Maybe we should not abandon Freud quite yet.) Less ridiculously, he fears that if we allow human cloning, we will be on the way to "designer babies." But if we are to recoil at the prospect of "designer babies," why should we draw the line between in vitro fertilization (now permitted) and cloning, rather than between cloning and selecting for genetically programmed traits?

A great deal (though not all) of the opposition to human cloning seems to be rooted in ignorance, even in hysteria; and yet I do believe that human cloning should probably be banned, and for a simple reason. The reason—which is, astonishingly, not emphasized by Fukuyama—is that in its current form the technology creates significant risks of serious illness and early death for the children who would result. And it would impose risks on their mothers, too.

Unless the accompanying benefits are extraordinary, no technology should be permitted if it creates risks of this magnitude. It is also plausible to fear other concrete harms, such as adverse psychological effects on people who are genetically identical to one or another parent; but this is a speculative concern. The sheer risks of illness and death are enough to stay our hands for now. (But note that this argument does not support a ban on nonreproductive cloning, that is, the cloning of very early embryos for medical and scientific uses.)

FUKUYAMA IS IN favor of "therapy," but he is against "enhancement." He wants this distinction to serve as the basis for "draw[ing] red lines" between "what is legitimate and what is illegitimate" in many areas, including preimplantation diagnosis and screening. But surely this is a very fragile distinction; and if it pivots on the difference between "normal" health and better-than-normal health, it is not clear that the distinction has much moral relevance. Suppose that medical technologies could make ninety-five percent of Americans as healthy, physically and psychologically, as the most healthy Americans now are. That would seem to be an extraordinary advance that would greatly reduce human suffering. Would this be therapy or enhancement? Would it be wrong to use technologies that would make all of us as healthy as, say, the top one percent?

Fukuyama offers no argument against practices of this kind, and I am not at all sure that he would oppose or ban them. But now suppose that biotechnology could move people well beyond the top one percent—that it could make people healthier than anyone is today. This would undoubtedly qualify as enhancement. But what would be wrong with it, if we were not causing harm to anyone or discriminating against anyone? Should we really feel a strong moral allegiance to the "typical" characteristics of the human genotype? People with certain theological positions might have an affirmative answer, but Fukuyama is arguing on secular grounds. Anyway, how can we be so sure that God, who endowed us with minds, would not like us to improve our genetic capacities?

Fukuyama refers with approval to the claim, which he attributes to Leon Kass, that "there is a natural functioning to the whole organism that has been determined by the requirements of the species' evolutionary history, one that is not simply an arbitrary social construction." The claim seems correct. What is missing from Fukuyama's account, however, is an explanation of why human beings should not improve, if they can, on this "natural functioning." Why should the outcome of evolutionary history enjoy such special moral status?

At times Fukuyama seems concerned about inequality—not about an across-the-board increase in human health and abilities, but about a situation in which some people, and not others, are able to enhance the capacities of their children. The concern is perfectly legitimate, but here, too, Fukuyama just skims the surface. In vitro fertilization is expensive, and poor people are unlikely to be able to afford it—and yet it would be odd to ban it for that reason. It costs a lot of money to screen embryos for early-onset Alzheimer's: would Fukuyama prohibit such screening on equality grounds? Prozac and Ritalin are expensive, but if they help people they should not be forbidden on the ground that wealthy people are far more able to afford them. Of course much more should be done to improve medical treatments for people who lack money. But how are poor people helped by bans on therapy and even enhancement? On the contrary, any bans are most likely to hurt poor people, if only because scientific advances are driven in part by the profit motive, and such advances help most people, not just a few.

Perhaps this misses Fukuyama's real concern. If wealthy people are able to engage in genetic engineering, they might be able to bypass the genetic lottery and give their children special characteristics, with the result of placing less-wealthy people at a new and potentially massive social disadvantage. In his fascinating book *Remaking Eden*, which appeared in 1997, Lee Silver discusses the possible rise of a new kind of social stratification, with the rich creating a class of "gene-enriched" people. To be sure, there is a potential problem here worthy of sustained thought: rich people do receive the best medical treatments, and perhaps even larger social disparities will increase over time. But at present this possibility does not offer a reason for government to impose new regulatory controls. At most, this anxiety should be taken to suggest that the relevant technologies should be made available to many rather than to only a few.

INEQUALITY IS NOT at the heart of Fukuyama's argument. His real claim is on behalf of "human nature." He thinks that if we understand what human nature is, we will be better equipped to approach the ethical issues raised by biotechnology. There is a sensible and important point in the background. To see it, consider Fukuyama's brief but suggestive treatment of the rights of animals. Dogs, cats, and horses should indeed have the right to be free from cruelty and neglect; and they do have that very right under state law. Still, as Fukuyama urges, no one thinks that dogs, cats, and horses should have the right to vote or to participate in literacy programs. A claim about what a dog is entitled to has everything to do with the kind of creature that a dog is. The same is true for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New books from YALE

How Democratic Is the American Constitution?
ROBERT A. DAHL



"This book is **vintage Dahl at the highest possible level.** It is lucid, acutely analytic, literate and both consistent with the long series of previous books by Dahl and new in its details and broad contours."
—Fred Greenstein $19.95

Starr
A Reassessment
BENJAMIN WITTES



"A brilliant piece of work. . . . Wittes has fashioned the only honest and formidable argument would-be defenders of Kenneth Starr have ever had to confront."—*The Weekly Standard*
$24.95

People's Witness
The Journalist in Modern Politics
FRED INGLIS

"Inglis is one of the rare writers about journalism . . . who combine a thorough knowledge of media theory with a bursting curiosity about journalistic practice."
—Victor Navasky
16 illus. $29.95



Spy Capitalism
ITEK and the CIA
JONATHAN E. LEWIS

"By far the most comprehensive and definitive description of the symbiotic relationship between the corporate world and the CIA's early space-based intelligence collection program. The quality of the research is extraordinary."
—William E. Burrows $29.95

Voting with Dollars
A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance
BRUCE ACKERMAN and IAN AYRES



"A **fresh and provocative** way of thinking about the interaction between dollars and votes, and a fascinating out-of-the-box solution for what's wrong."
—Robert B. Reich $29.95

Bush v. Gore
The Question of Legitimacy
Edited by BRUCE ACKERMAN



"Impassioned and piquing interpretations of law and its application or misapplication in the presidential election of 2000."
—*Kirkus Reviews*
$26.95

American Law in the Twentieth Century
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN

"This is **a work of vast scope and ambition,** nothing less than a history of the whole sweep of a huge and complex subject, a social history of American law in the 20th century."
—Robert W. Gordon $35.00

Divided Jerusalem
The Struggle for the Holy City
BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

"[A] **lively and provocative** new history . . . [that] forces us to reexamine what we think we know about [Jerusalem]."
—Thomas W. Lippman, *Washington Post Book World*
Named one of the books of the year by The Economist $29.95



Jihad
The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia
AHMED RASHID



"A tour de force."
—Peter Bergen, *Washington Post Book World*

"Americans, and especially U.S. policymakers, should read *Jihad.*"
—Paul Starobin, *Business Week* $24.00
The #1 *New York Times* Bestseller
Also by AHMED RASHID: TALIBAN
$14.95 A Yale Nota Bene paperback

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan
Second Edition
BARNETT R. RUBIN

This **"superb"*** book by a leading expert on Afghanistan is **"the book on Afghanistan for the educated public."**** (**Foreign Affairs*, ***World Policy Quarterly*,* both on the earlier edition) $18.95 paperback
Also by BARNETT R. RUBIN:
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN
From Buffer State to Failed State $40.00

Cloak and Dollar
A History of American Secret Intelligence
RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES

"A uniquely personal, scathing and surprising interpretation of American spy agencies from one of the leading international authorities on intelligence operations."
—Richard Gid Powers $29.95

Ireland's Holy Wars
The Struggle for a Nation's Soul, 1500-2000
MARCUS TANNER

This vivid and perceptive exploration of the enduring conflict in Ireland is **"excellent, readable, controversial and original."**—John Bruton, *The Daily Telegraph* 36 illus. $29.95

Yale University Press yalebooks.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

human beings. When we think about human rights, and about what makes those rights distinctive, we can make a great deal of progress by emphasizing distinctly human characteristics.

The problem is that Fukuyama confuses this point with a very different one that has to do with what he sees as the importance, for purposes of assessing biotechnology, of "behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental factors." Suppose that it is "typical" for members of the human species, on the basis of genetic factors, to fear flying in airplanes, to respond with violence when insulted, or to die from cancer or heart disease after a certain age. Surely Fukuyama would not object to cultural interventions that would counteract genetic predispositions to fear of flying or to excessive violence. Surely he would not oppose efforts to alter diet so as to counteract the genetic predisposition to die from cancer or heart disease. Why, then, should anyone object to medical technologies that would take people beyond the domain of the "typical"—by, for example, screening out genetic predispositions that lead to preventable illnesses and death? Or suppose that scientists can make human beings taller, healthier, faster, stronger, and smarter than is "typical." Why, exactly, object to that?

I do not think that Fukuyama has a good answer to that question. But I do think that he has an intuition. The intuition is nicely captured by his suggestion that Prozac makes girls more like boys and Ritalin makes boys more like girls, thus pushing members of both sexes "toward that androgenous median personality, self-satisfied and socially compliant, that is the current politically correct outcome in American society." The suggestion seems to me daft—but let us suppose for a moment that it is right. Suppose that some girls have a genetic predisposition toward depression and that some boys have a genetic predisposition toward excessive aggression, and that Prozac and Ritalin provide help on both counts. Suppose that the result is to make girls somewhat more self-satisfied and boys somewhat more compliant with social norms against aggression. Is this bad?

I think that Fukuyama's abstract interest in "human nature" and in what is "natural" prevents him from attending enough to what most matters: the concrete consequences, for actual human lives, of biotechnological advances. Sadness, anxiety, and aggressiveness should not be treated or screened out: bad and dark feelings are an essential part of good human lives. But if neuropharmacology can counteract crippling depression, which is far more dire than melancholy, surely it should be applauded. Human cloning should not be permitted if it would cause, for the children who result, serious illness and early death, or even serious psychological harm; but if stem-cell research promises to deliver significant benefits, surely government should encourage it. Mill was right. If science is able to make human lives healthier, longer, and better, then it is foolish to object in nature's name. ■

The pursuit of unhappiness in America.

Loving and Leaving

By Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn

I.

Whatever the legacy that Americans of our time will leave, we will undoubtedly be marked by one of the strangest facts of our history: that matters once understood to make the most difference for human contentment are taken lightly, and matters once understood as trivial have the greatest claim on our attention. We can see this very clearly in our approach to the family. Divorce has become so endemic in our society that a whole lore has risen up around it: that divorce is a temporary crisis; that so many children have experienced their parents' divorce that children nowadays do not worry much about it; that in fact it makes things easier, and it is itself a mere rite of passage; that if the parents feel better, so will the children.

Judith S. Wallerstein, who has spent her life studying and counseling families undergoing divorce, points out that such dinner-party notions amount to a set of rationalizations for the increasingly common—and even cavalier—decisions to end marriages, even those involving children. In her prolific research and writing on the subject, Wallerstein has nearly single-handedly exploded the myths deemed to be the truth about divorce. Her latest book, co-authored with Julia M. Lewis and Sandra Blakeslee, is a powerful and moving examination of the subject, and it should be read by anyone interested in what makes some marriages and some families work so much better than others—indeed, by anyone trying to decide whether to marry in the first place.

Every American can recite the statistic: about one out of every two marriages will end in divorce. But not everyone can appreciate the extent of the human suffering behind the numbers. An honest appraisal is hard to come by. The prevalence of divorce means that we are all invested in it. Nearly everyone who has not experienced it knows someone who has. To criticize divorce seems a mean-spirited attack on those who have already endured enough, often miraculously weathering either a bad marriage or a bad divorce and, if they are lucky, going on to find solace and even happiness elsewhere. Moreover, our inherited moral imagination and our common sense about the family, funneled as it now is through pop psychology and impoverished portrayals on television, prompt us to reduce the criticism of divorce to a reactionary attempt to roll back precious freedoms from the strictures of the past.

The most passionate and intelligent defenders of the family—they include

Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, the author most recently of *Race Experts* (Norton), is at work on a book on the family in America.

The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25-Year Landmark Study
by Judith S. Wallerstein, Julia M. Lewis, and Sandra Blakeslee
(Hyperion, 352 pp., $14.95)

Man and Wife in America: A History
by Hendrik Hartog
(Harvard University Press, 416 pp., $31.50)

Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation
by Nancy F. Cott
(Harvard University Press, 304 pp., $15.95)

The Marriage Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened Families
by James Q. Wilson
(HarperCollins, 288 pp., $25.95)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New, Relevant, Essential

BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION PRESS

Integrating China into the Global Economy
Nicholas R. Lardy

Beyond the Dot.coms
The Economic Promise of the Internet
Robert E. Litan and Alice M. Rivlin

Sticking Together
The Israeli Experiment in Pluralism
Yaakov Kop and Robert E. Litan

American Metropolitics
The New Suburban Reality
Myron Orfield

To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process
Report of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform
Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, Robert H. Michel, and Lloyd N. Cutler, co-chairs

The Education Gap
Vouchers and Urban Schools
William G. Howell and Paul E. Peterson

The New Russian Diplomacy
Igor S. Ivanov with an introduction by Henry A. Kissinger
Copublished with the Nixon Center

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy
Paul R. Pillar

A Strategic Vision for Africa
The Kampala Movement
Francis Deng and I. William Zartman

Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy
The Tribulations of Southern Africa: 1960–2000
Robert I. Rotberg
A World Peace Foundation book

Ivory Towers on Sand
Martin Kramer
A Washington Institute for Near East Policy book

Attacks on the Press in 2001
A Worldwide Survey
With a preface by Anne Garrels
A Committee to Protect Journalists book






















Brookings Institution Press
Phone: 800-275-1447 or 202-797-6258
Fax: 202-797-2960 (Order Department)

Available at your local bookstore or order online at
www.brookings.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

William Galston, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Mary Ann Glendon, and David Popenoe—are often eclipsed by the extremes at either end of the political spectrum. Many on the left interpret any defense of stable, two-parent households as a personal attack on single parents and divorced individuals and gays and anyone else not living in the traditional setup. The right, more than willing to oblige, often defends the family with just such coarse attacks, and by promoting a "Stepford Wives" caricature complete with the obedient stay-at-home wifely automaton catering to her dominant husband. We are repeatedly exposed to these extremes: liberationism, according to which momentary whims dictate social arrangements and new "family" forms; and the family-values scenario, according to which the advances made by women in the world of work, and the new freedoms gained in private life, are to be slighted or condemned. With friends like these, the family hardly needs enemies.

It is rare to find a perspective at once capable of compassion for those driven to divorce and honest in its confrontation with the real problems that a wholesale embrace of divorce raises for children and for society as a whole. In Wallerstein's exploration of the disastrous consequences of divorce, she never loses sight of the truth that for some people it can also spell a necessary deliverance from a disastrous marriage. Though her examination leads her to a passionate defense of the family, and to urgent warnings about the ultimate effects of divorce as an all-purpose reaction to the normal difficulties that couples face, Wallerstein does not call for the sacrifice of equality, freedom, and happiness at the altar of marital stability. Her argument actually runs just to the contrary: she believes that these goods are severely diminished precisely by our current openness to the dissolution of marriages.

THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF *Divorce* is part of an ongoing project—a "longitudinal study," in social science parlance—that has examined the effects of divorce on children not just at the time of divorce but at later times as well. One of the only studies of its kind, the Children of Divorce Project began in 1971 to track the children of sixty families in Marin County, California. Its results were the subjects of several of Wallerstein's previous books; and her latest book is based on the interviews conducted by Wallerstein and her co-authors at the twenty-five-year mark. Wallerstein's work has drawn much attention in professional circles and from the public. *Second Chances*, which appeared in 1996, became a national bestseller, as has *The Unexpected Legacy*. It is little wonder. Her books are humane, complicated, rigorous, and wise, and they are completely devoid of therapeutic clichés.

Wallerstein has continually pointed to the devastating effects of divorce on children, often swimming against various tides of professional opinion. Her research has contradicted notions that prevailed in the 1970s—for instance, that children were most directly affected at the time of the rupture but ultimately experienced relief from the closure of a conflict-ridden marriage. She found, much to the contrary, that children felt the effects of divorce years later. Virtually no children in her sample ever showed anything resembling relief.

The Unexpected Legacy reinforces these conclusions and presents Wallerstein's strongest case against divorce to date. Along with a statistical analysis of all the individuals studied, Wallerstein uses in-depth narratives of the lives of seven people, including children from intact families for the purposes of comparison. At the time of the twenty-five-year interviews, the grown children from the original study were between their late twenties and their early forties. Her intent was to discover how they had fared in life and love, and what long-term reverberations their parents' divorce still had for them. Far from being a temporary trauma of childhood, the effects of divorce turned out to reverberate in adulthood, as those now grown began to seek and to find long-term relationships and marriages of their own.

The discussion of the children of divorce usually downplays the significance of divorce, no doubt in the well-intentioned attempt to help the children "cope." The underlying assumption is that the main difficulty that children face is the stigma of divorce—a lack of acceptance or approval from others, a sense of being abnormal. Wallerstein opens her book with a reference to a *Sesame Street* episode in which Kermit the Frog asked a little bird where she lived: "The happy little bird chirped that she lives part of the time in one tree where she frolics in her mother's nest and the rest of her time in a separate tree where she frolics with her dad. The little bird concluded merrily, 'They both love me,' and ran off to play." The messages here—as Wallerstein puts it, that "divorce is a minor upheaval and normal occurrence," and that life after divorce is identical to life before it—urge us to take divorce lightly.

Wallerstein's evidence suggests that this approach could not be more misguided. Rather than an insignificant change in living arrangements, divorce has proven, in every case that Wallerstein has studied, to be a "life-transforming experience." Based on the thousands of children with whom she and her colleagues worked at the Judith Wallerstein Center for the Family in Transition, a nonprofit institution in California that studies and counsels families undergoing divorce and remarriage, she concludes that "one message is clear: the children do not say they are happier." Quite the contrary: the one thing they say consistently is that "the day my parents divorced is the day my childhood ended."

THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY lays out the specific ways in which divorce nearly always wounds childhood, leaving a lasting impression into adulthood. Divorce causes children to think of the world as a "far less reliable, more dangerous place because the closest relationships in their lives can no longer be expected to hold firm." Rather than being subsumed in a single traumatic event, the original divorce resurfaces repeatedly throughout life in the form of chronic self-doubts and worries about betrayal and instability. Parents' subsequent relationships or marriages often invoke the original feelings of sorrow and loss; and when the children become adults, their own relationships are fraught with anxiety, leading to rushed marriages with inappropriate spouses or otherwise troubled relationships. The message that children receive from the original divorce—that "love is fleeting"—usually colors their entire romantic experience.

One of the main ways that divorce affects young children is that it usually diminishes "the kind of nurturant care" that they had received during their parents' marriage. Wallerstein found that, contrary to much opinion, children who were under six when their parents divorced often suffered the most. To those not yet adolescents, divorce is in fact "a bizarre and terrifying idea," and children often continue to hope "well into their teens" that their parents will reconcile. Later they "remember one thing most: a vast, unsootheable sense of loneliness." Not only do children of divorced parents often feel the loss of their father, but even if they remain in their mother's care they feel her loss as well. Most mothers "desperately struggle to raise their children alone"; but owing to work, dating, or their own emotional state, they cannot keep up the same level of attention and order. Often children lose the comforts of a "structured childhood" with "regular routines—bedtimes, naptimes, mealtimes, playtimes," daily attention and encouragement; and teenagers often lack set curfews and supervision. Joint custody adds the confusion of conflicting sets of rules.

Divorce, in Wallerstein's account, affects children also by preventing them

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRIVATE HISTORIES, PUBLIC AFFAIRS



Herman Melville
A Biography
Volume 2, 1851-1891
Hershel Parker

"With immense sympathy, Parker relates how Melville's intellectual growth resulted in his writing novels that were increasingly obscure to his ever-diminishing readership, and how, in his early 30s, as a husband and a father of four, his repeated failures curdled his spirit and caused him to withdraw into himself."—*Library Journal* (starred review)

$45.00 hardcover

Ovid's Metamorphoses
translated by Arthur Golding
edited and with an introduction by Madeleine Forey

"Madeleine Forey's edition of Golding's Ovid (which was Shakespeare's) is usefully modernized for the common reader, and is wonderfully introduced."—Harold Bloom

$19.95 paperback

Public Integrity
J. Patrick Dobel

"At a time when confidence in public office holders is low, Dobel shows that there still is virtue in public life."—Daniel Baracskay, *Journal of Politics*

$19.95 paperback



A Life Shaken
My Encounter with Parkinson's Disease
Joel Havemann
foreword by Stephen G. Reich, M.D.

"Havemann has focused his clear journalist's eye on the science and history of Parkinson's disease—and on his own affliction with it."—Morton Kondracke, author of *Saving Milly: Love, Politics, and Parkinson's Disease*

$24.95 hardcover

Berlin Diary
The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941
William L. Shirer
with a foreword by Gordon A. Craig

"There is absolutely no better book by an American about the rise of the Third Reich. A gripping—and harrowing—view from inside Hitler's Germany."—Lamar Graham

$21.50 paperback

The Communitarian Persuasion
Philip Selznick

"This is an important and timely book, written in a firm and clear and compelling voice."—Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University

Woodrow Wilson Center Press

$17.95 paperback



Bathsheba's Breast
Women, Cancer, and History
James S. Olson

An absorbing and often frightening narrative history of breast cancer told through the heroic stories of women who have confronted the disease.

$24.95 hardcover

Shameless
The Visionary Life of Mary Gove Nichols
Jean L. Silver-Isenstadt

"A terrific book, a compelling and brilliantly written narrative of the life, times, and works of the little known nineteenth-century educator and reformer."—Robert D. Richardson, author of *Emerson: The Mind on Fire* and *Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind*

$24.95 hardcover

The First Casualty
The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo
Phillip Knightley

"In war, truth may be the first casualty, but in Knightley's compelling examination of the war correspondent as journalist-mouthpiece-propagandist, the truth survives unscathed."—Morley Safer

$19.95 paperback



Sexual Revolution in Early America
Richard Godbeer

"Here is the first broad-scale treatment ever of sexual attitudes and behavior in early America."—John Demos, Yale University

$34.95 hardcover

European Defense Cooperation
Asset or Threat to NATO?
Michael Quinlan

"This book offers seasoned judgments by an authoritative British observer."—David S. Yost, author of *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*

Woodrow Wilson Center Press

$11.95 paperback

Keeping the Peace
Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts
Daniel L. Byman

"Byman combines superior scholarship with pragmatic policy analysis in this excellent survey of ethnic conflict."—Michael E. Brown, Georgetown University

$22.95 paperback

The Johns Hopkins University Press • 1-800-537-5487 • www.jhupbooks.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from internalizing an image of a successful, loving marriage. As a result, they are later "trapped between the wish for love and the fear of loss," with no common sense about how to find the former and to avoid the latter, because "the psychological scaffolding that they need to construct a happy marriage has been badly damaged by the two people they depended on while growing up." Wallerstein beautifully captures the importance of the expanses of time during which children do little but observe other family members, absorbing "the minutiae of human interaction." What they see constitutes "the template for the child's view of how men and women treat each other, how parents and children communicate, how brothers and sisters get along." Moreover, children see their parents not as two separate individuals, but "as a twosome"; yet those from divorced families lose this all-important storehouse of images of their parents as a "loving couple." When the children come to love and to marry, "it's like becoming a dancer without ever having seen a dance."

WALLERSTEIN IS NOT a sentimentalist about the family. She offers no solace to parents in families that remain "intact" but are rife with conflict and disorder, even to the point of violence. In fact, her research shows that children raised in these "chaotic families" experience many of the same problems as children of divorced parents. In order to enjoy successful and loving relationships as adults, they are also forced deliberately to reject what they observed growing up. Instead of no template for a loving couple, they inherit one that is "lacking in kindness, tenderness, friendship, gentleness, and a sense of morality." Wallerstein's awareness of the cruelty present in some families makes it impossible for her to fall into simplistic pieties about the selflessness and the purity of those who stay together as opposed to the selfishness and the corruption of those who divorce.

Still, Wallerstein delivers a frontal blow to the received orthodoxy about divorce, which she calls the "trickle-down theory of happiness": "if the parents are happier the children will be happier, too." Her work thus speaks most clearly not to extreme cases in which ending a deeply troubled and destructive marriage is obviously the only way to protect the children, but rather to the institution of no-fault divorce that has proliferated since the 1970s, in which "the quiet loneliness and disappointment of a loveless marriage" drives one or both spouses to seek a fresh start. It is on this new terrain, she thinks, that there is much room for change. Finally she proposes that parents faced with a viable choice seriously consider remaining married for the sake of their children. It sounds archaic, but only in the context of the culture of immediate self-gratification that characterizes our times.

II.

GIVEN THAT THE recent divorce boom is mainly a phenomenon of the latter half of the twentieth century, turning to the more distant past might seem like a sure way to begin to piece together clues pointing to an alternative vision of marriage that could help those wishing to forsake current trends. Two recent books by historians seem to promise precisely that. Both cast themselves as comprehensive overviews of marriage in American history. Taken together, Nancy F. Cott's *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* and Hendrik Hartog's *Man and Wife in America: A History* would seem to provide just the riches that one would need to mine in order to gain some kind of "usable past" of love and commitment.

But what we get from the exhaustive researches of these two accomplished historians is something very different. They are exercised instead by the histori-

PAPERBACK HISTORY

New from Chicago



The Reckless Decade
America in the 1890s
H.W. Brands

"A first-rate overview of an age that, Brands correctly believes, has specific meaning for our own. . . . Brands knows how to write narrative and how to make the complex comprehensible."
—Jonathan Yardley, *Washington Post Book World*
Paper $17.00

Elizabeth I
Collected Works
Edited by Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose

"In a single extraordinary volume . . . Marcus and her coeditors have collected the Virgin Queen's letters, speeches, poems and prayers. . . . An impressive, heavily footnoted volume."
—*Library Journal*
Paper $22.50

Democracy in America
Alexis de Tocqueville
Edited and translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop

"This will be the English translation of Tocqueville for a long time, and it has the additional bonus that the introduction is as succinct an introduction to Tocqueville . . . as one can find."—Adam Gopnik, *New Yorker*
Paper $20.00

The University of Chicago Press
1427 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637
www.press.uchicago.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal precedents of our own divorce culture. Rather than histories of marriage, we get richly documented, engagingly written, finely nuanced histories of separation and divorce. Have relationships in America always been so exceedingly fragile? This does not seem to be the case outside of a tiny minority. Or have our own current obsessions made us more interested in the conjugal failures of the past than in the conjugal successes?

Hartog reports that he set out to write a legal history of marriage, but he ended up having to focus on the law regarding the separation of spouses. Initially assuming that the history of marriage was a story of the old-style marriage—"some coercive regime from which escape was practically impossible"—giving way to "modern marriage," which is characterized by "the universal availability of easy divorce," Hartog found instead that nearly all of the discussions of the legal aspects of marriage took place in the context of cases regarding separation. Rather than "a world in which marital struggles took their meaning and significance from inescapable and lifelong coupledom," he found a world in which separation was more common than we have assumed, and in which judges and legislators "improvised" accordingly, adapting the law to the circumstances presented to them case by case.

Hartog gives careful readings of relevant court cases and legal writings to show that the story was not one of a simple transformation from traditional marriage to modern marriage. "The legal history of marriage," he writes, has frequently been "imagined as the evolution from 'feudal' husband-headed households to 'modern' companionate, relatively egalitarian marriages." The reigning interpretation, strongly influenced by feminist legal thought, has cast "coverture," the concept according to which a wife's civic and legal identity was subsumed under her husband's identity, as an entirely negative manifestation of patriarchal control and hierarchy that was deliberately and wrongfully upheld by appellate judges. Hartog's own reading of the way that husbands and wives were treated in the law puts to rest such a tendentious account.

Coverture, which was never dominant throughout all the strata of European society, was also frequently compromised in the American setting. While often thought to be the fundamental rational principle of the inherited common law regarding marriage, coverture was never universally enforced, nor was it ever the system of total male dominance that critics claimed. When nineteenth-century women's rights advocates—and their twentieth-century successors—likened

NOW IN PAPER


TAKING TRADE TO THE STREETS
The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape Globalization
Susan Ariel Aaronson
Forewords by Pat Choate and I. M. Destler

Taking Trade to the Streets
The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape Globalization
Susan Ariel Aaronson

"Susan Aaronson has emerged as an important commentator on the issue of globalization. Her insights are penetrating; her views compel attention. This book should prove to be an influential contribution to the ongoing debate." —Jagdish Bhagwati, Columbia University

"A facinating and informative account of how labor and environmental activists have changed the trade policy debate in America." —Douglas Irwin, Dartmouth College

paper $19.95

The University of Michigan Press
www.press.umich.edu
Phone: (773) 568-1550
Fax: (800) 621-8476

MICHIGAN

ISBN: 1-893554-35-x, 165 pages, $24.95

TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD
SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX AND TITLE IX
Jessica Gavora

"Provides a useful and thought provoking look at both sides of a complex and contentious issue."
–Booklist

When it passed Title IX in 1972, Congress seemed to be doing something laudable and also long overdue-prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in America's schools. But thirty years later, a law designed to guarantee equal opportunity has become the most explicit, government-enforced quota regime in America, putting boys and men on the losing side of a battle for athletic and educational opportunity. Jessica Gavora shows how Title IX sports quotas have caused chaos at schools like Brown University and led directly to the cancellation of some of the most prestigious men's programs in the country—among them Providence College's baseball team, Princeton's wrestling team, and the men's swimming and diving program that produced several Olympic champions.

But if Title IX has tilted the college playing field, Gavora suggests that its greatest impact on American social life may still lie ahead as the federal bureaucrats, activist judges, and radical feminists who have shaped the statute's interpretation now seek to expand its reach into sexual harassment, student testing, science and math achievement and other areas of education where boys and girls have to conform to their notion of "gender equity."

ENCOUNTER BOOKS
At bookstores everywhere or call 800-786-3839 www.encounterbooks.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

women's role in the family under coverture to "enslavement," they were using an exaggerated rhetoric based on its most extreme potential abuses. We like to think of nineteenth-century marriage as an institution that called for women to give up any notion of themselves as individuals with their own identities, and instead to devote themselves entirely to shoring up their husbands and children; but Hartog shows that the notion of marital "unity," as a legal concept, originated only in the context of laws regarding the separation of spouses and was rarely taken literally.

It served instead as a "legal fiction" that helped to explain whether, in particular cases, men and women should continue to have responsibilities to one another even if they lived apart. As such, coverture was often employed to protect women—say, by enforcing continued support—rather than to subjugate them. While coverture did assume men's authority, it also assumed that their authority was to be kind and just, and exercised within strict limits. And while the concept did assume women's obedience, it also assumed that her obedience was a form of loving devotion given freely in return for similar loving devotion, protection, and support. The husband's love "became the condition of her obedience, and she needed obey only if he were loving."

In the event that this agreement broke down, the American setting offered new possibilities for changing the marital situation. Legal divorce was usually difficult to come by. But federalism—the placing of jurisdiction in the hands of the states—meant that different laws prevailed in different places; and certain states became known for having more liberal divorce laws than others. Separation became an increasingly viable solution, given the mobility of the American population and the lack of centralized forms of bureaucracy or surveillance. Fairly commonly, individuals who were separated from their spouses moved to a remote location and remarried, sometimes even with the community's knowledge and sanction.

Hartog portrays a society in flux, one with a clear concept of propriety but also with the means to bend it to new circumstances. His cases allow him to show in detail the ways in which marriages that had fallen apart were negotiated in the courts. His conclusion that women were sometimes more protected by the assumptions of separation under coverture than by the post-1970s regime of no-fault divorce is an important one. And his evidence of the frequency of separation shows that traditional marriage offered more opportunities for informal dissolution than usually thought.

Hitler's Jewish Soldiers

The Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military

Bryan Mark Rigg

"An unexplored and confounding chapter in the history of the Holocaust."—**Warren Hoge**, *New York Times*

"Startling and unexpected, Rigg's study conclusively demonstrates the degree of flexibility in German policy toward the *Mischlinge*, the extent of Hitler's involvement, and, most important, that not all who served in the armed forces were anti-Semitic, even as their service aided the killing process. . . . An invaluable contribution."—**Michael Berenbaum**, author of *The World Must Know: The History of the Holocaust*


HITLER'S
JEWISH
SOLDIERS
THE UNTOLD STORY OF NAZI RACIAL LAWS AND MEN OF JEWISH DESCENT IN THE GERMAN MILITARY
BRYAN MARK RIGG

More about this book at www.kansaspress.ku.edu/righit.html

520 pages, 95 photos,
Cloth $29.95

Author Lecture on Wednesday May 8, 7:30 pm:
Leo Baeck Institute, 15 West 16th Street,
New York, NY (212-744-6400)

Available at bookstores or from the press.

University Press of Kansas
2501 West 15th Street • Lawrence KS 66049
Phone 785-864-4154 • Fax 785-864-4586
www.kansaspress.ku.edu

UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS a limit to how sympathetically one can capture earlier ideas and practices of marriage by the study of the court cases and the legal discussions of those few that fell apart rather than the many that stayed together. The closest we come in Hartog's book to a sense of how a woman actually thought of herself in relation to her marriage is the late eighteenth-century case of a New Hampshire woman named Abigail Bailey. In this complicated and bizarre case, Abigail Bailey discovered, after twenty years of marriage to a "violent and hard man" with whom she had fourteen children, that he had "sexually abused one of their daughters." After a long series of events—including attempts to negotiate a separation, battles over the custody of their children, and various crafty maneuvers on her husband's part—Abigail Bailey sought and was granted a divorce.

To explain why it took her four years to act against her husband, Hartog draws on her memoirs to show that, rather than seeing her marriage as an "obliteration of a prior self" or a "denial of her self," Abigail saw it as "the central test of her self and of the strength of her religious identity." She saw her role in the marriage as demanding moral virtue; obedience and submission were part of honoring God and seeking salvation through living a moral life. Rather than a "simple merger and unity," marriage meant the fulfillment of her moral identity. After she discovered her husband's depravity, she confronted him, and fasted, and prayed, and sought and achieved—for a time—a separation; but it was only after many stormy events that she secured a divorce. For her own moral identity could be retained only through separation from him, or else "she would be publicly (and legally and morally) joined with her husband in sin and moral disorder." Being a "good wife" meant obedience to God over her husband.

Hartog shows how it was possible for women to see submission to their husbands as a source of moral strength, virtue, and fulfillment at the same time that they suffered from civic and legal inequality. He also shows how, in extreme cases such as this one, the ideal of the marriage as a set of mutual obligations allowed for a woman's escape from a cruel and immoral marriage. But he makes clear that he is not out to correct the image of coverture as always inherently oppressive to women by going to the other extreme of holding it up as an ideal alternative to the "rights-centered, individualistic, and selfish world ushered in by no-fault divorce." Using the extreme cases of marital dissatisfactions and wrongs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that come to the attention of the courts, Hartog hardly risks making coverture into a modern-day ideal.

If the post-1970s condition of marriage is ironically less desirable for some women than its nineteenth-century condition, where does that leave us today? Hartog seems to answer that marriage under coverture was not all that different from marriage today: "We, like men and women of the nineteenth century, construct [marriages] to fit our own individual identities; we negotiate, strategize, commit ourselves to present forms, play with and distort those same forms." In trying to take into account both those who criticize coverture as patriarchal and those who see earlier forms of marriage as based on better instincts than our own, his argument ends up being frustratingly non-committal. In the last paragraph of his book, he throws up his hands: "Why did I marry? Hell, I married. Reasons fail. I am happy I did, but why I did will always remain just beyond my horizon of self-knowledge. I thought I was acting as a free agent, but I was also working off scripts and patterns that I barely recognized." Hartog is obviously a fortunate man, but such a conclusion is not helpful for the analysis of others who have fared less well.

ALSO DRAWING HEAVILY on legal sources, and also without articulating any real defense of marriage, Nancy F. Cott sees the history of marriage as a far more deliberate and reprehensible creation or "construction." What she calls "traditional marriage" appears in her account as an intentional imposition of the state. What is most significant to her is that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the government supported a "*particular* marriage model: lifelong, faithful monogamy, formed by the mutual consent of a man and a woman, bearing the impress of the Christian religion and the English common law in its expectations for the husband to be the family head and economic provider, his wife the dependent partner." In practice, she says, there were many challenges to this model: the practice of "informal marriage" (when couples who lived together considered themselves married); "self-divorce" (mutually agreed, extralegal separation that permitted remarriage); free love (unencumbered by marriage); even polygamy, as practiced by some Native Americans and Mormons.

Cott traces the historical trajectory of marriage practice, beginning with what she sees as the increasing tolerance for diverse practices in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, during which frontier conditions were often conducive to informal (and even unortho-

new from NORTHWESTERN

Praise for **PACIFIC TREMORS** *by Richard Stern*

"The words of Marcia...linger beyond the end of this playful, thoughtful novel... 'The Last Tycoon...showed her there could be greatness out here.' No less than Pacific Tremors *does so now."*—Washington Times

"What's remarkable...is Stern's ability to invest the floating world of his novel with a kind of unexpected solidity, a sense of belonging, of place {which} help us reconsider what we thought we knew."
—Chicago Tribune

"{C}ompelling and subtly complex fiction."
—Los Angeles Times

"A novel of considerable depth, wit and spirituality."
—Washington Post



ISBN 0-8101-5131-6, cloth, $26.95

"Stern...is a thoroughly original novelist... Pacific Tremors... *richly succeeds."*
—Richard Ford

"Brilliant...wonderful scenes, beautifully unfolded.
—Austin Wright

"How wonderful that a Jewish novelist can portray women who are not bitches or caricatures of some sort."
—Mark Krupnick

Available at your local bookstore or directly from Northwestern University Press at 1-800-621-2736.



ISBN: 1-893554-45-7, 344 pages, $27.95

HEAVEN ON EARTH
THE RISE AND FALL OF SOCIALISM
Joshua Muravchik

"Joshua Muravchik has written an illuminating history that traces the great and not-so-great individuals who made socialism happen."
– *Wall Street Journal*

In **Heaven on Earth**, Joshua Muravchik tells the story of socialism's rise and fall through portraits of dreamers and doers such as French Revolutionary Gracchus Babeuf, whose "Conspiracy of Equals" was the first to try to outlaw private property; Robert Owen, who hoped to plant a model socialist utopia in the United States; Friedrich Engels, creator of the cult of Karl Marx and "scientific" socialism; Benito Mussolini, self proclaimed socialist heretic and inventor of Fascism; Clement Attlee, who rejected the fanatics and set out to build socialism democratically in Britain; Julius Nyerere, who merged social democracy and communism in the hope of making Tanzania a model for the developing world; and Mikhail Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping and Tony Blair, who became socialism's inadvertent undertakers. Filled with character and event, Muravchik's narrative gives us an epic chronicle of a movement that tried to turn the world upside down—and for a time succeeded.

ENCOUNTER BOOKS
At bookstores everywhere or call 800-786-3839 www.encounterbooks.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dox) arrangements. As time progressed, monogamy was increasingly codified in law and associated with the nation's very self-concept. Both sides in the antebellum debate over slavery, for example, appealed to the family metaphor. The abolitionists insisted that slavery made a moral family life impossible; and a major defense of slavery was that slaves were protected by membership in an imagined family headed by the slave-owner. After the Civil War, the right of blacks to marry was considered a significant mark of their citizenship and their freedom.

Cott also points to the ways that marriage with coverture was less a form of outright subordination of women and more along the lines of a contract premised on consent, but she sees its prescribed roles of male provider and female dependent as much more pernicious than they appear in Hartog's account. After the Civil War, she says, the government increasingly perpetuated its particular model of marriage by regulating obscenity, abortion, and the immigration of prostitutes, polygamists, and others who were thought to pose a threat to the moral order. Cott's point is that lifelong heterosexual monogamy had no real basis in nature, and that it was constructed historically, aided in this country by the nation's attempts to unify itself and to maintain order among the citizenry by enforcing a single model of marriage. "Radiating outward," she writes, "the structure of marriage organizes community life and facilitates the government's grasp on the populace."



Only in the late twentieth century, Cott believes, did the challenges to "traditional" marriage begin to be reflected in law, leading to its "disestablishment." She thinks that we have now returned to the more fluid and permissive approach of the frontier era. Once again, "plural acceptable sexual behaviors and marriage types have bloomed." Consider polygamy: after being outlawed even by Mormons since the late nineteenth century, it has experienced a revival of sorts. Same-sex marriage has also come under serious public consideration.

At the end of her book, Cott asks whether marriage has a future. Her answer is maybe, if the government supports "various marriage definitions," and if "private intimacy would also nurture generous attention to the public interest." Only if the state allows marriage to become "an arena of freedom" will marriage "be replenished." We are left only with the suggestion that government should refrain from legitimating any particular form of marriage or sexual expression. Without any guidance to the contrary, we are forced to conclude that Cott means to place all possible sexual practices, from polygamy and prostitution to gay marriage and cohabitation, on a par. This is libertarianism at its wackiest. To most defenders of same-sex marriage, as to earlier supporters of interracial marriage, such an equation is truly (and rightly) anathema.

III.

While histories of separation and divorce can tell us much about separation and divorce, they ultimately tell us little about marriage. Wallerstein's studies prove that we have a pressing need for a real alternative to the present practices of failed or undesirable marriages. Openness to some of the new freedoms—say, the option of remaining single or belonging to an openly gay couple without harassment—hardly means that we have to embrace bizarre or destructive practices such as prostitution or polygamy. Making such minority practices into a norm is certainly overcompensating for their being slighted by ancestors less tolerant than we are. It must be possible to steer a course between the total free play of uncommitted individuals and the stifling old-time contracts forged between unequals. Past practices are too deeply flawed to be simply revived. And yet aspects of past marriages, or past marital ideals, can be salvaged in order to enrich our current lexicon: marriage grounded in moral or spiritual aims, reciprocal duties and responsibilities, mutual devotion and fidelity.

The most fundamental problem that we face regarding marriage today is our inability to answer the most basic question: why marry (or stay married) for life at all? This is the question taken up in James Q. Wilson's new book. Wilson has long been disturbed by the moral condition of contemporary life, and in this study of marriage he seeks to identify the causes of the moral crisis facing the family. The declining importance of marriage and the family, he believes, lies at the root of a "profound corrosion of our cultural soul."

Wilson argues that the United States faces nothing less than a crisis of the social order. The astronomical divorce rate, the rise in teen pregnancy, the proliferation of single-parent families, and other recent developments have laid the groundwork for what he thinks is the division of this country into two separate nations. In the first nation, "a child, raised by two parents, acquires an education, a job, a spouse, and a home kept separate from crime and disorder by distance, fences, or guards." In the second, "a child is raised by an unwed girl, lives in a neighborhood filled with many sexual men but few committed fathers, and finds gang life to be necessary for self-protection and valuable for self-advancement." We have heard this two-nations rhetoric before, most recently from Gertrude Himmelfarb in *One Nation, Two Cultures*. But Wilson zeroes in on what he considers the primary factor in determining whether someone inhabits the first or the second nation: a stable family life.

Drawing on the work of the sociologists Orlando Patterson and Elijah Anderson, Wilson believes that it is among the poor, and especially among poor inner-city blacks, that the greatest dangers of this divide can be seen. Like these scholars, he thinks that a separate way of life has emerged that differs drastically from that of most middle-class Americans. It amounts to a "world without fathers, without safety, without a decent life or reasonable prospects for the future." Wilson quotes Anderson's observation that "in our big cities, the middle class, both white and black, thinks of itself as the outcome of the great tradition of Western culture, but nearby, there is a second culture of young, marginally employed, sexually adventuresome, socially aggressive young men who reject the idea of hard work and social conformity that made their elders successful." Patterson has also lamented the social basis of "gangsta rap" music. In *Rituals of Blood*, he remarked upon "the murderous aggressiveness and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self-destructive violence of a disproportionate number of under- and lower-class Afro-American men, their posturing and braggadocio, their misogynistic abuse of women, and their identification of manliness with the impregnation and abandonment of mothers." Wilson, too, is aggrieved by the dire consequences of this street code of "predatory sexuality." He concedes that the disruption of family life transcends any one social group, but he thinks that the behavior of this second nation poses a greater danger to society as a whole.

Wilson's work enters a long-standing debate about the family that these days rages with particular ferocity. The debate often devolves into a shouting match between those who see the so-called traditional family as a ploy to maintain patriarchy and to squelch individual freedom and expression, and those who nostalgically gush about traditional "family values." These simplifications have made it nearly impossible to articulate a sustained defense of the family without being dismissed as a secret partisan of male domination. Similarly, any defense of the two-parent family raises suspicions that it is a disguised attack on single mothers.

Needless to say, many Americans have tired of this insouciant approach to an institution that common sense tells them is of fundamental importance. This frustration helps to explain the resonance of "family values" rhetoric since the Reagan years. But "family values" was just that: rhetoric. Not only did politicians and religious leaders who espoused the concept often exhibit no intention of living by it themselves, but the phrase proved to be so loosely defined as to be meaningless. And many who adopted the slogan really did seem to want to relegate women to an inferior position, bidding them to exit the public arena and to return to their domestic duties. What that movement lacked was a principled defense of the family that took into account the clear advances that women have made in politics and in the workplace in recent years.

Wilson attempts precisely such a defense. His book makes a refreshingly strong case for the importance of a stable two-parent family structure for the well-being of children. Rejecting the claims that the family should be defined as "any pattern of sexual cohabitation," he sees the flouting of the two-parent family as deeply troubling. Wilson supports his consternation by citing studies—including one conducted of thirty thousand households by the Department of Health and Human Services—that showed that children growing up in a one-parent home were more prone to be suspended from school, to suffer from emotional difficulties, to become delinquents, to give birth out of wedlock, to be abused, to take drugs and commit adult crimes and go to jail. Controlling for the role of poverty in exacerbating these problems, the report established that weak family structure is a major disadvantage.

Wilson sketches the origins of the fragility of the contemporary family, pointing to long-term historical developments. On the one hand, the Enlightenment brought a drastic transformation in our thinking about marriage by making us "preoccupied with individual rights and more restless with collective obligations; more interested in contract rather than status; more ready to search for self-expression than to accept joint endeavors." On the other hand, slavery's assault on black families had similarly long-term effects. Wilson agrees with Patterson that we need to take another look at the degree to which slavery debilitated families, particularly by making fathers marginal figures and laying the groundwork for a "uterine society" in which children's ties with their mothers and female kin were of exclusive importance.

A MORE RECENT historical development undergirding today's disruption of normal family life, in Wilson's view, is the decline of the shame that once attached to having illegitimate or unsupported children. He points to the Progressive Era reformers who sought to drop from social welfare policies the requirement that a home be a "moral" institution—meaning one in which the mother was married. This requirement was indeed dropped by the New Deal programs that were the basis of the later expansion of welfare in the 1960s and afterward.

But alongside Wilson's historical explanations are other analytical devices, particularly some notions rather loosely borrowed from evolutionary biology. In a peculiar and highly speculative chapter called "Why Do Families Exist?" Wilson argues that the family is the cultural response to the natural urges of men and women. Simply put, he believes that men are fundamentally driven by biology to have sex with as many women as possible and that women are driven to care for children. The family is merely society's way of protecting the mother-child unit, of enforcing "the obligations on which the life of the mother and her infant depend." Thus the family is more a natural interest of women than a natural interest of men.

Armed with this deeply controversial assumption, Wilson also points to the sex ratio—the relative numbers of men and women in any given society—as a major factor in explaining social stability. In



Beau Mitchell
Stone Child College / GPA: 3.41
Major: Environmental Science
Goal: Scholarship, Give something back

American Indian College Fund
Educating the mind and spirit

Please call 1-800-776-FUND
or visit www.collegefund.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

societies with an overabundance of women, "women must either struggle hard to find a husband, abandon marriage, or settle for some substitute form of sexuality, such as promiscuity, and raising children without a father." He cites a study of sex ratios to argue that when men outnumber women, marriage will be more common because women will have more say. What is at work in American society now, he thinks, is a generally imbalanced sex ratio that becomes especially extreme for white women who wait until after age twenty-five to marry, and for black women at all marriageable ages; and this imbalance, he contends, is a crucial factor in the current crisis in the family.

Wilson believes that men's biological drive predisposes them against marriage, but to their ultimate detriment. He draws on *The Case for Marriage* by Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher, which presents statistics indicating that married people are happier and healthier, suffer fewer emotional troubles, do better financially, and live longer than those who remain unmarried. Since marriage seems to benefit men more than women, Wilson finds it "astonishing" that men "reject" marriage. The only explanation that he can find is short-term temptation: "Sex now is more fun than sex always with the same woman." As a result, if marriage is to be saved, men need to be persuaded that marriage is in their rational long-term self-interest.

At the end of his book, Wilson briefly considers other ways to address the larger family crisis, such as reviving the power of stigma and social opprobrium (for parents, but somehow not for their children) in order to discourage out-of-wedlock births. As for policies that help single parents in the meantime, he mentions visiting nursing services to teach teenage mothers about parenthood, homes for teenage mothers, tax grants for poor women who stay home to care for their children, and a proposed "prenatal bill of rights" by which parents agree to postpone their careers to care for their young children. But it is clear that he believes the main solution is to convince every man who fathers a child to honor his obligation to the child's mother by marrying her. While programs can help single mothers, they will "not induce people to marry. And unless they marry, and stay married, the children will suffer."

Wilson takes a valiant stand for the family. In places his argument is very powerful, particularly when he marshals common sense in the battle against what stands as wisdom about child-rearing today: that an army of therapists, day-care workers, and others can make up for the failures of parents to meet the basic needs of their children. "Children are not raised by programs, governments, or (in this country) villages," he wisely observes, "they are raised by two parents who are fervently, even irrationally, devoted to their children's well-being." And yet Wilson's defense of the family rests on shaky ground. In casting the family's entire raison d'être as the mother-child bond, he rules out the importance of the father-child bond, let alone the husband-wife bond. In casting family life as completely antagonistic to men's natural drives, he furthers the prevailing view of marriage that dominates our own consumerist society. At a time when self-gratification is the premise on which our entire cultural apparatus rests, the appeal to biological man, with his dangerous and voracious sexual appetite, merely serves as an added excuse for the irresponsible fathers whom Wilson criticizes.

There is no question that male sexuality is a formidable force. If we abandoned all social restraints, perhaps we would indeed find that all men want nothing but unlimited sexual access to as many partners as possible. But we might find that this is all women want, too, on some level. Many anthropologists, after all, argue that it is men's desire to assert control over paternity—for the sake of survival of the species—and not women's maternal instinct that lays the basis for limiting sexual access. Wilson's speculations, which call on an overly simplistic view of human nature and of sexuality and do not take up the existing debates on these subjects, bear the stamp of a wider school of thought that seems to be newly fixated on a limited version of male sexuality—that of the testosterone-driven teen years. This view tends to minimize female sexuality as a force altogether, just as it ignores the fluctuations of sex drive over the course of life in both men and women—not to mention the question of what one scholar calls the cultural "adornments" of sexuality and the powerful (and natural) imperatives of the psyche and the soul.

The fact is, as we have known from time immemorial, that sexuality in general—though perhaps for men and women in varying degrees and manifestations, and at different times—always holds enormous potential for social chaos. Wilson argues that men should forsake their sexuality in order to accept an institution that will pay long-term dividends, mainly in improved health. This is a bargain that no man in his right mind should make. And Wilson's premise—that women naturally cling to the family out of the desire to care for their children—is belied by the facts. In the vast majority of divorces, it is women who initiate the breakup. Many women have children out of wedlock knowing full well that there is no prospect of marriage. And the willingness of so many women to accept full-time day care of even very young children suggests, at the bare minimum, that culture can override the maternal instinct, which Wilson casts as so primal.

If it is a natural basis for the family that we are seeking, I propose a more reliable one: that marriage actually allows for a much greater degree of sexual expression—in quantity and in quality—than would be attainable for scavengers in the wild. In other times—in times less fixated than we are on superficial sensation—a notion of marriage as providing an unparalleled opening of the floodgates of sexuality prevailed. But today endless choice poses as the promise of transfiguration and transcendence.

All of these vexations and controversies, of course, are not exactly peculiar to us. For instance, we have been treated for a long time to tirades against the family on the grounds that it runs against women's self-interest. Such thinking has no doubt led to many women's decisions to untie the marital knot, all in the name of liberation and fulfillment. And yet, as Barbara Ehrenreich pointed out in her pathbreaking book *Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment*, the social contract between men and women had been seriously rent before the women's movement, by the rise of the "playboy" culture in the wake of World War II. Peddling an image of the unfettered male, free to follow his sexual appetites wherever they may lead, this marketing ploy helped to sell pornography and other consumer items while putting forth a new, highly individualistic vision of the good life.

These extreme messages have seeped into mainstream culture, obviously aided by the two-pronged assault on collective life coming from the market and from the therapeutic culture. And so Americans have been relentlessly encouraged to seek the gratification of their every desire and the fulfillment of their every idle fantasy. But at the heart of this ethos is a great lie: that the most powerful desires of mankind can be fulfilled outside of a real connection with others.

As the most insightful social critics have been trying to tell us for several generations, what is at the root of the problems facing the family today is, in fact, a profound corruption of desire itself. A current advertisement for Chrysler exemplifies this perversion when it proclaims "Drive=Love." The marketplace intrudes itself into all realms, persuading us to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Summer Reading from the **Cato Institute**

This book combines economics and history to show how political elites have brought about the growth in federal power. 448 pp./Cloth $26.95 ISBN 0-312-294115-8





Traces the rise and fall of the century-long dream of central planning and top-down control and its impact on globalization—revealing the extent to which the "dead hand" of the old collectivist dream still shapes the contours of today's world economy. 325 pp./Cloth $29.95 ISBN 0471442771

James Madison's greatest legacy is the American Constitution and the ideas supporting limited government: delegated and enumerated powers, separation of church and state, and the rule of law. 224 pp./Cloth $19.95 ISBN 1-930865-23-6/Paper $10.95 ISBN 1-930865-22-8





Public policy analysts have traditionally focused on the supposed failures of markets to achieve efficiency. Gordon Tullock and two other leaders of public choice theory argue that government cannot rectify those supposed market failures. 185 pp./Cloth $18.95 ISBN 1-930865-21-X/Paper $9.95 ISBN 1-930865-20-1

Exiting the Balkan Thicket reviews the West's experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo and shows how the United States can move beyond the status quo of indefinite intervention. 132 pp./Paper $8.95 ISBN 1-930865-17-1





In this collection, scholars and political leaders make the case for freedom, free enterprise, and the rule of law. Published as part of the Cato Institute's 25th anniversary celebration. 460 pp./Cloth $19.95 ISBN 1-930865-27-9/Paper $10.95 ISBN 1-930865-26-0

CATO INSTITUTE

Available at fine bookstores, or call 1-800-767-1241 (12-9 eastern, Mon.–Fri.)
Cato Institute • 1000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20001

www.cato.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

think in market terms about even those parts of life that most fundamentally resist commodification. It is no wonder that an age swept up in a frantic cycle of planned obsolescence turns spouses into objects that can be cast off when the mood or fashion changes, and turns sexuality into a matter of consumer choice.

Sometimes it is hard not to despair about relations between men and women in American society. They seem to have hit rock bottom. Everywhere we see treatises from professional and pop psychologists proclaiming the fundamental differences between men and women, and the clashes that occur when such differently programmed individuals try to communicate. The various accounts often disagree over the extent to which men and women differ by nature or by culture; but the impression that one takes away from all these accounts is of an underlying loss of faith in the ability of men and women to get along. Their interests are portrayed as nearly irreconcilable. With little belief in one another, it is no wonder that couples cannot muster the considerable resources that they need to meet the internal and external obstacles, large and small, that they are destined to face in the course of a lifetime.

Most critics of divorce base their attacks on what they see as the reprehensible abrogation of obligation and commitment. They are right that our society's idealization of individual gratification at all costs has forced those social virtues underground. Still, basing the entire case for lifelong marriage on these virtues—which, as they are usually cloaked, come close to sounding like pure emotional drudgery—without any real vision of marriage as a desirable state in itself is guaranteed to fail. In a world in which freedom and rapture are defined as choice, change, and movement, permanence of any kind sounds bleak, like a dead end.

Though he challenges most present-day lore about marital disorganization, James Q. Wilson fails to question the notion that women and men are fundamentally in conflict. Similarly, Judith Wallerstein does not consider one crucial premise: that the interests of parents and children are often at odds. In conceding that parents' lives are often improved by divorce while children's lives plunge into the abyss, she undermines her own case and shows the wrinkles of a defense of the family that rests solely on the idea of obligation. True, it is difficult to imagine that parents could opt for divorce in light of the unassailable evidence of its detrimental effects on children; but still it is possible to acknowledge that human weakness—to which we are all prone—can interfere with our best intentions. If the choice is starkly between individual happiness and obligations to others, who would confidently predict that we will always choose the latter?

What is necessary, then, for a wholesale change to occur? Certainly it would require a rediscovery of the spiritual and romantic resources that allow us to cultivate the art of renewing love and passion. Presumably, it would also involve better ways of choosing a spouse in the first place—perhaps a retrieval of older rituals and habits of dating, courtship, sexual modesty and restraint, cohabitation only as trial marriage, postponement of childbearing until the marriage is on a solid footing, premarital spiritual advice, and stricter divorce laws, as some suggest.

But change would also entail something less easily captured by sociologists and policymakers: a different sense of intimacy from the one now in play. Intimacy these days is almost always treated as something of little weight and consequence. We need instead to recover a form of intimacy that yields a fuller expression of human passions and engagements, and rests on the unalterable ground of trust and faith, and—most pointedly—accommodates rather than banishes sexual excitement. A truly irresistible vision of marriage would have to find the missing ingredient that transforms a mutual commitment into an unbreakable promise, a legal contract into a sacred bond, an obligation into a privilege, self-sacrifice into self-indulgence, duty into deliverance. Which is to say, we need a richer understanding of love than the fleeting, solipsistic, and manipulable version currently at our disposal. For it is love, not just duty or self-sacrifice, that finally can make the interests of men and the interests of women, the interests of parents and the interests of children, coincide. This sounds trite and simplistic only because what passes for love now is trite and simplistic. Until this fool's gold is revealed for what it is, divorce will continue to be our first resort, and not our last. ■

The Werewolf and Us

By Patrick J. Geary

Metamorphosis and Identity by Caroline Walker Bynum

(Zone Books, 280 pp., $28)

A monster, or *monstrum*, Caroline Walker Bynum reminds us, earned its name because it points to something beyond itself. Bynum, who first gained international attention for her bold analyses of the gendered nature of medieval religious experience in *Jesus as Mother* (1982) and *Holy Feast and Holy Fast* (1987), has been regarded as something of a monster herself. She is denigrated by conservatives for having led the way toward a medieval history that foregrounds the disorderly and the grotesque, and by the feminist left for dismissing postmodern scholarship that interprets the medieval world in "presentist" terms. And she has become that *rara avis*, a serious medievalist with a popular following. This in itself seems monstrous, and so one must ask: at what is this monster pointing?

For the past ten years, Bynum's attention has pointed away from gender. She has focused instead on a very different aspect of European cultural tradition: the long history of men and women trying to come to terms with the paradoxes of personal identity and corporal change. She had asked this question before: more than twenty years ago, when much ink was being spilled about the so-called "discovery of the individual" in the high Middle Ages, Bynum argued that the twelfth century did not so much discover the individual—our concept of the individual or the personality did not exist in the Middle Ages—as rediscover the self, by which medievals meant the soul or the inner person. Moreover, the same medievals discovered the competing social and cultural groups to which that self could choose to belong.

More than a decade later, in *The Resurrection of the Body*, Bynum surveyed more than one thousand years of body language. Christian intellectuals struggling

Patrick J. Geary is professor of history at the University of California Los Angeles and the author most recently of *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton University Press).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the doctrine of physical resurrection rejected every temptation to understand resurrection in a spiritual or transformative sense. Otherwise sophisticated medievals developed increasingly more elaborate (and convoluted) explanations for how the resurrection must be of exactly the same, identical physical body; and in so doing they contended with the overwhelming problems of growth and decay, of cannibalism and dismemberment.

Bynum interpreted this tradition as evidence of a fear of metempsychosis, of the loss of the self through the loss of the body. Certainly medievals wrote much about a body-soul dichotomy—and yet at the same time they were unwilling to see the self as simply a soul trapped in a body. Their fear of physical transformation betrayed an underlying determination to see the human person in a more sophisticated way: as a psychosomatic unity. Those medieval discussions, Bynum further argued, set the parameters for contemporary understandings of self and other; of our bodies, our selves: "If we see the individual as unique—valued yet opaque and unknowable because (in the currently fashionable term) 'other'—our assumption is informed by hundreds of years of puzzlement over embodiment." The medievals, our contemporaries.

In her new book, Bynum continues her attempt to see how the understanding of the relationship between body and self, and permanence through change, and hybridization and transformation, provided tools for thinking about selfhood and individuality. The book is rough going. It is a collection of essays and addresses, and it shows the usual weakness of such volumes. Not all of the essays really deal primarily with the announced title of the collection, and there is considerable repetition (Gerald of Wales and his werewolf keep springing out at the reader like the shaggy beasts in some B-grade horror movie), and the tone of the essays varies widely because they were originally presented to widely different audiences. Some, such as Bynum's lectures on "Wonder" and on werewolf stories from Ovid to Angela Carter, are broad and sweeping pieces; and others, such as her essay on hybrids in the spirituality of the twelfth-century mystic and polemicist Bernard of Clairvaux, are dense analyses of medieval Latin texts that will leave the non-specialist wondering what all the fuss is about.

What all the fuss is about is this: can twenty-first-century men and women gain a deeper understanding of selfhood and identity, of continuity and change, by rehearsing thousand-year-old stories of werewolves and hybrids, and revisiting hoary debates about eucharistic transubstantiation? Someone once suggested that no one can really understand change without a firm knowledge of calculus. But forget calculus: Bernard of Clairvaux knew nothing about elementary physics, chemistry, or biology. Like his contemporaries, he had no understanding of growth or decay at the biological or chemical level. His tools of analysis were a rich rhetoric of opposites: mixture and purity, imitation and admiration, dissolving and returning. Listen to Bernard wrestling with the paradox of mystical union with God:

> As a drop of water seems to disappear completely in a quantity of wine, taking on the wine's flavor and color; as a red-hot iron becomes very, very like the glow of fire and lays aside its own original form; as air suffused with the light of the sun is transformed into the brightness of the light, so that it seems like light itself rather than only illuminated; so it is necessary that those who are holy, in an ineffable way, are liquefied and inwardly poured away from themselves and into the will of God. How will God be all in all if anything of man remains in man?

The other authors whom Bynum discusses are no more enlightened by modern standards. Gerald of Wales, a frustrated ecclesiastical wanna-be who collected every salacious slander about the Irish that he could find, worries principally about whether a priest was justified in giving communion to a dying werewolf. Even Dante, the most sublime and learned poet of the Middle Ages, has only the Aristotelian concepts of matter and form as tools for thinking about metamorphosis and identity. So why should anyone but a medievalist bother?

The question of whether we can learn anything about ourselves by listening to the voices of medievals is by no means limited to questions of identity and change. For well over a century, Western intellectuals have systematically eroded our confidence that the intellectual tradition of the Middle Ages has anything to contribute to the present. In the sectarian squabbles between Protestants and Catholics, reformers at least believed that medieval churchmen were wrong and that their errors were worth refuting. In our time, by contrast, we do not even care whether they were right or wrong. The more common attitude is that they are simply irrelevant. The most notorious example is Will Durant, who, in *The Story of Philosophy*, simply passed over the entire period between Aristotle and Francis Bacon. And Bertrand Russell once dismissed Bernard as someone "whose saintliness did not suffice to make him intelligent." But Bynum

NEW
from
PRINCETON ARCHITECTURAL PRESS

KOSMOS
A Portrait of the Russian Space Age
Adam Bartos and Svetlana Boym

"A belated peek behind the iron curtain and into the hitherto unseen spaces of this era....exquisite and richly detailed. It is almost as if the Soviet space programme had been frozen in time and Bartos were there to shoot it thawing....He stages his photographs carefully, allowing the details to emerge out of sometimes seemingly prosaic shots."
—*World Architecture*, April 2002

1-56898-308-5 11 x 9.5 176 pp.
94 color photographs $40.00 Hardcover



SURVIVAL CITY
Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America
Tom Vanderbilt

A fascinating travelogue to the hidden battlefields of the Cold War.

"A crucial and dazzling book, masterful, and, for me at least, intoxicating. Survival City *recalls the buoyant spirit of Michael Paterniti's* Driving Einstein's Brain *and the exacting but soulful reading of misplaced architectural aspirations of D.J. Waldie's* Holy Land."
—Dave Eggers

1-56898-305-0 6 x 9 227 pp.
80 b/w illustrations $25.00 Hardcover

PRINCETON ARCHITECTURAL PRESS
37 EAST 7 STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10003
www.papress.com
Available at your local bookseller or call 1-800-722-6657

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will not let us off so easily. She insists that we follow her on an often disorienting journey through medieval discussions about literature, miracles, marvels, and monsters, so as to observe a society constantly encountering a change that it sought to deny.

A good place to start is her essay "Metamorphosis, or Gerald and the Werewolf," an address to the Medieval Academy of America but essentially an after-dinner talk, and thus broadly accessible. Here Bynum leads us through a series of discourses that explicitly treat change from one thing to another around the year 1200. All show a widespread fascination with what appeared to be the empirical evidence of transformation, hybridization, monstrous combination, and spontaneous generation. From the re-appreciation of classical literature to the enthrallment with marvels and miracles, people worried a great deal about the possibility of one thing becoming something else.

The first discourse of transformation adduced by Bynum is the poetry inspired by Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, which was very much in vogue in the twelfth century. The Ovid of the twelfth century, she shows, was a scientist, a metaphorical cosmologist, whose poetry of transformation was read as a celebration of continuity in which transformation is less change than the unfolding of a nature; a revelation of what is, rather than a mutation of one thing into another. In the late twelfth-century commentary of Arnulf of Orleans, for example, the tale of the transformation of the youth Cyparissus—who, because of his immoderate mourning, was turned into the mournful cypress tree—becomes merely a metaphor of the aging of a handsome youth into an old man. For twelfth-century readers, the *Metamorphoses* was not about metamorphosis at all, but about change as fertility and generation, or else a return to one's true nature.

Bynum then turns to the learned theologians of the next century, as they wrestle with the transformations implied in the magical, the marvelous, and the miraculous. What, they ask, is the ontological basis of change brought about by miracles? When Jesus multiplied the loaves and the fishes, did he create new bread matter? When demons or angels appear in human form, have they been changed into bodies, are they "clothed" in bodies, or do they simply create the illusion of bodies? And, most famously, how was one to understand the miraculous appearance of flesh and blood that was occasionally reported to suddenly become visible in the eucharistic bread and wine?

The answer, in all but the final case, was again a discourse that attempted to control change, to limit it and to mitigate it. Miracles of transformation tended to maintain the similarity of the before and the after. Armed with Aristotelian notions of hylomorphism, of matter and form, Thomas Aquinas and other schoolmen eschewed the creation of new matter or the literal transformation of one being into another. The multiplication of the loaves was accomplished by adding extraneous pre-existing matter to the loaves, in the way that grain grows into a harvest. Demons cannot become bodies, though they can enter existing bodies (dead or alive) and animate them. Only in the transformation of bread and wine into flesh and blood does one encounter true metamorphosis, but this is the limiting case. As for the miraculous appearance of flesh and blood, this is no metamorphosis either, but the rare and terrible revelation of the accidents (the physical appearances) being brought into accord with substance.

THE MOST FLAMBOYANT medieval discourse, and one that exercises Bynum, concerns werewolves. Twelfth-century and some thirteenth-century authors of what she broadly calls entertainment literature were fascinated not with miracles but with marvels, particularly those involving fairies, shape-changers, and transformations. These creatures emerge from popular folklore; but since their tales are told by educated clerics such as Gerald, they, too, become the object of reflection on identity and change. Gerald tells of a priest traveling from Ulster to Meath who camped for the night in a wood. He was approached by a talking wolf. The wolf bore little resemblance to the bloodthirsty monsters of classical literature or modern horror movies. Instead it politely implored the startled priest to hurry to administer the Eucharist to its dying mate, explaining that both were humans condemned by a vindictive saint to become wolves every seven years.

But once again these werewolves disappoint as stories of metempsychosis. Medieval werewolves were not humans transformed into wolves or wolves into humans. They were humans, human bodies, trapped inside the flesh and the skin of wolves. The dénouement of these stories is quite literal. When the priest hesitated to give the sacrament to an animal, its mate "pulled all of the skin off the she-wolf from the head down to the navel ... and immediately the shape of an old woman, clear to be seen, appeared." The outer wolf is stripped away, revealing the naked person, the human body, within. Once more, continuity triumphs over change.

Werewolves were but one type of monstrous hybrid. Bernard of Clairvaux, who famously railed against the depiction of those dazzling hybrid creatures that inhabited the margins of manuscripts ("monstrous centaurs, creatures part man and part beast ... many bodies with one head and many heads with one body, tail of serpent on quadruped, head of quadruped on fish"), worried even more about the monster that he saw himself and many of his contemporaries to be. Bernard longed for unity and simplicity: mixtures were usually negative, a confusion that denigrated and distracted. He was acutely aware of his own inadequacies in this regard. "I am a sort of modern chimera, neither cleric nor layman," he confessed, in an acknowledgment of his confused life of vigorous polemical engagement with the world while as a monk he was vowed to, and longed for, withdrawal and contemplation.

Hybrids, in Bernard's view, were almost always negative. They never resulted in a synthesis into something new, but instead maintained an unnatural duality. Bernard's disparagement of hybrids, as Bynum explains, was owed in part to the fact that when it came to understanding the possibility of change, of the union of two different natures into a new and better unity, Bernard was conceptually challenged. Such change was simply beyond his thought-world. Change might mean replacement, and it might mean destruction, but it could not mean becoming.

And yet Bernard was aware that Christ, the God-man, was a mixture, and so was

Fort-Da

Stupid as a movie star, I was
someone else's idea: So I went all formal
and took everything seriously. Now I have learned
that this is ordinary object impermanence,
this divided soul. This fort-da, this yes-no,
this him-and-him-and-him-and-him.
A regular chorale of past and future errors
swells beneath my feet: This is my theme song
in every picture, each gaudier than the one before,
with the pencil lines around my eyes darker,
soon I will be the lone and lorn raccoon tossing lire
to the randy boys of Rome.
Once the money is gone who will bring it back.

April Bernard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his virgin mother. Hybridity could, then, be positive—but it was always troubling, always mysterious. And hybridity was exactly the human condition. Bernard's human was not a soul trapped in a body; it was an uneasy hybrid of body and soul, a body that was at once vile slime and humanity's only access to experience, to sensation, to ultimate joy; a soul that was both the image of God and the site of greed and despair. Since he could not really conceive of change, of merger, of becoming, Bernard's static understanding of human nature, and more generally of the world, remained a picture of unresolved mixtures forced into unities, but unities always threatening to dissolve, always tinged with horror and wonder. "For joined together to each other are God and human, mother and virgin, faith and the human heart," he wrote. "Wonderful are these mixtures, and more marvelous than any miracle, for so diverse and even so opposed to each other, they were joined together."

So how does following Bernard of Clairvaux's tortured medieval reflections on unity and mixture, stunted and limited by his scientific and conceptual tools, help us to understand our own concerns about identity and change? Aren't he and his contemporaries trapped in the particularities of their world, a world so radically different from ours that we can visit it only as aliens, not as interlocutors? Bynum offers two answers, one specific to the problem of identity and change, one more generally applicable to the historical enterprise.

About the question of change, she argues that we share with medievals ontological anxieties about the continuity of identity through transformation, however differently we may express these anxieties or attempt to resolve them: "Despite the obvious contrast between ancient and modern embrace of the shape-shifting motif, on the one hand, and medieval resistance to it, on the other, stories in the European werewolf tradition are not fundamentally contradictory: all imagine a world characterized by both flux and permanence; all confront both the promise and the horror of change." More specifically, Bynum contends that the exploration of medieval discussions of change takes us into a world of rhetorical and philosophical reflection that is sophisticated and enticing even if it is also alien. These discussions, she contends persuasively, force us to look with equal attention (and perhaps with skepticism) at our popular and learned attempts to come to terms with a yearning for a stable identity in the face of growth, decay, and death.

Bynum's more general answer to the question about the relevance of the medieval intellectual universe may be found in her first essay on wonder. Medievals, she abundantly demonstrates throughout these essays, did not resolve the problem of continuity and change even to their own satisfaction. The process of something becoming something else, or seeming to do so, reached beyond their ability to comprehend and explain; and such marvels as werewolves, hybrids, and miracles, for all their tortured reflections, remained the object of admiration and amazement and wonder rather than simply of appropriation and analysis and generalization. It is this respectful and even awed attitude toward the other that Bynum wishes to offer as the particular lesson in humility that we can derive from taking seriously the strivings of a world so distant from our own.

Whenever historians try to reduce the past to the familiar as a precursor of the present, or attempt to appropriate the past to their contemporary agendas, they are guilty of a hubris that slights the past and impoverishes the present. Bernard of Clairvaux does not hold the answer to the question of continuity and change. Nor do we get to the bottom of Gerald of Wales's fascination with werewolves when we attribute it to his unresolved psychosexual anxieties. Bynum wants historians to approach the past with modesty, respecting its intricacies and hesitating before claiming to have resolved its complexities. "We write the best history when the specificity, the novelty, the awe-fulness, of what our sources render up bowls us over with its complexity and its significance," she wisely remarks. "Our research is better when we move only cautiously to understanding, when fear that we may appropriate the 'other' leads us not so much to writing about ourselves and our fears as to crafting our stories with attentive, wondering care."

If medieval monsters were marvels that were incomprehensible and yet significant, Bynum asks that we consider adopting a similar attitude toward the past itself. The past is not to be bought up, strip-mined, and sold off like some West Virginian coal mine. It is always more than whatever social scientists, political ideologues, and social activists desire it to be. Bynum is asking that even while we deploy all the tricks and the tools of modern historical analysis, we take seriously the obligation to marvel at the complexity, at the otherness, of the medieval world, a world that we will never perfectly understand and yet that seems to point to something worth understanding. This indeed is a monstrous challenge. ■

Probably this year's most important self-improvement book...

"How You Too Can Develop a Razor-Sharp Mind..." by Gerardo Joffe Only $29.95*

*But see below for an even better deal!


HOW YOU TOO CAN DEVELOP A RAZOR-SHARP MIND AND A STEEL-TRAP MEMORY
(And Perhaps Even Improve Your Sex Life and Extend Your Days)
by Gerardo Joffe
Turn to page 443 of this book and see how you can get it for absolutely free!

It is scientifically proven: Your brain is like a muscle. Sit in front of the tube, preferably with a six-pack and a bag of potato chips and it will turn flabby and quite useless. Exercise it vigorously and you will indeed be able to develop a razor-sharp mind and a steel-trap memory. There may even be a bonus of better sex and longer life. And, finally, a rigorously exercised brain will not develop Alzheimer's disease.This breakthrough book (soft cover, 460 pages, 8-1/2" x 11" format) will be your trainer and monitor to your new well-developed brain.

(A $30 Haverhills gift certificate is bound into the book. So it's practically FREE. What a deal!)

Sid Tuchman of Indianapolis, IN says: *"What an astonishing book! One can almost hear those brain cells crackle!"* Hugh Cunningham, DDS, of Albany, GA says: *"This is marvelous! I already feel a whole lot smarter than before I immersed myself in Joffe's* ***16-Level Paradigm****."* And Lloyd Hammett of Winnfield, LA says: *"If this book will not make you smarter, nothing will."*

We are the publishers of this book and are able to sell it for just $29.95. **But we have an even better deal:** ***Buy three books and we will let you have them for the price of two -- only $59.90!*** Your friends and relatives will thank you for this important gift. This book may (really!) change your life. Order it today!

Order directly from the publisher by toll-free phone (800) 600-2777, by fax (415) 356-7804, or by mail. Mention order code **1092Y305** and give Visa/MC # and expiration date, or send check for $29.95. Add $4.95 shipping/insurance for one book ($9.90 for three), plus sales tax for CA delivery. 30 days refund/return, except for shipping/insurance.

advance books
division of jomira/advance
470 Third St., #211, San Francisco, CA 94107

✆ Order by toll-free phone: (800) 600-2777 or (fastest!) by fax: (415) 356-7804 ✆
Visit our website at www.haverhills.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WASHINGTON DIARIST

Split End

HOW THE MIGHTY HAVE fallen. Four years ago the face of Ally McBeal graced the cover of *Time* magazine over the headline "IS FEMINISM DEAD?" "[F]eminism," wrote reporter Ginia Bellafante, "has devolved into the silly" with "powerful support" from "a popular culture insistent on offering images of grown single women as frazzled, self-absorbed girls." And no one embodied that support more powerfully than Ally, "the most popular female character on television." But times change. As of last week Ally's a goner—not only *not* the most popular female character on television but, after the twentieth of May, no longer a character on television at all.

WHAT HAPPENED? THE CAUSES ARE complex. But one thing we know is that in the last season, Ally grew up. Having spent every Monday night for the last four and a half years looking for love, she finally found it—just not with any of the maladapted men she spent those years chasing. Rather, she found it with a kid. Of her own. A child—created from an egg she donated for an infertility study—now ten years old, smart, sassy, and sophisticated. What's more, Ally was made the first female partner in her law firm's history. Capping off her run of good (if decidedly implausible) fortune, Ally even found someone to stay home and take care of leaky pipes and perky child, to plan birthday parties, offer romantic advice, and pop open a bottle of wine at the end of a long day. So what if, technically, he's the handyman and she pays him to hang around? He's the perfect wife—with the face of Jon Bon Jovi to boot (literally: the '80s rocker has put aside his guitar to play TV's hunkiest Mr. Mom).

IN SHORT, WHAT'S HAPPENED TO ALLY this season is a feminist fairy tale about how women's lives *should* work. And the feminist analysis is clear: As soon as Ally got everything the movement hoped for her, she got canned. In a way, that's probably right. The problem with Ally in the end was not, I suspect, that "audiences have tired of her frazzled single woman," as the *New York Times* Style section suggested this Sunday. (The author of the *Times* obit was none other than Bellafante herself, who we know had already tired of the frazzled Ally years ago.) Rather, the people who enjoyed watching Ally cope with her hand-wringing, hair-twisting, hallucinating-about-dancing-babies doldrums were the millions of viewers who gave up on Ally when she grew up. And one reason we gave up was that the old Ally and the issues that engaged her were simply more interesting—more true to our lives—than the new, improved version.

PARTLY THIS IS BECAUSE THE NEW Ally is living out a familiar and oddly dull narrative that so many working women already follow: Rush to work, fire the junior staffer to meet budget, rush home, deal with the kid. But it's not only that the old Ally was more entertaining when she was tripping over her tortured self; she was also, strangely enough, more engaged in questions of feminist politics than the I've-got-it-together reincarnation, who makes being a single working mom look like a piece of birthday cake. Contrary to *Time*'s suggestion, the movement had a pretty good ally when Ally was going out of her mind on a regular basis; it lost her when she reached the end of the self-fulfillment rainbow.

FROM THE GET-GO, THE HOUR-LONG drama made serious efforts to make the political personal. Certainly any woman in a coed office wonders whether it creates a hostile working environment when her male colleagues ogle a pretty delivery girl (two episodes during season one); and six years after Anita Hill, we were still interested in watching Elaine, the firm's secretary, try to sue her employer on those grounds. We also still worry about workaday fashion—any working girl will admit it's a neat trick to find a balance between looking attractive and drawing attention—and the flaps over Ally's postage-size mini or her roommate Renee's visible cleavage sent us back to our closets with a sharper eye. Should a woman feel guilty for discarding a man after a one-night stand (an episode entitled "The Blame Game")? Can a woman sue for sexual harassment after refusing to have sex with her boss, when all the other women in the office did—and got promotions ("The Playing Field")? How should a man feel when the woman he falls for turns out to be a man ("Homecoming")? In the explicitly feminist circles I moved in when the show premiered, we talked about these things, and things like them, and a TV show opening up the discussion—with sympathetic characters in the mix—was more than half-welcome.

BUT WHAT MADE THE EARLY "ALLY McBeal" episodes appealing wasn't just that this scrawny young woman was living out our political discussions. It's that she—and the entire make-believe firm—was living proof (OK, make-believe proof) that the personal and the professional are not necessarily divided by a Berlin Wall; indeed, they interact in messy, and sometimes helpful, ways. Ally was forced—by the power of her own overwhelming personality—to accommodate the demands and foibles and wisdoms that we mostly carry only as far as our office doors. Indeed, such flexibility helped her understand her clients, and her clients helped her understand herself. Sure, Ally's emotional life often did more than spill over—it burst the dam. And sure, the life lessons she brought to the office mainly had to do with how to handle the man of the moment and her own inner loneliness. But her struggles, however psychically distorted, did give her compassion. Had she learned those lessons from her daughter or her mother—as, say, star and Executive Producer Amy Brenneman does on another popular drama, "Judging Amy"—people would have praised her for her hard-earned wisdom instead of despising her for loving her navel.

LET'S BE CLEAR: I, FOR ONE, AM NOT looking for a boundaryless office. But arguably, unwillingness to confront the personal—more precisely, the *feminine* personal—is the biggest failure of the Second Wave. It's why the movement has refused to deal with the fact that even *after* the Revolution, many women want to marry men and bear their children. It's why there's little effort to understand office romance except through the prism of sexual harassment law. It's why day care is nowhere on the feminist (and consequently the national) agenda, and it's why the emotional and practical tolls of having no one tending the home fires has gone completely unremarked by the movement. It's why, just this month, *Time* ran on its cover yet another installment of the Baby vs. Career story that drove women I know to tears for reminding us of the incredible double bind. When Pat Ireland hung up her hat as head of the National Organization for Women last summer, she told *The Washington Post* she hadn't had children because "I decided that I couldn't do what I wanted to do with my career and have children. Maybe it's because of the way I was raised—very 1950s ... but I couldn't see how you could do all that and have kids.... And to be honest, I still don't." Makes you wish there were a feminist like Ally still hanging around.

SARAH BLUSTAIN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Book From Brookings Press On Educational Vouchers

Earlier this month, the Brookings Institution Press published *The Education Gap: Vouchers and Urban Schools*. According to John E. Brandl, dean, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, "This is the most important book ever written on the subject of vouchers."

Brookings Press describes *The Education Gap* as follows:

"In *The Education Gap*, William Howell and Paul Peterson, with co-authors Patrick Wolf and David Campbell, report new findings drawn from the most comprehensive study on vouchers conducted to date....

"The findings shed new light on how existing voucher programs affect students' educational experiences, covering factors such as school climate, class size, homework, resources, and test scores. They also reveal the impact of voucher programs on racial segregation, school-family communication, political tolerance, community social capital, parental satisfaction, and children's self-esteem.

"Although the programs operated in a wide variety of settings, the findings were quite consistent. In combined results for New York, Dayton, and Washington, African American students participating in voucher programs scored, on average, three percentile points higher than their public school peers in Year I, six percentile points higher in Year II, and seven points higher in Year III....

"[T]he authors suggest that the limited educational options available to black Americans may [explain these gains]. Since many low-income African American families cannot easily move to neighborhoods with strong public schools, new forms of choice for low-income families are most likely to benefit African American students.



"The authors recommend that these issues be explored further in larger, better-funded voucher programs in central cities with high concentrations of African Americans. While acknowledging that vouchers are not a panacea for all the troubles in American education, Howell and Peterson report signs that vouchers may help close the achievement gap found nationwide between African American and white students."

A decade ago, when there was virtually no academic research on school vouchers, proponents and opponents monopolized the debate with intense opinions and theoretical arguments.

While the debate remains intense, the publication of such works as *The Education Gap* means it no longer occurs in a scholarly vacuum.

More information about *The Education Gap* is available at www.brookings.edu/bipress/books/education_gap.htm and www.ksg.harvard.edu pepg/.

baeo
Black Alliance for Educational Options

For more information go to: www.schoolchoiceinfo.org or www.baeo.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANDRÉS SERRANO, "MEAT WEAPON" [illegible] COURTESY PAULA COOPER [illegible]

One of the Best New Magazines of 2001 – *Library Journal*

[illegible]TIVE ANALYS[illegible]

the lates[illegible]disciplinary research from noted

[illegible]EATURES

by culin[illegible]professionals, historians, writers, a[illegible]

[illegible]GUS IMAGES

artwork [illegible] the richness and vibrancy o[illegible]

Join Us [illegible]ble

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS JOURNALS

WWW.GASTRONOMICA.ORG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED